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Abstract 
 
Total hip replacement (THR) surgery is a highly successful procedure offering relief of 
chronic pain and improving physical functioning. Given an ageing population, there is an 
ever increasing demand for THR, and an increasing need to establish its cost-effectiveness. 
This thesis explores two aspects of choice between the alternative prostheses: how choices 
should be made, and what choices are actually made.  
On the former, a key indicator is the long-term prosthesis survival rate.  However, when 
choosing between prostheses, there is often insufficient evidence on long-term survival.  The 
National Joint Registry (NJR) is an invaluable emerging source of information on this count. 
Using its Annual Reports, I identify, for example, that the use of cementless prostheses has 
grown rapidly, despite their performance in terms of early revision being inferior to the 
traditional cemented types.  
 
However, the NJR was only introduced in 2003, and cannot yet provide information on 
longer term prosthesis survival.  Previous research has attempted to predict long-term 
survival by forecasting from short-term data.  I assess this approach by revisiting a well-
known case-study, examining how well estimated survival curves predict what actually 
happened.  I find that the predictions are very inaccurate, underlining the future value of the 
NJR as it accumulates more evidence.  
 
On the latter, I employ raw NJR data to examine the actual choices between prostheses made 
by hospitals. Patients’ characteristics explain little variation between hospitals with hospital 
characteristics appearing more important. I consider how choice might be affected by a 
highly concentrated oligopolistic manufacturing industry and find evidence of heterogeneous 
purchasing at the hospital level, consistent with a recent NAO report. I conclude that the NHS 
is not exploiting its potential buyer power,  leaving itself susceptible to manufacturer seller 
power. I identify evidence potentially consistent with market sharing of regional and product 
markets by the manufacturers.  
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1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
Musculoskeletal conditions (of which joint disease is one) are the most common cause of 
severe long-term pain and physical disability[3], and Osteoarthritis of the hip is one of the 
most common causes of disability in the Western world[4], due to a wearing out of the hip 
joint. For those with end stage joint disease of the hip, Total Hip Replacement surgery (THR) 
offers the only effective treatment.  
The number of people over the age of 50 years is predicted to double over the next decade, 
and this will inevitably lead to an increasing incidence of diseases associated with old age, 
such as joint disease[5]. This ageing population, and increasing presence of disability, places 
a considerable and rising financial burden on healthcare budgets[6]. Beyond the ageing 
process,  there have been various genetic and constitutional risk factors identified for joint 
disease in the literature: Obesity is a major risk factor for OA of the knee for middle aged 
women, alongisde mechanical risk factors such as weightbearing in sport and occupations 
which involves excessive bending, such as farming. Diet also has been cited as playing a role 
in the incidence of OA in terms of levels of vitamin D[7]. Moreover, patients with end stage 
joint disease typically experience chronic pain and loss of physical function which is a drain 
not only on National Health Service (NHS) resources but also on society at large in terms of 
lost productivity and an increased burden on domiciliary/informal care.  
Necessarily, healthcare providers will be required to make cost-effective resource allocation 
decisions, and this involves choices.  These choices relate not only to the aggregate budget on 
hip replacement as a whole, as opposed to other areas of healthcare, but also within the hip 
replacement budget.  This thesis explores an important aspect of choice: the decision process 
regarding which of the many alternative prostheses for THR surgery should be/is chosen for 
individual patients.  This is of relevance not only for the patient him/herself, but also for 
resource allocation within the overall healthcare budget. 
The main of objectives of this thesis are twofold: 
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a). To examine an important factor in how choices between prostheses should be made, 
bearing in mind that information is scarce on the long-term survival rates of different 
prostheses. 
b). To examine what choices are actually being made, and to investigate what this reveals 
about the buyer-seller relationship between the NHS and the large multinational firms who 
manufacture the prostheses. 
To answer these questions, I use applied econometric methods to analyse data taken from two 
national hip registries: Sweden, and England and Wales, employing models which have their 
roots in the academic literatures of economic evaluation, public procurement and Industrial 
Organisation. 
This opening chapter first provides a brief background on THR surgery, hip prostheses and 
the national joint registries, and then introduces the main academic disciplines underpinning 
the thesis: economic evaluation; Industrial Organisation and public procurement.  
 
1.2 Total Hip Replacement surgery (THR) 
THR surgery was first successfully performed in 1962 in England and is now one of the most 
frequently performed surgical procedures in the world[8], with over 72,432 operations carried 
out in England and Wales in 2008/9[9], with the number almost doubling in the last decade.  
The care pathway for THR is described by the 'Map of Medicine' for the NHS[10]. It starts in primary 
care with the GP, who assesses the patient's status. At this point, a decision is made about whether to 
manage the hip discomfort using excericse, weight loss, pain relief and adaptive aids for self-care, or 
whether to consider a referral to secondary care  (orthopaedic surgeon). A referral to the surgeon 
should be made particulary if non-surgical treatment has not been beneficial[11] or if the patient has a 
poor functional status. The surgeon will take a history and examine the patient before recommending 
surgery and within this, discuss treatment options with the patient including the option of no surgery. 
Surgery should take place up to 18 weeks from the first appointment. The surgeon will also consider 
alternative techniques such as: joint preserving techniques as an alternative for younger patients with 
mild to moderate intra-articular degeneration; arthroscopic surgery; open surgery and pelvic and/or 
osteotomy. The next stage is consideration of the prosthesis selection, taking into account NICE 
guidance benchmarks and according to the 'Map of Medicine' "should be goverend by guidance by 
evidence of its effective performance, and if possible the performance of the operating team using it, 
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including published evidence from the NJR". The surgeon will also consider the cementing options i.e 
prosthesis type, the bearing surface and the option of hip resurfacing[12]. In terms of the surgery 
itself, the surgeon decides on the surgical approach (patient position - posterior or anterolateral) and 
the surgical techniques (such as whether to use minimially invasive surgery and would closure 
techniques). Complications arising from surgery include: mortality, infection, dislocation, DVT, 
pulmonary embolism, dislocation, inadequate fixation and fracture around the implant site. If a 
complication is suspected, a patient will be radiographically examined to see if further surgery or 
medical follow-up is required. If no complications arise from surgery then the patient will require 
early mobilisation, rehabilitation and be discharged with follow up at 6 weeks post-surgery and x-rays 
at 1 and 5 year time points and subsequently, every 5 years[10]. No clinical pathway is available for 
revision surgery from the NHS Map of Medicine or in general NHS literature. However, the 
implication is that prosthesis failure is detected by the surgeon, either through the 5 yearly follow-up 
X-rays or due to the patient self-reporting indications for prosthesis failure. These indications for 
prosthesis failure could be identified by the patient in the form of reduced mobility or increased pain 
which may be a sign of  prosthesis loosening or wear and tear of the artificial joint. Other less 
common indications for prosthesis failure include: infection, dislocation, joint stiffening and blood 
clots[13]. Once prosthesis failure is detected, the primary treatment option is revision surgery, 
although alternative options include: resection arthroplasty or fusion/arthrodesis. However,  these 
proceedures are not commonly used as they are reported to require more complex surgical 
teachniques with often poor clinical outcome[14]. 
The hip joint itself is made up of a ball and socket, the ball is the top of the thigh bone (the 
femur) which fits into the socket. THR surgery involves removing parts of the bones which 
make up the hip joint and replacing them with an artificial joint, which will hereafter be 
referred to as a ‘prosthesis’ (also referred to as a hip ‘implant’ in the literature). During 
surgery, the surgeon will saw off the top end of the femur and hammer a metal or ceramic 
ball on a stem into the femur in place of the removed piece of bone. The hip socket is then 
drilled into in order to provide a shallow cup for the ball joint to fit into and lined with a 
material such as polyethylene, metal or ceramic. The joint can be fixed into place with 
cement to fix the prosthesis to the bone, or it can be secured by other methods of fixation, 
such as the bone growing into or onto the surface of the component.  
THR surgery is widely accepted as a highly successful surgical procedure[4] which has led to 
a huge growth in the development of the prostheses used for surgery. One of the drivers for 
this has been to improve late failure rates. The total cost of joint replacement surgery to the 
NHS in the UK in 2000 was approximately £140 million[15], (£182 million in 2010 
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prices)[16] with the direct hospital costs of each procedure ranging from £488 to £9,905, and 
a  mean of £4,788[15] (2008 prices). The anticipated cost savings of total joint replacement 
surgery (relative to no surgery) include the reduced costs of arthritis treatment, medication 
and community care. The direct and indirect benefits include improved quality of life of the 
patient (and their families) and increased productivity of the nation’s workforce. 
A key issue is the durability of the prostheses – how long it will survive before any further 
revision surgery (where the artificial joint is replaced) is needed.  In the long-term, the 
primary reason for prosthesis failure is loosening of the prosthesis itself.  As demand for the 
procedure has been increasing over time, so too has the associated demand for revision 
surgery. Revision surgery is technically difficult with reported inferior clinical outcomes[10], 
and unsurprisingly it is more costly than primary surgery. Prosthesis failure can occur in the 
immediate postoperative period[17], which is known as 'early failure' and is due to 
dislocation, primary deep infection and other technical problems[18]. Or it can occur 
anything up to 20-30 years post-surgery[17], which is known as 'late failure' because of long 
term wear of the artificial joint “resulting from the production of prosthetic wear particles 
characterized by the formation of excessive granulation tissue and osteolysis” p.941,[19].  
Thus, the relative survival rates of different prostheses is of central importance1 (alongside 
the patient’s age and activity level) when deciding which prosthesis any given patient should 
receive.  
In 1998 there were more than 60 alternative hip prostheses manufactured by 19 companies 
listed on the market in the UK[20], with total NHS expenditure on hip prostheses of 
approximately £53 million [15] (£69 million in 2010 prices). Ten years later, by 2008, the 
National Joint Registry (NJR)[1], listed 124 brands of acetabular cups and 137 brands of 
femoral stems - a substantial increase in the number of prostheses available from 1998 to 
2008. Revision surgery has also increased, with 3,012 revision procedures carried out in 
2003/4, rising to 6,581 by 2008/9 [1, 21] and accounting for approximately 9.4% of all THR 
procedures in England and Wales. Revision surgery is a key element of cost effectiveness, 
with Briggs et al[22] reporting a mean cost for a standard hip or knee revision procedure in 
2000/1 as £5,294 (£6,385; 2008 prices) compared to £3,889 (£4,690; 2008 prices) for a 
primary procedure.  
 
 
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 Alongside the patient’s age and activity levels 
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1.3 The National Joint Registry for England and Wales 
There is very little high-quality evidence on the performance of some the alternative 
prosthesis types, particularly at the disaggregated level of the prosthesis brands[8]. This lack 
of high quality evidence (highlighted in the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) guidance of 2000[23]) along with the well publicised problems 
documented about the early failure of the 3M Capital Hip brand[24] led to the establishment 
of the NJR for England and Wales in April 2003. It is the largest national joint registry in 
existence with the primary aim of monitoring the performance of joint prostheses and 
ensuring patients receive the best clinical care.The NJR records data on hip, knee and most 
recently, ankle surgery. It is further enhanced by the option to link it to HES (Hospital 
Episode Statistics) and PROMs (Patient Reported Outcome Measure). HES[25] is a records 
based system, established in 1989 to collect data on all admissions to NHS hospitals in 
England including information on: diagnoses and operations; patient characteristics; 
administrative information, such as waiting time and date of admission and geographical 
information, such as patient residence and site of treatment. PROMs was introduced into the 
NHS in 2009 and involves the patient completing a questionnaire both before and after 
surgery[26]. The aim of PROMs is to use the patient perspective to inform decision-making 
at all levels of the NHS[26] and is currently in place for four elective procedures: hip and 
knee surgery, hernia repair and varicose veins. However, neither the NJR nor HES routinely 
collects data on indirect non-medical costs and resource use (such as patient productivity 
losses or out-of-pocket expenses)2.  
 
1.4 Relevant Economic Literatures 
Given the broad objectives of this thesis – analysis of choice, both prescriptively and actually 
- the thesis will draw on a number of relevant academic literatures. This section briefly 
introduces the three which lie at the heart of the research.  
1.4.1 Economic evaluation 
In the context of this thesis, economic evaluation is concerned with evaluating the alternative 
hip prostheses to inform policy decisions regarding which prosthesis should be implanted, 
given the available resources[27]. Folland et al define ‘health economics’ as the study of how 
 
2
 The NJR, HES and PROMS databases are managed by Northgate Information Solutions on behalf of the NHS. 
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resources are allocated to and within the health economy[27], and within this, clinical 
effectiveness is not sufficient in isolation for this evaluative purpose, costs must also be taken 
into account[28] and the comparative analysis of costs of alternative treatments of health care 
is common to all types of economic evaluation[29].  
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on economic evaluation by drawing on 
the seminal text by Drummond et al[29]  who define economic evaluation as: 
"the comparative analysis of alternative courses of action in terms of both their costs and 
consequences" (p. 8 [29]). 
Figure 1 sets out the tasks that characterise economic evaluation according to Drummond et 
al. 
Figure 1, distinguishing characteristics of health care evaluation[29] 
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A study which considers the costs and consequences of an alternative, but not at the same 
time, is defined as a partial economic evaluation, such as a Cost analysis (figure 1, box 3B), 
these evaluations do not provide answers to efficiency questions. In comparison, examples of 
full economic evaluation techniques, in box 4 of figure 1, include: 
Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) where costs are related to one common effect between the 
alternative programmes, stated either as 'cost per unit of effect' or 'effects per unit of cost' 
(life years gained per pound spent).  
Cost utility analysis (CUA) attaches utility values to the health states produced by the 
alternative programmes. Utility refers to an individual or society's preferences for a set of 
health outcomes, allowing for health related quality adjustments to be applied to a given set 
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of treatment outcomes, alongside providing a generic outcome measure to allow for 
comparison of the treatment of costs and outcomes of different health programmes. 
In the UK, the generic outcome measure which is usually used in CUA is the quality adjusted 
life year (QALY), which adjusts the length of time affected through the health outcome by 
the utility value. Utility is measured on a scale from zero, representing death, to 1, being 
perfect health.  Where one intervention generates more QALYS and a lower cost, this is 
unambiguously preferred.  However, where higher gains in QALYs are achieved at a higher 
cost, a comparison should be made in terms of the cost per QALY ratio ‘ICER’ (incremental 
cost effectiveness ratio).  In the UK, NICE are reported to use a threshold value of around 
£20,000 to £30,000 per QALY, therefore where an intervention costs less than £20,000 per 
QALY it is more likely to be accepted than an intervention costing above £30,000. 
Unlike CEA and CUA, Cost benefit analysis (CBA) should be carried out where one wants to 
consider a situation where it may be appropriate to increase the budget. It has its grounding in 
welfare theory and measures all benefits of interventions in monetary units (typically using 
willingness to pay, also known as contingent valuation). 
As Briggs et al[30] discuss, an increased demand and use of economic evaluation for 
resource allocation decision making, has led to clear requirements on researchers in terms of 
the analytic methods they employ to carry out the evaluations. These methods need to 
incorporate all appropriate evidence into the analysis in order to be able to compare the new 
intervention with all alternative options and to reflect any uncertainty present. Consequently, 
economic evaluation has turned to decision analytical modeling as a framework for decision 
making under situations of uncertainty. Decision analytic modeling involves a set of analytic 
tools grounded in statistical decision making and closely associated with Bayesian statistics, 
which has been widely used in business analysis and engineering[30]. As Briggs et al explain 
"in the context of economic evaluation, a decision analytic model uses mathematical 
relationships to define a series of possible consequences that would flow from a set of 
alternative options being evaluated" p.6[30]. 
There is relatively little economic evidence on the effectiveness of medical devices, including 
hip prostheses. However, there is clear recognition of the increasing range, innovation and 
cost associated with medical devices[31]. This has led to a growing debate within the 
orthopaedic and health economic community on the need for regulation and economic 
evaluation of medical devices, and how to go about this process - with a focus on whether 
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these processes should be the same or different to those already in place for pharmaceuticals 
[32-34]. As Vallejo-Torres et al discuss, conducting health economic evaluations is not a core 
activity of most of the medical device companies[31] and thus is not integrated into their 
product development process. In fact, there are a number of reasons why evaluation of 
medical devices clearly differs to that of pharmaceuticals, including the 'learning curve' effect 
associated with the use of a device, where the surgeon gains experience at implanting the 
device over time, and their skill and experience impacts on the success of the 
intervention[33]. Recently, Vallejo-Torres et al have argued for an iterative economic 
modeling approach to be used to inform decisions regarding the cost effectiveness of a device 
in its early stages.  
 
1.4.2 Industrial Organisation (IO)3 
In assessing whether the patient is receiving the most 'cost-effective' prosthesis on the NHS, it 
is also necessary to consider what choices the NHS is currently making, and to examine 
whether it is acting as an efficient purchaser and provider of, in this case, hip replacement 
surgery. In order to pursue this, a useful starting point is to think in terms of the two sides of 
the market - of the demand and supply. On the demand side, there is the NHS which is a large 
organisation with considerable potential buyer power i.e. a single buyer (monopsonist) in the 
market. On the supply side, there are the manufacturers of hip prostheses who the NHS 
purchases from. As will be shown later, there is a small number of suppliers, mainly large 
multinational firms.  In this respect, the position is similar to that of the pharmaceuticals 
markets.  Thus the choice decisions in this context are the result of a relationship between 
mainly a single buyer, with potentially considerable buyer power, and a small number of 
oligopolist suppliers/sellers, also with potential market seller power. In order to explore the 
implications of this relationship, the thesis will draw on the theory of Industrial Organisation 
– the part of micro-economic theory which "studies the operation and performance of 
imperfectly competitive markets and the behaviour of the firms in these markets". p.7[35]. 
To help set the scene,  it is useful to refer back to the basic micro-economic theory of perfect 
competition, monopolies and oligopolistic competition, for which I will, in the main, refer to 
a standard microeconomic text[36]4.  
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 Chapter 6 provides a more in-depth discussion of the theory of IO and competition policy related to this thesis. 
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Under perfect competition, six main characteristics exist: there are a large number of buyers 
and sellers; consumers and producers have perfect knowledge; the products sold are identical; 
firms act independently of each other with the aim of maximising their individual profits; 
firms are free to enter and exit the market, and finally, firms can sell as much output as they 
wish at the current market price. 
However, in reality, most markets comprise of a only a few firms, who may be very sizeable, 
in order to realise economics of scale and declining average costs. In the most extreme case, 
costs may be minimised when there is only one firm, a natural monopoly.  
In contrast to a perfectly competitive market, in a monopolistic market the supplier is a price 
maker (it sets the price at which it sells its output), entry of new firms into the market is 
blocked, and buyers are price takers. Where a monopolistic market exists there is allocative 
inefficiency, in that the price exceeds the marginal cost of producing the product, and the 
monopolist supplies less output than is optimal for society.  This is the classic case against 
monopoly (which forms part of the justification for competition policy).  It is traditionally 
shown by industrial economists using the classic diagram comparing perfect competition and 
monopoly, which shows the welfare loss from monopoly, figure 2.1, p.41-44[37]. 
Of course, perfect competition and monopoly are theoretical extremes, and most real world 
industries entail a small number of suppliers who usually account for a large proportion of the 
industry, this is known as an oligopoly. Where there are only two suppliers in the market, this 
is known as a 'duopoly'.  In oligopolistic markets, further entry into the market is often 
difficult, and sometimes completely blocked. An example of an oligopolistic market is the 
food supermarkets in the UK, where the leading firms, Asda, Tesco, Sainsbury's and 
Morrisons have a combined market share of 65%[36].  
Now, an extra dimension in the analysis concerns the interdependence of the firms – when 
one firm changes its price/output/product range etc. it has an immediate effect on the sales of 
the others.  In this case, a key issue is how the rivals react to this interdependence.  One 
possibility is that they engage in fierce competition, and this may result in a beneficial 
outcome for consumers which is not very different from that produced under perfect 
competition.  This can happen especially if it is easy for new firms to enter the industry and 
undercut the otherwise high price of the existing firms, as modelled by Contestable Market 
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4
 The reader is referred to Morgan et al[30] for a comprehensive description of monopoly, this text is heavily 
referenced in the remainder of this section. 
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theory, p.73-75[37].  But other possibilities include much softer competition, under which 
firms decide to not act aggressively to each other to avoid provoking retaliation.  In that case, 
price may be high and inefficiencies similar to those under monopoly might occur. 
Traditional oligopoly theory, and its modern equivalent, Game Theory in an IO context, is 
devoted to such issues. 
One example of ‘soft competition’ under oligopoly is where the group of suppliers effectively 
join together in order to maximise profits, by forming a 'cartel'. In extreme forms of cartel, 
the suppliers collectively produce a level of output where the industry marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost – equivalent to monopoly. In order for a cartel to function successfully, 
it must be able to prevent its members from cheating by producing too much output and also 
limit or restrict the new entry of other suppliers. While cartel agreements are illegal in most 
countries including the UK and the EU, they still occur quite frequently, as can be seen from 
the cases published by Competition Authorities, and the academic literature analysing the 
causes and effects of cartels [38, 39].  More generally, other forms of collusion may exist, 
which are not illegal, because firms do not make formal agreements to collude, but 
nevertheless amount to an implicit agreement not to act aggressively to each other.  These are 
generally referred to as ‘tacit collusion’, Motta[37], chapter 4, p.138-141, and are also more 
likely in markets where there are only a few firms and entry of new firms is difficult.  In the 
context of this thesis, the fact that there is only a small number of suppliers (in fact, as shown 
later, just two firms have a very large share of the market) raises the logical possibility that 
competition between them may not be fierce.  If so, the supply of hip prostheses may be 
subject to the harmful effects of monopoly like behaviour – high price, market sharing and 
perhaps slow innovation.   
From a public policy perspective, in a situation where a monopoly, duopoly or oligopoly 
exists, policy should be put in place to constrain suppliers from exploiting their market 
power. In the UK concerns related to competition and market failure are referred to the Office 
of Fair Trading and/or the Competition Commission. In Europe, this is the role of DGCOMP 
within the European Commission. 
However, the above discussion has focused only on the supply side of the market, and the 
implication is that, on the demand side, buyers do not have any power to counter the effects 
of competition between suppliers.  More generally however, Industrial Organisation theory 
and the Competition Authorities recognise that there will be some markets in which the 
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buyers too have power.  It is argued that such ‘buyer power’ is more likely to occur in 
markets where there is only a small number of large buyers who can use their bargaining 
power to enforce competition between the sellers. In this case, if the buyer is well informed 
about the prices of the product and about the available alternatives, it may be able to exploit 
its dominant position in the market to extract low prices by threatening to switch its 
purchasing from one seller to another – even when faced by a set of powerful suppliers. If so, 
even a cartel might not be able to exploit the potential for selling power. This possibility is 
always assessed by the authorities when they conduct investigations of potential competition 
problems in particular markets, p.121-123 [37].  
In the context of this thesis, the NHS is a large organisation with the potential to exploit its 
buyer power, thus behaving as an effective monopsonist (single buyer). Thus, the question is 
whether the NHS, which in principle has considerable buying power, when faced with 
suppliers who also have considerable selling power, is able to achieve an efficient allocation 
of resources?  Below, chapters 6 and 7 explore this question: chapter 6 examines various 
facets of the buyer and supplying industries, and chapter 7 explores whether the purchasing 
decisions of different hospitals reveal whether the NHS is a homogenous entity exploiting its 
buyer power to achieve efficient purchasing of joint prostheses, or whether there are 
systematic differences between hospitals at the disaggregated local level which might reflect 
segmentation of the market by the sellers, and perhaps the loss of buyer power by the NHS.  
 
1.4.3 Public Procurement 
When considering whether the NHS can/does exploit its buyer power, it is also necessary to 
have an understanding of public procurement in general, and specifically process of 
procurement by the NHS in particular.  This is also explored in chapter 7, but the following 
provides a brief introductory overview of some relevant literature. 
In the UK, public procurement refers to various areas of government activity - social 
security, health, education, defence and public order account for almost three quarters of 
total government public expenditure[6], estimated at over £150 billion per year[40]. Here I 
focus on some of the issues with specific reference to the NHS. 
Public procurement is the process whereby public organisations such as the NHS, purchase 
goods and services from a third party; and within this, 'Commissioning' refers to the 
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decision making on which service or product the public sector service requires. 
Commissioning in the NHS was established as part of the introduction of the ‘internal 
market’ in 1991, initially with  two models of purchasing (i)  health authorities -  centred on 
the health needs of the population; and (ii) fundholding - where GPs in individual practices 
or consortia could purchase elective care for patients[41]. More recently, Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) have been acting as the commissioners of health care for their local 
population, commissioning services from hospitals (the providers). Each PCT receives a 
budget based on a complex ‘weighted capitation’ formula designed to link budgets to local 
needs[41]. However, the recent 'Health and Social Care Bill' white paper of January 
2011[42] (under the coalition government formed in 2010), has set out a new restructuring 
of commissioning, with GPs working in groups of practices called a consortia. Each of these 
consortia will be responsible for its own commissioning and financial decisions, although 
these decisions will be overseen by a national NHS commissioning board who will also 
commission some services directly. Thus, from 2013, GP consortiums will take over from 
the PCTs currently responsible for commissioning[42]. 
Earlier, the New Labour NHS reforms (discussed in more detail in chapter 6) also set out 
policy aims which had a direct impact on procurement. On the supply side of health care, 
hospital Foundation Trusts were first established in 2004, these are autonomous hospitals 
operating within the NHS who have greater operational and financial freedoms than NHS 
Trusts i.e. not performance managed by the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). There were 
also transaction reforms which involved a move from negotiated contracts with hospitals i.e. 
block contracts and cost and volume contracts, to the system of Payment by Results (PbR), 
where hospitals are paid on a 'per case basis' and the prices are fixed nationally. Both these 
major policies will continue to run under the new ‘Health and Social Care Bill of 2011'. 
Most recently Sir Phillip Green's report[43] commissioned by the new coalition government, 
identified large scale inefficiencies at the Central government level, although this report did 
not specifically apply to the NHS. Even more recently, the National Audit Office (NAO) has 
published a pivotal report on "The procurement of consumables by NHS Acute and 
Foundation Trusts"[42] (orthopaedic prostheses are included within 'consumables').  This 
provides a rare but informative account of procurement practices within the NHS. Amongst 
other things, it found very limited data to be available on purchasing by individual trusts (p.4) 
- a finding which has been echoed by my own literature searching for this thesis. This lack of 
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comparable data means that trusts cannot easily identify how the prices they pay compare 
with those paid by other individual trusts and therefore whether better 'deals' might be 
available. In their own data collection, the NAO reports very wide variations in the prices 
paid for the same item. 
Of central relevance to one of the key issues of this thesis - whether the NHS acts as a large 
homogenous purchaser of hip prostheses - the NAO report finds that most trusts are now 
outside the DoH's control (due to their Foundation trust status), and thus there is no 
mechanism to secure any commitment by the separate trusts to purchase in a 'collective' 
manner. Procurement is the responsibility of individual trusts, which the report suggests 
means that "significant economies of scale are being lost across the NHS" (p.7). The report 
also suggests that suppliers to the NHS have no doubt benefited from this lack of price 
transparency and weak price negotiation which arises from the disaggregated and 
'fragmented' purchasing system.  I return to this in later chapters, but this evidence does call 
into question whether the NHS can, in fact, be viewed as a single dominant buyer of hip 
prostheses.  If not, this leaves firmly open the possibility that the main prostheses suppliers 
may be able to exploit their potential for market power. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of THR and more specifically, the prostheses 
implanted, including a historical context and description of the market for prostheses to date. 
It also introduces the National Joint Registry for England and Wales in more detail alongside 
other national joint registries.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 then address the first objective of the thesis, which examines an important 
element in how choices between prostheses should be made – the survival rates of prostheses. 
Chapter 3 presents an initial analysis of the data already published from the NJR on early 
revision (time from when the prosthesis is implanted to when it requires replacing).  Chapter 
4 provides a literature review of the subject area with specific focus on the economic 
evaluation literature of the alternative hip prostheses used in THR surgery. In summary, the 
main finding of chapter 4 is that there is very little empirical evidence on the long term 
survival of the prostheses. In view of this, Chapter 5 explores the possibility of projecting 
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survival rates of prostheses into the future a solution to the lack of published long term data. 
This chapter employs the Swedish hip registry which has been collecting data for 
considerably longer than any other joint registry. It revisits a previous study by Briggs[18] et 
al to test the robustness of their extrapolations. The findings of this chapter suggest a lack of 
robustness of extrapolation methods to date in this context.  
This cautionary finding leads to the change in focus at this point in the thesis.  Given that 
chapters 3,4 and 5 find that clear recommendations on prosthesis choice employing long term 
survival cannot yet be made, the second part of the thesis switches to the actual decisions 
which are made by surgeons regarding which prosthesis is implanted (thereby addressing the 
second objective). Here, the motivation is to explore how the potential buyer power of the 
NHS, on the one hand, and the potential selling power of the manufacturers, on the other 
hand, interact in terms of the mix of prostheses used across different hospitals in the NHS.  
Chapter 6 first discusses some of the relevant policy and theoretical issues including a 
discussion of patient choice and principal-agent theory. The chapter then moves on to the 
issue of public procurement in the NHS and the role of the NHS as a potential monopsonist 
with significant buyer power, drawing on the theoretical background of Industrial 
Organisation. The chapter then turns to the supply side industry and its potential seller power, 
concluding with a brief synopsis of the implications for market power.  
Chapter 7 presents the main empirical work in this part of the thesis.  Using a set of 
econometric techniques to test hypotheses, it first establishes whether choice of prostheses is 
determined mainly by patient characteristics or by the characteristics of different hospitals, 
and finds very large differences between hospitals.  It then investigates whether variables 
such as hospital size, location and status play important roles, and whether there is any 
evidence that the manufacturers have segmented the market.  
The final chapter brings together the conclusions of all the chapters providing a summary of 
the main findings, acknowledging the limitations of the thesis and setting out an agenda for 
future work. 
  
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1.6 Summary 
The ultimate aim of policy in this area should be to ensure that the patient receives the best 
quality hip prosthesis available, within the constraints of the NHS budget. This thesis 
explores two different aspects of choice within the NHS which are relevant to this aim.  The 
first is how to inform decision-making with methods which can identify which prosthesis 
should be implanted, bearing in mind that little is known about their actual long-term survival 
rates. The second is to identify the actual choices made by different hospitals in order to 
attempt to answer whether the NHS is an efficient purchaser of hip prostheses, behaving like 
a single entity, or whether there are differences between hospitals which may suggest that the 
dominant prostheses suppliers might have a strong influence on different decisions taken at 
the local level. 
 
 
  
.

Chapter 2, Contexts and background: Hip prostheses, National 
Joint Registry and early revision 
 
This chapter provides the background perspectives for the rest of the thesis.  It is organized 
into three parts.  Section 2.1 provides a brief history and definition of THR, describes the 
regulatory setting in the UK, and introduces the key data sources used in this thesis - the 
National Joint Registry for England and Wales and the Swedish Joint Registry.  Section 2.2 
draws on the published versions of the NJR to map out a statistical introduction to the current 
state of THR in England and Wales, in terms of types of prostheses, the patient-mix and 
hospitals.   
 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Definition of hip prostheses  
Hip prostheses have two components - a stem made of stainless steel or a chrome cobalt 
molybdenum alloy and a cup made of high density polyethylene[4] . In England and Wales,  
NICE recognises three broad categories of prosthesis: cemented, cementless and hybrid[20] 
determined by their method of fixation. Traditionally, components were fixed to the bone 
with an acrylic cement, known as 'cemented' and first designed by Sir John Charnley in the 
1960s. More recently there has been an increase in prostheses which are not fixed with 
cement, relying on the bone growing into irregularities on the surface of the component[4], 
these are known as 'cementless'. The third type of prosthesis is a 'hybrid', where one or other 
of the components is fixed by cemented, and the other is cementless. An alternative to THR 
surgery is hip resurfacing, this was introduced in the mid-nineties, and involves conserving 
the femoral bone and only replacing the surface of the joint[8]. The reader is referred to Vale 
et al[44] for an in-depth review of hip resurfacing. 
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2.1.2 Brief history of THR 
Total hip replacement surgery has revolutionised the treatment options for patients with end 
stage joint disease of the hip[45] over the past 50 years. Table 2.1 provides an overview of 
the historical developments in THR, and some of the main manufacturers over the past two 
centuries (this draws extensively on Anderson et al[46]).  It clearly shows the rapid 
technological change which has taken place, particularly from the 1950's onwards, and that 
the origins of THR are firmly based in Britain and the United States.  
One of the early pioneers of this type of surgery was George Kenneth KcKee who worked in 
Norwich, England as an orthopaedic surgeon. He was the first surgeon to explore what we 
now term a ‘THR’ i.e. using both an artificial ball and socket joint in the 1950s. In the United 
States, Austin Moore replaced the head of the femur as early as the 1940s. However, it was 
the development of the low friction arthroplasty produced by Sir John Charnley in Oxford in 
the 1960s which really led to the modern day prostheses used in THR. Since then, many 
surgeons and manufacturers of medical devices have developed newer prostheses using 
different materials and methods of fixation from the original ‘Charnley’ prosthesis. However, 
the Charnley and its competitors from the same era, such as the Exeter and the Stanmore, are 
still widely in use today, albeit in ‘updated’ forms. 
The Table also reveals the evolution of the prosthesis manufacturing industry, in terms of the 
birth of firms, and consolidations by mergers and acquisitions. Most of the early innovation 
and development in the hip prosthesis industry started with a single surgeon working with an 
engineer or small chemist. For example, one of the more famous partnerships was that of Sir 
John Charnley and Chas F Thackray ltd. Chas F Thackray Ltd was first established in the 
1800s as a pharmacy in Leeds, in 1918 they turned their focus to surgical equipment and by 
the 1940s they had developed a partnership with Charnley to develop hip prostheses. This 
partnership continued up until the 1990s when Thackray Ltd was acquired by Boehringer 
Mannehaim, a large multi-national company who had also acquired Depuy in 1974.  Smith 
and Nephew also started as a pharmacy back in 1856, but over time turning their focus to 
orthopaedic equipment, and today is one of the major multinational suppliers of orthopaedic 
prostheses.  
In the 1970s, a flurry of acquisitions and developments followed, with Bristol Myers Squibb 
acquiring Zimmer USA and Pfizer acquiring Howmedica (a British company). This period 
also saw the rise of some of the current major players in the industry, such as Biomet, Joint 
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Replacement Instrumentation (JRI) and Osteonics (acquired a year later by Stryker). By the 
1990s more of the pharmaceutical companies had entered the market.  
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Table 2.1 
Time 
Period  
Action Category 
1800-
1900 
Chas F Thackray Ltd established, as a pharmacy purchased in Leeds, UK[38] Est 
Smith & Nephew established as a chemists - Hull, UK (1856), they later enlarge and 
specialize in elastoplasts and plaster of Paris  
Est 
Down Bros (formerly Millikin and Down) established (1881) to supply splints and 
medical devices to Guy's hospital, London - UK 
Est 
Depuy established (1895) - USA Est 
1918 Chas F Thackray focus on surgical equipment[38] Tech 
1920s First insertion of artificial joint - French and US surgeons Tech 
Zimmer established (1927) - USA Est 
1930s Don Richards establishes Richards, Tennessee, USA (1934) Est 
First metal THR (femoral head and cup replaced) (1938)  - London UK Tech 
1940s Austin Moore & Harold Bohlma, replacement of cancerous femoral head (1943) - USA Tech 
Orthopaedic Equipment Company (OEC) established (1943) - USA Est 
Mushroom shaped acrylic prosthesis to replace head of femur (1946), Judet brothers - 
Paris France 
Tech 
Chas F Thackray and Sir John Charnley (surgeon) together work on prostheses Tech 
Introduction of antibiotics and anesthesia Tech 
Establishment of the NHS in Britain 
1950s Wright manufacturing established (1950) - Memphis, USA Est 
Trend emerging in the US for replacement of femoral head 
Chrome cobalt alloy femoral stem (1950), Frederick Thompson - USA Tech 
George Kenneth McKee (1951) championing THR (artificial ball and socket joint) 
using metal 
Tech 
D Howse established to distribute: Howse-Arden; McKee-Farrar; Monk prostheses Est 
Introduction of Stanmore prosthesis (Royal National Orthopaedic hospital, London)  Tech 
Self-locking femoral replacement with holes to encourage bone growth - (1952) Austin 
Moore& Frederick Thompson (USA) 
Tech 
1960s McKee adds acrylic to the cement for fixation due to loosening of metal components Tech 
Establishment of Zimmer UK (1964) resulting from a disagreement between 
Justin.O.Zimmer (Zimmer USA) and one of his salesmen, who went on to Europe and 
established the Zimmer name in many other countries. 
Est 
McKee Farrar adapt the Thompson femoral component (1965), leads to a increase in 
the success rate 
Tech 
Depuy secure rights for the Muller hip (1968) Dev 
Uptake of the Charnley low friction arthroplasty (Oxford UK) Tech 
Introduction of the Ring prosthesis (Royal College of Surgeons, UK) 
Joint Replacement Instrumentation (JRI) established  to import Muller prosthesis Est 
Ring change to using polyethylene Tech 
Research starts on the Ling-Lee prosthesis (1967)  (later becomes the Exeter) Tech 
Establishment of the Hip society (1968)  
Howmedica established 1969 (previously Howesound & Howemet) Est 
1970s Down Bros supply the Redhill hip under license to Howmedica Dev 
General acceptance of the surgical success of THR 
McKee stops inserting metal on metal hips due to early complications (1972) Tech 
Howmedica secure rights for the Harris hip  - 2 component replacement (1972) Dev 
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Bristol Myers Squibb (1972) (pharmaceutical company) acquire Zimmer USA A 
Pfizer acquire Howmedica (1972) A 
Deloro Stellite (Swindon, Wilts) establishes Deloro Surgical (UK) Ltd  (1972) 
manufacturing hip prostheses including Stanmore 
Est 
Boehringer Manneheim acquire Depuy (1974) A 
JRI established, Sheffield, UK (1977) Est 
Biomet established (1978) - Warsaw, Indiana, USA  Est 
Osteonics established (1978) (by engineers from Howmedica) Est 
Osteonics acquired by Stryker (1979) A 
Ring use the polyethylene cup with an offset peg Tech 
1980s Switch in trend from metal on metal prostheses to metal on plastic Tech 
Johnson & Johnson open division called Cintor – marketing knee replacements and 
the Charnley hip in the U.S (1981) 
J & J acquire D Howse & Co, thus entering the UK market (1982) 
Est 
Zimmer UK acquires Deloro Surgical  (1980) A 
Corin (UK) established(1985)  supplying the Freeman Modular hip and Cormet hip Est 
Orthopaedic Equipment Company (OEC) acquire Zimmer UK  A 
Biomet acquire OEC (1984) A 
Introduction of the Wrightington THR (Howmedica) Tech 
C-stem prosthesis (by Wroblewski) (1982) Tech 
Smith & Nephew acquire Richards (1986) A 
Journal of Arthroplasty established (1986) (focus on joint replacement) 
Aesculap (German) acquire Down Bros (1988) A 
Exeter modular hip introduced (1988) (copied by others including C-stem) Tech 
1990s Boehringer Manneheim (pharmaceutical company, also own Depuy) acquire Chas F 
Thackerey 
A 
B Braun Medical ltd acquire Aesculap A 
Roche acquire Boehringer Manneheim (Depuy) (1990) A 
Biomet enter into a manufacturing agreement with Merck (1997) M 
Johnson & Johnson acquire Depuy from Roche (1998) A 
Smith and Nephew acquire Midland Medical Technologies (1999) A 
Exeter establishes dominance in the British market(1999) Tech 
2000s Publication of NICE guidance to Hip prostheses, England and Wales (2000)  
Zimmer acquire Sulzer (known as Centerpulse) (2003) after bidding war with Smith & 
Nephew 
A 
The National Joint Registry for England and Wales established (2003) - England and 
Wales 
 
Smith & Nephew acquires Plus Orthopedics Holding AG ("Plus") (2007) A 
LVB Acquisition Merge Sub, Inc merges with Biomet A 
Est = manufacturer established; Tech = technological development; Dev=manufacturer development; 
A=acquisition; M=merger 
Table 2.1 Timeline of developments in the hip prostheses  industry[46] 
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2.1.3 Regulation 
Hip prostheses are categorised as a medical device[47]5 and as such, in the UK, they are 
monitored by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), an 
executive agency for the DoH. This was established in 2003 as a consequence of a merger 
between the Medicines Control Agency and the Medical Devices Agency, and is responsible 
for ensuring that medicines and medical devices work and are acceptably safe.  
MHRA explain that the main difference between how medicines and devices are regulated 
relates to how a product gets onto the market; medical devices are approved by the private 
sector organisations which are called 'notification bodies' and their approval  is needed before 
a CE mark[48]6 is awarded to a device. These ‘notified bodies’ are private organisations who 
carry out ‘compliance assessments’ before certain medical devices can go on the market. 
They are designated and audited by MHRA[49], a full list of them can be found on the 
MHRA webpage[50] .  
Aside from MHRA, NICE provides guidance to patients and the NHS on best-practice 
procedures in healthcare. Within this remit, they carry out appraisals of new and existing 
pharmaceutical and medical technologies, in order to demonstrate the value of the product to 
the NHS based on proven clinical and cost-effectiveness[51].  In 2000, NICE published 
guidelines[52] on: 'The selection of prostheses for primary total hip replacement', which have 
remained the primary guidance in the UK on total hip replacement and hip prostheses7. The 
main points in their guidelines are that prostheses should demonstrate a revision rate of 10% 
or less at 10 years, which should be regarded as the current benchmark. NICE also considers 
it reasonable to recommend consideration of a prosthesis with a minimum of 3 years revision 
rate experience if its performance is consistent with the benchmark of a 10% revision rate at 
10 years[52]. 
Following the NICE guidance, the Orthopaedic Data Evaluation Panel (ODEP) was 
established to 'ensure consistency and enable easy data presentation and comparison'[2] of 
hip prostheses, as part of the NHS Supply Chain. It provides a rating for prostheses based on 
 
5
 According to the European Union (EU) directive 2007/47/EC. a medical device is defined as: "any instrument, 
apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether used alone or in combination, including the 
software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes and 
necessary for its proper application, intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose 
of diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease"[41].
6
 CE mark is a declaration from a manufacturer that a product meets all appropriate provisions of the relevant 
legalization including those relating to safely and where required has been assessed in accordance with 
these[42].  
7
  NICE states that they will consult the review plans on this guidance in May 2011 
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data submitted by the manufacturers, Figure 2.1 reports these ODEP ratings. For example, the 
Charnley cemented cup and stem both have a rating of 10A, indicating strong clinical 
evidence of prosthesis survival at 10 years.  
Manufacturers are required to inform ODEP of all their commerically available prostheses 
which have been involved in postmarket clinical follow-up studes using seperate proformas 
for cup and stem. They request data on product details including: prosthesis history; whether 
it has met the NICE benchmark; information on publications such as conference and peer-
reviewed papers; Kaplan-Meier survival curves and revision rates. However, manufactueres 
are not required to provide information on those products still in development. ODEP 
provides no explanation about whether or how the manufacturers proforma information is 
checked or verfied and whether the manufacturer information is publicly available[53]  
Figure 2.1, ODEP classification[2] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Joint Registries 
It is well documented that historically there is very little high quality evidence on the 
performance of hip prostheses, specifically in terms of their key survival rates, i.e. the time 
until they need to be replaced)[54, 55]. In order to address this gap, many countries have 
ODEP Classification:  
Pre-entry - Manufacturers are requested to keep ODEP informed of all commercially 
available prostheses that are involved in post market clinical follow-up studies. 
Unclassified 
3A  - 3 year data, Acceptable evidence. Failure rate of 3% or less. 
3B - 3 year data, Weak evidence. Acceptable failure rate. 
5A - 5 year data, Acceptable evidence. Failure rate of 5% or less. 
5B - 5 year data, Weak evidence. Acceptable failure rate 
7A - 7 year data, Acceptable evidence. Failure rate of 7% or less. 
7B - 7 year data, Weak evidence. Acceptable failure rate. 
10A - 10 year data. Strong evidence. Failure rate of 10% or less. 
10B - 10 year data. Reasonable evidence. Failure rate of 10% or less.[2] 
10C - 10 year data. Weak evidence. Failure rate of 10% or less. Products given 2 years 
to improve data or they are deemed unacceptable. 
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established their own national joint registries reporting the performance of the prostheses by 
type and brand name. 
The first joint registry was established in Sweden in 1975 (the Swedish Hip Registry) and this 
is usually viewed as the pioneering joint registry. Its primary aim was to collect data on 
nationally used prosthesis survival rates. Other subsequent joint registries have since aimed to 
follow the Swedish Registry's approach, but they have often come under political and 
practical challenges[56] for example, the German Arthroplasty Register was unsuccessful in 
sustaining its existence because of "the low rate of participation and the resulting 
financial problems", p.1567,[56]. 
Country/Registry name Year established 
Sweden Knee 1975 
Sweden Hip 1979 
Finland 1980 
Norway 1987 
Denmark 1995 
Germany Knee 1997 
Denmark Hip 1997 
Australia 1999 
New Zealand 1999 
Sweden (shoulder & elbow) 1999 
Canada 2001 
Romania 2001 
England and Wales 2003 
Slovakia 2003 
Switzerland 2004 
Source: [56] 
Table 2.2  Countries with National joint registries 
 
The NJR and Finnish Registries were set up by government institutions, with the NJR funded 
by levies placed on the prostheses sold[9]. Most other registries are maintained by national 
orthopaedic associations. Participation in most registries is voluntary, other than Denmark 
and Slovakia, where participation is compulsory by government decree[56]. 
Five registries report that they collect data on clinical scores. The NJR introduced national 
collection of PROMS in 2009 in the form of a self-reported patient questionnaire, which asks 
patients about their health from their point of view[26] The New Zealand registry also collects 
6

data using the Oxford hip, knee and shoulder questionnaire and the Swedish Registry uses 
self-reported questionnaires in the form of the Western Ontario Osteoarthritis of the shoulder 
index and the EuroQol (EQ-5D). The Romanian and Swiss registries collect data on 
radiological findings as part of the post-operative follow-up[56]. 
The main goal of every register is to measure the outcome of joint replacement. In order to do 
so, the revision of an implant is set as the endpoint of failure, and the survival rate is 
calculated according to Kaplan-Meier survival analysis[56]. Several joint registries have 
demonstrated success in identifying poorly performing prostheses i.e. the Scandinavian 
registries and the Christiansen Hip [19].  
The Swedish Hip Arthroplasty Register (SHAR)[57] 
As the Swedish registry is used in chapter 5 it merits a brief separate discussion here.  It was 
established over 30 years ago. Since then it has been routinely collecting data on the 
alternative types of prostheses implanted and the surgical techniques used, revisions and 
reoperation rates and demographic data. All 79 hospitals (public and independent sector) are 
included in the register, mostly reporting their data via a web application. 
The register reports prosthesis survival at 3, 5 and 10-year time points, with 10 year survival 
now reported as being over 95% on average. Recent developments in SHAR include routine 
collection of patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) since 1992 (routinely collected on 
the NJR since 2009), and a joint database with Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1995 
onwards. SHAR also reported cost and cost-effectiveness analysis at the hospital level in their 
2007 report, however this was not continued in the 2008 annual report due to some apparent 
difficulties with cost calculations 
 
The National Joint Registry 
The NJR for England and Wales is the main data source used in this thesis.  It was 
established in 2003, and collects data on hip, knee and most recently, ankle replacements 
carried out in the NHS and independent healthcare sectors[58]. It has been managed by the 
Health Quality Improvement Partnership (HQIP) since 2008 (previously managed by the 
DoH) and is funded through a levy raised on the sale of hip and knee replacement prostheses. 
It is the largest international registry recording prosthesis performance and is therefore able to 
provide data on a scale not previously available. To date, the NJR contains data on up to 7 
years survival rates of prostheses. The specific aims of the registry are discussed on the NJR 
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website[59] and in the 4th annual report[60], however, they can be summarised as the 
following: 
“to highlight in real time any brand of prosthesis showing high failure rates, and allow 
prompt removal from the market, if necessary” and to “improve evidence-based purchasing 
of joint replacement implants for orthopaedic units/hospitals” p.1[61]. 
The NJR is linkable to HES and more recently, to the PROMs database, all of which are 
managed on a day to day level by Northgate Information Solutions. The option to link these 
three data-sets provides a vast and invaluable source of linkable individual patient level data 
previously unavailable for England and Wales. 
 
2.2 The current position in England and Wales: prostheses, patients and hospitals 
The analysis in the following chapters use, as their source, the raw data on individual patients 
in the NJR and Swedish joint registries.  However, the summary statistics already published 
in the annual reports of the NJR provide a useful starting point.  This section draws 
selectively from the annual reports to establish an opening picture. 
2.2.1 Recent growth in THR 
As a consequence of an ageing population8 and the rising incidence of diseases of old age 
such as Osteoarthritis, rates of elective total hip replacement have risen year on year for the 
past two decades[9, 60, 62, 63]. Figure 2.2 shows the growth in THR procedures in the NJR, 
as reported  from 2003/4 to 2009/10.  It clearly illustrates the rise in procedures over this 7 
year period[9, 60]. It should be noted that some proportion of the increases in reported rates 
will be due to increases in compliance and consent rates as the NJR became more established 
- see annual reports for reported compliance and consent rates. In particular, reported 
compliance was much lower in 2003, 84.5% of NHS Trusts; 91.6% of Independent Sector 
hospitals and 75% of Treatment Centres, by 2009 this overall figure had risen to 96% 
participation[9]. As will be seen in later chapters, this sometimes leads to anomalous findings 
for 2003 relative to the years which follow. 
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8
 Also as a consequence of surgeons operating on younger patients with new technologies such as hip 
resurfacing (also included in NJR data) 
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Figure 2.2 - THR procedures entered in NJR, 2003/4 to 2009/10 
 
 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
 
 
For the years before the introduction of the NJR, data on rates of elective THR were 
obtainable from HES; Dixon et al’s analysis of data from that source show a steadily 
increasing trend from 1991 to 2000, but with a slight dip in 1996/1997[63].  
2.2.2 Broad Prosthesis types 
A key feature of competition in many markets is product differentiation: often, this is the 
main method firms use to compete (e.g. pharmaceuticals, breakfast cereals and cars), this can 
affect competition both positively and negatively.  On the one hand, introducing new 
innovative brands can be the method by which new firms enter, or existing firms compete 
with their rivals.  Consumers may benefit from more choice and improved product quality.  
On the other hand, strong differentiation can make the entry of new firms harder because they 
find it difficult to persuade consumers to switch from their existing brands.  It may be the 
case here, where hospitals and surgeons have strong brand preferences, based largely on 
previous practice and training. 
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In this particular market, there is obviously the key distinction between cemented and 
cementless prostheses.  From a competition policy perspective, the European 
Commission[68, 69] view cemented and cementless prostheses as substitutes and therefore 
within the same market, but this does not necessarily mean they are very close substitutes: 
surgeons may have a strong preference for cementless over cemented prostheses for certain 
types of patients, but the opposite for other patients.  Therefore, it is important to distinguish 
at the outset these two broad types. Figure 2.3 and Table 2.3 show the numbers of cemented 
and cementless implants recorded on the NJR from 2003/4 to 2008/9. Clearly, the proportion 
of cementless prostheses increased rapidly over this period: while cemented still accounted 
for three times as many implants as cementless in 2003, by 2008 cementless have overtaken 
cemented as the preferred prosthesis type. 
  
Figure 2.3: Type of prosthesis: cemented or cementless by year, 2003/4 to 2009/10 
 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
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 Year Cemented Cementless Total 
2003 14280 3590 17870 
2004 23992 8957 80856 
2005 28602 13955 90548 
2006 25313 16416 90513 
2007 26685 20690 100513 
2008 24730 24892 100488 
2009 23414 27492 50906 
Total 311401 194752 506153 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 2.3: Type of prosthesis by year (cemented and cementless) 
 
2.2.3 Brands  
Product differentiation is just not between the two broad categories of cemented and 
cementless; as can be seen from Table 2.4, in any given year there are more than 200 
different brands implanted. While it should be remembered that each patient will receive 2 
brands, 1 cup and 1 stem (counted here as different brands), Appendix 1 shows that the most 
commonly used combinations of cups and stems involve both cup and stem from the same 
manufacturer.  As will become clear in chapter 6, most manufacturers offer a range of brands 
within each of the four types (cementless/cemented and cup/stem.)  
 Number of Brands 
 Year Cemented cup Cemented stem Cementless cup Cementless 
stem 
Total 
2003 48 57 42 41 188 
2004 51 71 49 50 221 
2005 50 66 51 53 220 
2006 48 68 47 49 212 
2007 49 66 54 56 225 
2008 50 68 54 52 224 
Source: Authors' calculations: NJR data-set (see Appendix 2 for a discussion of this data-set)9 
Table 2.4 Number of prosthesis brands in the market 
 
Of the top 16 most widely used prosthesis brands, 2003-2008, 4 are cemented stems, 4 
cementless cups, 6 cemented cups and only 2 cementless stems. The ‘best-selling’ brand is 
 
9
 Unlike all other tables in this chapter which I derived from the tables published in the NJR annual reports, this 
table is constructed from  the raw data on individual patients  provided to me by the NJR. However, this raw 
data was  only available up to the end of 2008. The data-set is described in more detail in Appendix 2 
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the Exeter V40, which is a cemented stem and accounts for approximately 18% of all 
prostheses fitted (cemented, cementless, cup and stem). 
The main manufacturers of these brands are discussed, along with the brands, in more detail 
in chapter 6. However, in brief, there are 25 manufacturers recorded on the NJR, but only 5 
have a market share of consistently over 5 %. Stryker Howmedica Osteonics and Depuy both 
account for a third each of the market with the remaining manufacturers: Zimmer, Joint 
Replacement Instrumentation and Biomet 6% accounting for approximately 7%, 8% and 6% 
respectively. 
 
2.2.4 Patient Mix 
The NJR records data on various characteristics of the patients undergoing THR surgery, 
these are summarised in table 2.5. This confirms that THR is most frequently performed on 
older people10. Clearly, more females undergo THR surgery than males, around 57% . Only 
one indication for surgery is included in the table, Osteoarthritis (OA), this is because it is 
overwhelmingly the primary indication, accounting for approximately 94% of all cases. Other 
reasons include: avascular necrosis; fractured neck of femur; congenital dislocation and 
infection[9].  The final patient characteristic included in the table is side of surgery – the hip 
which is undergoing the replacement surgery: left, right, or bilateral (meaning both sides at 
the same time). Most patients have a right sided THR (55 % approx), very few patients have 
both hips replaced at the same time (0-1%). Bilateral surgery is both more lengthy in terms of 
operation time, and takes longer for the patient to recover due to the increased immobility in 
the rehabilitation phase post surgery.  
 
  
 
10
 Although there has been a small decrease in the average age of patients undergoing THR since 2003/4 most 
of this change occurred between 2003/4 and 2004/5, and this may simply be a consequence of the reduced 
coverage of the NJR its first year, as reported above.   
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Table 2.5  Characteristics of patients undergoing THR surgery, 2003/4 to 20098/10 
 
Further information is provided in table 2.6 on the same patient characteristics, now 
disaggregated between cemented and cementless. It has already been shown above that 
increasing numbers of patients are receiving a cementless prosthesis. This table now reveals 
that it is younger patients who are more likely to receive a cementless prosthesis 
(approximate average age of 65 years for cementless prosthesis compared to 72 for 
cemented). This provides part of the explanation for the trend, noted above, for the decline in 
the overall age of patients undergoing THR surgery. It also shows that male patients are more 
likely to receive a cementless prosthesis than a cemented, while the reverse is true for 
females. There is little difference in cemented and cementless for the indication for surgery or 
the side of surgery.  
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Table 2.6,  Characteristics of patients undergoing THR surgery according to prosthesis type, 2003/4 to 2009/10 
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2.2.5 Numbers of hospitals11 
The dominant provider of health care in England and Wales is the NHS, which is free at the 
point of use and funded by government taxation. However, there is a small private sector (which 
will be referred to as the independent sector for the remainder of this thesis) provider of health 
care, which is often funded by employers’ medical insurance. There is also an increasing number 
of procedures which the independent sector is sub-contracted to carry out on behalf of the NHS. 
More recently, the NHS and independent sector have both established treatment centres (NHS 
treatment centres (NHS TC) and Independent sector treatment centres (ISTC) respectively), 
which are small units which carry out day surgery or specific surgical procedures often including 
hip and knee replacement surgery. 
Table 2.7 shows the number of hospitals reporting data for the NJR according to these hospital 
types. It reveals a steady number of NHS hospitals, at just over 200 hospitals (apart from 2005/6 
in which there were slightly more at 220). The number of Independent sector (IS) hospitals 
reporting their data has declined marginally from 166 in 2003/4 and 2004/5 to 160 in 2009/10. In 
contrast, there has been an increase in the number of treatment centres reporting data, both IS 
and NHS, which would be in keeping with their recent and increasing establishment under the 
Labour government (until 2010). 
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 The term 'Hospital' is used throughout the thesis and refers to the surgical unit of treatment,   
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Sourced from various authors of the following NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 2.7,  Number of participating hospitals entering data on the NJR, 2003/4 to 2009/10 
 
2.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a factual background to the thesis, providing some key empirical 
findings which can be summarised as follows: Rates of THR have risen year on year in England 
and Wales for the past two decades. The procedures are carried out within four main providers: 
NHS hospitals, NHS Treatment Centre's, Independent Sector hospitals and Independent Sector 
Treatment Centre's, although the NHS remains overwhelmingly, the main provider of THR 
surgery in England and Wales. 
There has also been a rapid increase in the number cementless prostheses implanted (from 2003 
to 2008), to the extent that they have now overtaken cemented as the most commonly implanted 
type. In terms of patient mix, THR is more frequently performed on older female patients with a 
primary diagnosis of OA. Younger, male patients tend to be more likely to receive a cementless 
prosthesis. 
Beyond broad types of prostheses, product differentiation can be disaggregated at the brand level 
for cup and stem combinations, where in any given year more than 200 different brands of 
prostheses are implanted. The 'best-selling' brand of either cup or stem, cemented or cementless, 
is the Exeter V40 cemented stem, accounting for 18% of all prostheses fitted in England and 
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Wales (from 2003 to 2008). There are 25 manufacturers of hip prostheses recorded on the NJR, 
although only 5 of these have a market share of consistently over 5%, with Stryker Howmedica 
Osteonics and Depuy accounting for a third each of the market. 
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Chapter 3, Revision in the early years: evidence from the NJR 
Annual Reports 
3.1 Purpose 
This is the first of the three chapters concerned with revision rates of different prostheses.  The 
purpose here is to present an opening analysis of the NJR data on revision already available in 
the public domain, in that it uses only the aggregate summary tabulations available in the 
published Annual Reviews of the NJR. (In later chapters, I conduct more detailed analysis of the 
primary unpublished disaggregated data on the individual patients which have been made 
available to me.)  Although the NJR has only been in existence for seven years, and therefore 
these data can only tell us about revision in the early years after primary surgery, it is already 
becoming a potentially rich source of information which, to date, does not appear to have been 
subjected to much detailed academic research.  Thus, this chapter helps to fill that gap.   
The chapter begins with a brief summary of the only other published (to date) paper[54] using 
the NJR data.  This was based on the first three years data and was largely confined to broad 
comparisons between cemented and cementless prostheses.  My first objective is to update their 
analysis to 2009 using information now available from the more recent NJR annual reports. The 
second part of the chapter takes the analysis further by now exploring differences between 
different brands within each of these broad categories.  It establishes a series of stylized facts 
concerning differences in revision rates between different brands of prostheses, how they change 
over the early years, and how they relate to reported ODEP ratings.  
In terms of the thesis as a whole, the chapter provides a starting point for chapters 4 and 5. In 
particular, it provides a useful introduction to chapter 5, in which I investigate the reliability of 
extrapolating long term prosthesis survival rates, when only short-term data are available. 
A key, and widely accepted outcome measure, when assessing the success of primary THR, is 
the time from primary surgery until the prosthesis needs replacement, known as revision surgery. 
Revision surgery can be necessary sometimes almost immediately post-surgery, but hopefully 
not until, say, 15 to 20 years, post primary surgery – if at all. The end point for prosthesis failure 
is usually defined as revision: "exchange or extraction of at least one part of the prosthesis"[70] 
However, it is recognised that this is not the same as the point in time when the prosthesis first 
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fails. Prosthesis failure is much harder to define for example, whether prosthesis failure should 
be recorded as the point when the patient first recognsies some discomfort at the hip joint, when 
they first re-visit their GP or surgeon to report the problem or when they are referred for surgery. 
The implication of not taking into account the time point when failure first occurs is that a time 
lag exists from when the prosthesis fails until when the patient undergoes revision surgery. If the 
lag was the same across all patients then the implication for the analysis on revision surgery 
would not matter. However, it is unlikely that this is the case, in which case factors such as the 
(i) propensity of the patient to seek medical advice; (ii) time until GP or surgeon is consulted, 
(iii) propensity of the GP to refer to the specialist (iv) waiting time until specialist is seen and (v) 
waiting time for surgery, may vary across regions associated with the alternative prostheses 
implanted. especially given potential waiting time variation from referral for revision surgery 
until the date of surgery. Ideally, data would be available on issues by region: number of GPs per 
head; waiting list until specialist seen and waiting list for revision surgery would be included. 
However, chapter 3 uses data on revision surgery taken from the NJR annual report which does 
not report data GPs per head or waiting times. Moreover, the data used in chapter 5 is taken from 
an extract provided by SHAR which also did not include information on waiting list times or  
GPs per head, neither is it available in SHAR annual report. Clearly the issue of defining and 
measure prosthesis failure is an issue for the analysis in this chapter and chapter 5 and warrants 
further investigation for inclusion in any cost-effectiveness analysis of alternative hip prostheses. 
As mentioned earlier, NICE guidelines specify that revision should not be necessary in more 
than 10% of cases, ten years after surgery. When revision is necessary within the first year it is 
often referred to as an 'early revision or failure' and can be caused by indications such as: 
infection, dislocation, pain or fracture[9]. Where revision is not required until after the early 
years, it is usually referred to as a 'late revision or failure', with the primary cause being aseptic 
loosening principally due to wear of the artificial joint.  
Therefore, any meaningful comparison between different prostheses ideally requires long term 
data on survival.  Although long-term registry and peer-reviewed evidence is available for the 
‘best-selling; brands such as the Exeter cemented stem and the Corail cementless stem, this is 
rarely available.  This is partly because of the continued emergence of new or updated prostheses 
for which there is by definition only short term data on survival.  But more generally, there is a 
lack of observational data - studies following a cohort of patients over a 15 to 20 year period are 
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very few, and not all countries have national joint registries; and even if they do, they have not 
been collecting data for a 15 or 20 year time period (see Table 2.2, chapter 2). Consequently, 
when reporting prosthesis survival rates typically the data are right censored as is the case in this 
chapter. As discussed in the previous section, the Swedish Hip Arthroplasty Register is the only 
joint registry reporting long term survival data of around 30 years.  
With the creation of the NJR, eventually sufficient data will accumulate for England and Wales, 
and this will permit comparison of actual long-term survival rates.  In the meantime, the NJR 
does now provide up to 7 years post-operation information on some patients, and it is these data 
which are analysed in this chapter. 
 
3.2 Updating a previous study: Sibanda et al 
To date, the only paper (apart from the NJR annual reports themselves) to have analysed the 
early revision rates reported in the NJR is by Sibanda et al[54].  This reports revision rates after 
primary hip and knee replacement in England between 2003 and 2006, although here I focus 
only on their findings on hip replacements.   
The authors use data on 170,410 records of primary hip procedures, Their paper was only able to 
consider revision occurring within the first 3 years of surgery, and only between the four broad 
prosthesis type: cemented, cementless, hybrid and resurfacing, with revisions identified through 
the linkage with the HES database due to 'missing patient identifiers in the NJR'. The linkage of 
HES and NJR data-sets was carried out according to a five hierarchical linkage criteria described 
in detail in the paper. Revisions were identified using the OPCS-4 codes and revision rates were 
estimated using the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis method where time of death or September 
the 30th 2006 was the end of follow-up. Multivariable Cox regression was used to estimate 
hazard ratios for prosthesis type, age group sex and indication or surgery as risk factors for 
revision.  
They report an overall revision rate for primary THR of 0.7%  at 1 year and 1.4% at 3 years. 
They show that revision rates varied significantly according to prosthesis type (p<0.0001), 
concluding that patients receiving a cemented prosthesis had the lowest 3 year revision rate and 
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that the highest rate was for resurfacing. They also found that the differences in revision rates by 
prosthesis type were apparent even at 3 months post-surgery. In terms of patient characteristics, 
the pattern of revision rates was related to the patients' gender but not to age, and it was almost 
twice as high for other indications than OA.  They also provide a brief comparison of revision 
rates reported by other national joint registries and conclude that rates observed in Australia and 
Norway are distinctly higher than those observed in England and New Zealand. 
I now update this analysis of Sibanda et al, by using data reported in the 5th, 6th and 7th NJR 
annual reports.  I also now disaggregate by individual brands. First, Tables 3.1 compare the 
characteristics of patients cited in the Sibanda paper (2003-2006), with the updated data since 
reported in the NJR annual reports for 2006/7; 2007/8 and 2008/9[9, 66, 67]12. The two parts of 
the table confirm the increased popularity of cementless prostheses, at the expense of cemented 
(cementless rises from 25% to 41%, while cemented falls from 54% to 37%).  Both tables show 
that younger patients are more likely to receive a cementless type and older patients more likely 
to receive cemented.  
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 It should be noted that there is some overlap with the data - table 2.8 does not report data for a full year, only up to 
06/06. Data from the annual reports is only reported for each financial year. 


 
Characteristic  Prosthesis type 
   Cemented Cementless Hybrid Resurfacing Overall 
Age                        <55  1634 2937 1313 3098 8982 
                             55-64 5998 6020 2733 2551 17302 
                             65-74 16642 6727 3776 516 27661 
                                75+ 16957 3338 2298 37 22630 
                Not recorded 1 0 0 0 1 
Sex                    Female 26512 10840 5969 2359 45680 
                           Male 14705 8172 4148 3843 30868 
                 Not recorded 15 10 3 0 28 
Indication for surgery 
                Osteoarthritis 
38854 17701 9274 5879 71708 
                             Other 2378 1321 846 323 4868 
Total 41231 19022 10120 6202 76575 
Source: Sibanda et al[54] 
Table 3.1 (a) Characteristics of patients undergoing primary THR 2003-6 (4/03-9/06)[54] 
 
Characteristic Prosthesis type 
  Cemented Cementless Hybrid Resurfacing Overall 
Ag e                   <55 y 2743 11332 2410 5801 22286 
                          55-64 9100 22125 6071 4981 42277 
                          65-74 24429 26144 10576 1187 62336 
                              75+ 29895 14875 9257 125 54152 
Sex                  Female 44074 42529 17912 3546 108061 
                           Male 22631 31947 10402 8548 73528 
Indication for surgery 
               Osteoarthritis 
66886 74485 27634 12649 181654 
                           Other 4672 5391 2828 635 13526 
Total  66167 74476 28314 12094 181051 
Source: NJR annual reports:[66, 67, 71] 
Table 3.1(b) Characteristics of patients undergoing primary THR 2006-9 (4/06-3/9)[9] 
 
 
Table 3.2 turns to revision rates.  Part (a) is reproduced from Sibanda et al, reporting 1 year and 3 
year revision rates disaggregated by gender, and part (b) updates by now including 2006/7 to 
2008/9, and providing estimates of 5 year revision as well. This confirms the Sibanda et al 
finding that cemented prostheses perform better than cementless, in terms of the 3 year revision 
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rate.  I can now confirm that this is also true after 5 years: 2% for cemented compared to 3.4% 
for cementless.  This is clearly statistically significant: the 95% confidence intervals are non-
overlapping (1.8-2.1% for cemented and 3.2-3.7% for cementless.)  As can also be seen, hybrid 
implants (one component cemented and the other cementless) lie somewhere between, and hip 
resurfacing continues to have the highest revision rates at all time points.  
Thus, this updating confirms the somewhat surprising result in Sibanda et al -  a continued trend 
towards implanting more cementless prostheses, despite the fact that they have higher typical 
revision rates than cemented.  It can now also be seen that this applies at 1, 3 and 5 year time 
points – indeed, the difference between mean revision rates actually increases over time: 0.7 at 1 
year, 0.9 at 3 years and 1.4 at 5 years. It is also worth noting that variation in the revision rates 
by gender exist. In most cases these are not significantly different (the confidence intervals 
overlap), but the revision rate for cementless prostheses is signficantly different at 1 year for men 
is 0.4, compared to 1.0 for women and the confidence intervals do not overlap. One possible 
reason for gender differences in revision rates may be because women are less likely to 'wear' 
their joints out due to occupation or sport activity.  
Category Men (C.I) Women (C.I) 
  1 year revision rate 3 year revision rate 1 year revision rate 3 year revision rate 
Cemented 0.4 (0.3-0.4) 1.1 (0.8 to 1.5) 0.3(0.2 to 0.4) 0.8 (0.7 to 1.0) 
Cementless 0.4 (0.3 to 0.6) 2.4 (1.9 to 3.1) 1.0 (0.8 to 1.2) 1.6 (1.3 to 2.0) 
Hybrid 0.9(0.6 to1.3) 1.9 (1.3 to 2.6) 0.6 (0.4 to  0.8) 1.2 (0.7 to 1.9) 
Resurfacing 1.5 (1.1 to 2.5) 1.9 (1.4 to 2.5) 1.9 (1.4 to 2.6) 3.7 (2.8 to 5.0) 
Source: NJR annual reports:[66, 67, 71]; 95% confidence intervals in brackets. 
Table 3.2(a)  Revision rates by prosthesis type 2003-6 Sibanda et al[54]  
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Category April 1st 2003 to 31st December 2009 (C.I) 
  1 year revision rate 3 year revision rate 5 year revision rates 
Cemented 0.6 (0.6 to 0.7) 1.4 (1.3 to 1.5) 2.0 (1.8 to 2.1) 
Cementless 1.3 (1.2 to 1.4) 2.5 (2.4 to 2.7) 3.4 (3.2 to 3.7) 
Hybrid 0.9 (0.8 to 1.0) 1.8 (1.6 to 1.9) 2.7 (2.4 to 3.0) 
resurfacing 2.1 (1.9 to 2.3) 4.3 (4.0 to 4.8) 6.3 (5.7 to 7.0) 
Source: NJR annual reports:[66, 67, 71] 
Table 3.2(b) Revision rates by prosthesis type 2003-9:  NJR annual report[9] 
 
 
3.3 A more disaggregated analysis at the individual prosthesis level 
One of the limitations of the Sibanda paper, for current purposes, is that it did not compare 
revision rates at the individual brand level.  Since the NJR annual reports do report survival rates 
for individual prostheses brands, I can now fill in this gap. Tables 3.3(a)-(d) show the revision 
rates of the most frequently used brands for each of cemented cup and stem and cementless cup 
and stem at 3 and 5 year time points, ranked in ascending order by 5 year revision rates.   
+- 
(a) cemented cups 
Cemented cup - Brand Manufacturer No. patients  3 year Revision rate  5 year Revision rate  
Low profile muller Zimmer 2,316 0.7 1.2 
Elite plus cemented cup Depuy 6,466 0.9 1.3 
Stanmore-Arcom Biomet 1,554 0.9 1.4 
Elite plus ogee Depuy 13,730 1.0 1.3 
Opera Smith & Nephew 4,758 1.1 1.5 
Contemporary Stryker  23,320 1.2 1.9 
Charnley cemented cup Depuy 7,709 1.2 2.1 
Charnley ogee Depuy 7,254 1.5 2.2 
Exeter duration Stryker  7,519 1.6 2.2 
ZCA Zimmer 4,553 1.6 2.4 
Cenator cemented cup Corin 1,896 2.0 2.8 
Apollo Biomet 1,346 2.8 3.7 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Tables 3.3  Revision rates for individual brands of prostheses (1/4/03 - 31/12/09) [9] 
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Cemented stem - Brand Manufacturer No. patients  3 year Revision rate  5 year Revision rate  
MS-30 Zimmer 1,425 0.9 1.3 
Stanmore modular Biomet 2,938 1 1.4 
C-stem Depuy 8,372 1.3 1.6 
Elite Plus Depuy 1,188 1.2 1.8 
Exeter V40 Stryker  67,015 1.3 1.9 
Charnley Depuy 13,565 1.3 2.1 
CPS-Plus Smith & Nephew 1,474 1.4 2.3 
CPT  Zimmer 10,226 1.8 2.5 
Muller STR Zimmer 1,177 1.4 2.6 
SP II Link Orthopaedics 1,271 2.4 2.9 
Muller -Biomet Biomet 1,469 2.4 3.3 
C-stem AMT Depuy 2,260 1 n/a 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 3.3 (b) cemented stems 
 
Cementless cup - Brand Manufacturer No. patients  3 year Revision rate  5 year Revision rate  
Trident Stryker  16,079 1.7 2.4 
Reflection cementless Smith  & Nephew 2,730 1.2 2.5 
Triology Zimmer 11,652 2 2.5 
Pinnacle Depuy 24,581 2.2 2.9 
Duraloc cementless cup Depuy 4,911 2.4 3.2 
CSF JRI 10,399 2.6 3.2 
Exceed Biomet 3,396 1.8 3.3 
Plasma cementless cup B Braun/Aesculap 1,296 2.6 3.3 
Allofit Zimmer 1,703 2.3 3.6 
EPF-Plus Smith & Nephew 3,734 3.1 4.7 
CSF Plus JRI 2,957 2.3 n.a 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Tables 3.3(c) cementless cups 
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Cementless stem - Brand Manufacturer No. patients  3 year Revision rate  5 year Revision rate  
Accolade Stryker  4,184 2.5 2.8 
Furlong HAC JRI 13,977 2.5 3.1 
Profemur Wright Medical 
UK Ltd 
1,004 3.1 3.1 
Taperloc Biomet 3,689 2.3 3.4 
Bimetric Biomet 1,834 2.8 3.4 
Synergy Smith & Nephew 2,156 2.1 3.7 
Corail Depuy 30,093 2.6 3.8 
ABG II Stryker  1,565 2.9 3.8 
SL-Plus Smith & Nephew 4,161 3.3 4.4 
Versys Zimmer 1,064 3.5 4.8 
S-ROM Depuy 1,018 4 5.5 
CLS  Zimmer 2,332 3.1 5.9 
Source: NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67]  
Table 3.3(d) cementless stems 
 
These tables allow me to establish four ‘new’ facts at the individual prosthesis level. 
3.3.1 There are considerable variations in revision rates within each of the four types.  
From Sibanda et al, it is only known in broad terms that, cemented prostheses display superior 
revision performance to cementless prostheses, but these are only averages for each type. What  
is not known is whether all cemented prostheses display superior survival than all cementless.  In 
fact, these new tables reveal considerable variability within each type.  For cemented cup, 5 year 
revision ranges from 1.2% for the Low Profile Muller (the 9th most commonly implanted) to 
3.7% for the Apollo (the 12th most commonly implanted). For cementless cups, the range is 
from 2.4% for the Trident (the second most commonly implanted) to 4.7% for the EPF-Plus (the 
7th most commonly implanted)13, For cemented stems, the MS-30 has the lowest 5 year revision 
rate of 1.3%, while the Muller-Biomet has the highest at 3.3.  For cementless stem, the lowest 
rate is the Accolade, 2.8% (the 3rd most commonly implanted cementless stem), while the 
highest revision rate is twice that: CLS with a revision rate of 5.9%.  In other words, the ratio of 
lowest-highest 5 year revision rates is in the region of between two or three to one. While these 
numerical differences in revision rates are fairly small in absolute terms, the importance of the 
variation is still potentially important: the differences could widen at later time points i.e. at 7 
 
13
 One prosthesis (CSF Plus) does not have a reported 5 year revision rate presumably because 5 year data are not 
yet available. 
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and 10 years; moreover, if NICE decided to revise its benchmark downwards, there is some 
indication that some prostheses may no longer be rated as successful. 
This can be summarised concisely with the equations reported in Table 3.4, in which the three 
and five year revision rates of different brands are regressed simply against dummy variables for 
each prosthesis type14.  This confirms that, as already known, both cementless stem and cup have 
higher revision rates than cemented stem and cup.  But equally important, the R squared reveals 
that there remains an unexplained 50% component of the variance - this represents the magnitude 
of variations between different prostheses within each type.  This suggests that it is misleading to 
ignore differences between brands within each type and that further analysis at the individual 
brand level is required1516.   
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*significant at the 0.05 level 
†R-squared -  3 year revision rate: 0.5964, 5 year revision rate: 0.5488, 
Robust standard errors are estimated to control for heteroscedasticity. 
Sample size: n=47, covering 345,316 prostheses 
Data used in regression analysis is sourced from  the following NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 3.4, Regressing revision rates against prosthesis type 
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14
 Cemented stem is the omitted default. 
15
 Although it should also be recognised that there may also be some confounding caused by the relative proportions 
of different bearing types within stem and cup combinations that affect brand comparisons. Alongside this there 
could also be an element of a performance and intensity bias introduced from high volume centres and surgeons. 
16
 In further regression experiments, I regressed the three and five year revision rates against dummy variables for 
manufacturers, but there were no significant differences between the manufacturers for 3 or 5 years and the R-
squared is particularly low (0.2137 and -0.1664 for 3 and 5 year revision rates respectively). Similarly, when 
manufacturer dummies were added to the prosthesis dummies, this did not add significantly to the overall fit shown 
in Table 3.4. 
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3.3.2 The 3 year revision rate is an imprecise predictor of the 5 year rate 
Of particular interest, now that there is more data on revision over a slightly longer time period, 
is whether the three year revision rate is a good predictor of the five year rate.  This is 
particularly relevant to the question is explored in Chapter 5. 
Table 3.5 reports the results of regressing five year revision rates against three year revision 
rates, with the individual brand of prosthesis as the unit of observation.  It shows that the three 
year rate is a positively significantly determinant of the five year rate. This is as expected – a 
prostheses which requires revision within the first three years is also more likely to within the 
first 5 years.  However, the regression coefficient (1.255) is not only significantly different from 
zero, it is also strongly significantly greater than unity, and this suggests that the differentials 
between prostheses tend to widen over time.  The R-squared of 0.8492, although a quite good fit, 
is by no means perfect; in other words, if prosthesis A performs better than B over the first three 
years after implant, this may not be so after 5 years17.  Figure 3.1 plots this relationship with the 
fitted regression line drawn in.  As can be seen, there are a number of outliers.  For example, 
there are three prostheses with a 3 year revision rate of 3.1; the fitted regression line predicts 
that, at that level of 3 year revision, 5 year revision should be 4.2.  However, this is a large 
under-prediction for the CLS (actual 5 year revision of 5.9), a smaller under-prediction for the 
EPF Plus (actual 4.8), and large over-prediction for the Profemur (actual 3.1).  If this magnitude 
of ‘error’ can occur with just an additional 2 years of experience, it calls into question whether 
even a 5 year rate is sufficient to predict what might happen over, say, the next 10 years after 
implant. 
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* significant at the 0.05 level  
†R-squared: 0.8492 
Sample size: n=47, covering 345,316 patientsRobust standard errors are estimated to control for heteroscedasticity. 
Data used in regression analysis is sourced from NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 3.5  Regressing five year revision rates against three year revision rate (brand level) 
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 The overall rank correlation coefficient is similarly high (ρ = 0.93) and is also high for cemented cup and stem (ρ 
= 0.95). However, for cementless cup and stem they are noticeably lower (ρ=0.71 and ρ=0.65 respectively). 
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Figure 3.1 The relationship between three and five year revision rates 
 
 
 
Data used in scatter plot is sourced from various authors of the following NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
 
Table 3.6 investigates whether the fit can be improved by adding dummy variables for the 
prosthesis types and manufacturer, but, as can be seen, none of the prosthesis types is 
significantly different from the default of cemented stem and only Wright Medical is significant 
(and negatively) different from the default dummy of Stryker (although Zimmer is significant at 
the 0.06 level).  
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*default manufacturer dummy: Stryker Howmedica Osteonics, default type dummy: cemented stem 
†significant at the 5% level 
‡R-squared: 0.8735 
Sample size: n=47, covering 345,316 prostheses 
Data used in regression analysis is sourced from the following NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 
Table 3.6, Regressing five year rates against three year rates controlling for manufacturers 
and prosthesis types  
 
 
3.3.3 There is no evidence that better performing (in terms of lower revision) brands achieve 
higher market shares (i.e. greater use in hospitals.) 
To test for this relationship, Figure 3.2 plots the market share of each prosthesis brand against its 
5 year revision rate. The Exeter V40 stands out as the outlier with a 17% market share and a 
fairly low revision rate of approximately 2%.   A simple regression equation reveals that there is 
no significant relationship between the two (this is true whether or not the outlier is excluded).   
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Figure 3.2 Relationship between manufacturer market share and revision rate 
 
 
 
 
Data used in scatter plot is sourced from various authors of the following NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67] 

3.3.4 There is no clear relationship between ODEP ratings, market shares and NJR revision rates 
As explained in Chapter 2, the NJR also reports the ODEP[2] ratings for the most implanted 
prostheses brands.  These new data on revision rates provide an opportunity to assess these 
ODEP ratings.   
First, the ODEP ratings are reproduced here in Tables 3.7.   
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    ODEP Rating 
Cemented stem - Brand Manufacturer 2009 2008 2007 
Contemporary Stryker  5A 5A 5A 
Elite Plus Ogee Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Elite Plus cemented cup Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Exeter Duration Stryker  10A 10A 10A 
Opera Smith & Nephew 10A 5B 5B 
ZCA Zimmer 10A 10A 10A 
Marathon cup Depuy Pre-entry Pre-entry - 
Charnley cemented cup Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Charnley Ogee Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Low Profile Muller Zimmer Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified 
Stanmore-Arcom Biomet 10A 10A 10A 
Cenator cemented cup Corin 3A 3A 3A 
Apollo Biomet Pre-entry Pre-entry Pre-entry 
(a) cemented cup [2] 
    ODEP Rating 
Cemented stem - Brand Manufacturer 2009 2008 2007 
Exeter V40 Stryker  10A 10A 10A 
CPT  Zimmer 10A 10A 7A 
Charnley cemented stem Depuy 10A 7A 10A 
C-stem cemented stem Depuy 10B 10B 10B 
C-stem AMT cemented 
stem 
Depuy 3A 3A - 
Stanmore modular Biomet 10A 10A 10A 
MS-30 Zimmer 10B 10B 10B 
CPCS Smith & Nephew 3A Pre-entry Pre-entry 
CPS-Plus Smith & Nephew 7A 7A 7A 
Muller-Biomet Biomet 5B 5B 5B 
Muller STR stem Zimmer 10A 10A 10A 
CCA cemented stem Mathys Orthopaedics 
Ltd 
10A 10A 10A 
Furlong cemented stem JRI 10C 10C 10C 
(b) cemented stem[2] 
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    ODEP rating 
Cementless cup - Brand Manufacturer 2009 2008 2007 
Pinnacle Depuy 7A 5A 3A 
Trident Stryker  5A 5A 3A 
Triology Zimmer 7A 7A 7A 
CSF Plus JRI Unclassified Unclassified Pre-entry 
Exceed Biomet 5A 5A 5A 
CSF JRI 10A 10A 10A 
EPF-Plus Smith & Nephew 3A 3A 3A 
Reflection cementless Smith  & Nephew 7A 7B 7B 
Duraloc cementless cup Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Allofit Zimmer 5A 5A 5A 
Procotyl Wright Medical UK 
Ltd 
Pre-entry Pre-entry - 
Trabecular metal cementless Zimmer 5A Pre-entry Pre-entry 
Plasma cementless cup B Braun/Aesculap 5A 5A 5A 
(c) cementless cup [2] 
    ODEP rating 
Cementless stem - Brand Manufacturer 2009 2008 2007 
Corail Depuy 10A 10A 10A 
Furlong HAC JRI 10A 10A 10A 
Accolade Stryker  5A 5B 3B 
Taperloc cementless stem Biomet 10A 10A 10B 
SL-Plus cementless stem Smith & Nephew 10A 10A 10A 
CLS cementless stem Zimmer 10A 10A 10A 
Synergy cementless stem Smith & Nephew 5A 5A 5A 
Profemur cementless stem Wright medical UK 
Ltd 
Pre-entry Pre-entry Pre-entry 
Bimetric cementless stem Biomet 10A 10A 10A 
Versys cementless stem Zimmer Various Various 3A 
S-Rom Depuy 10A 10A 7B 
ABG II cementless stem Stryker  5B 5B 5B 
Sourced from NJR annual reports:[9, 58, 60, 64-67]  
(d) cementless stem[2] 
Table 3.7- ODEP ratings for the most popular prosthesis brands 
According to the NHS Supply Chain[2], ODEP ratings are based on information from the NJR, 
peer-reviewed literature; and from the manufacturers themselves. Manufacturers are requested to 
keep ODEP informed of all commercially available prostheses which are involved in post market 
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clinical follow-up studies.  The two dimensions to the ODEP classification are explained in 
Figure 2.1 in chapter 2; the numerical rating indicates the number of years evidence on which the 
rating is based, and the alphabetic rating indicates the strength of the evidence (10A being 
strongest.)   
Inspection of Table 3.7 reveals that over half (26/51) of the listed prostheses are awarded a 10 
rating, and 23 of these are rated as A.  More interestingly, 3 prostheses are given only a B or C 
rating after 10 years, and one of these (Furlong cemented stem with 10C) now only has 2 years 
to improve its data before it is deemed unacceptable.  Second, some of these (most popular) 
prostheses are being implanted despite there being no outcome data available to ODEP (CPCS 
cemented stem; profemur cementless stem; CSF, procotyl and Trabecular metal for cementless 
cups). Some of the other most implanted prostheses are based on only weak evidence, for 
example, at the 5 year level i.e. the Accolade and ABG II cementless stems and the Muller 
Biomet cemented stem.   
Table 3.8 reinforces these findings by presenting the ODEP ratings alongside the NJR 5 year 
revision rates and market shares for the 16 most used prostheses.  Although ten of the 16 are 
rated 10A, as noted earlier, the Furlong only receives a 10C rating from ODEP (and S-Stem is 
only rated 10B); two others (Trident and Contemporary) only have a 5 rating – in other words, 
their popularity is in spite of a limited evidence base.  Interestingly, some of these most popular 
brands are recording relatively high revision rates, notably the Corail, which has secured a large 
market share and a 10A rating, in spite of a relatively high revision rate of 3.8%18. 
  
 
18
 It should be noted that some brands of prostheses are implanted with a relative mix of bearings, for example: the 
Corail is often implanted with hard-on-hard bearings which are reported to have a slightly higher revision rate than 
metal on polyethylene bearings.  
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Brand ODEP rating Market share 5 year revision rate 
Exeter V40 10A 0.17 1.9 
Corail 10A 0.06 3.8 
Contemporary 5A 0.05 1.9 
Pinnacle 7A 0.05 2.9 
Charnley stem 10A 0.04 2.1 
Elite Plus Ogee 10A 0.04 1.3 
Trident 5A 0.04 2.4 
Trilogy 7A 0.04 2.5 
CSF 10A 0.03 3.2 
C-Stem 10B 0.03 1.6 
Furlong 10C 0.03 3.1 
Charnley cup 10A 0.02 2.1 
Charnley Ogee 10A 0.02 2.2 
CPT  10A 0.02 2.5 
Elite Plus  10A 0.02 1.8 
Exeter Duration 10A 0.02 2.2 
Source: NJR reports: [58, 60, 64, 65, 71-73] 
Table 3.8, ODEP rating, market share and revision rate by top 16 prosthesis brands  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
Ideally, if alternative prostheses are to be evaluated comparatively, we need reliable evidence on 
their long run survival/revision performance.  However, long run survival data are still 
unavailable on a widespread scale, and this is why the extrapolation techniques analysed in 
chapter 5 are so potentially important.  As a preliminary to that analysis, this chapter assesses 
what we can already learn from the early results on shorter-term survival, as published in the first 
seven years of the NJR. 
The only published paper to date on survival rates using NJR data is by Sibanda et al. Their main 
finding was that cemented prostheses perform better, in terms of their 3 year survival rates, than 
do the increasingly popular cementless. This chapter now updates their analysis to include 5 year 
revision data, and finds that the Sibanda result still holds.  Beyond this, it extends the depth of 
the analysis by examining revision rates for individual brands of prosthesis. It has four main 
results: (i) there are quite large variations in revision rates between different prostheses within 
each of these broad types; (ii) the three year revision rate is an imperfect predictor of the 5 year 
!2
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rate, in other words, data on early revision may give a misleading impression of revision in the 
longer run, (iii) there is no apparent tendency for the prostheses with the lowest revision rates to 
be the most commonly implanted in the NHS; and (iv) the ODEP classifications do not appear to 
be closely related to the emerging evidence on revision rates from the NJR19. 
 
  
 
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 Consideration of the articulation type is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4, A review of the economic evaluation literature comparing 
the alternative hip prostheses used in THR surgery20 
 
4.1 Background 
The objective of this chapter is to critically appraise and summarise current published evidence 
on the costs and cost-effectiveness of using alternative prostheses in THR surgery[74, 75]. 
Economic evaluation (see section 1.4.1, for an introduction to economic evaluation) is widely 
used to inform policy decisions regarding which new healthcare technologies should be adopted 
given the available resources[76]. NICE provides guidance to the NHS in England and Wales on 
the clinical and cost-effectiveness of new and already developed technologies and within this, 
provides recommendations on the principles and methods of health technology appraisal[77].  
From an economic perspective, some or all of the direct medical costs of implanting a new or 
alternative hip prosthesis may be offset by reductions in the subsequent direct medical costs 
associated with complications and/or secondary intervention and also by an earlier return to 
productive activity.  
Health care purchasers (in the NHS, surgeons and clinical or finance managers) are motivated by 
a desire to buy the most effective prostheses for patients but are also constrained by health 
budgets, meaning they increasingly demand greater ‘value for money’ from the prostheses. 
Potential important differences in non-medical resource use and costs may also result from the 
use of different prostheses. These include productivity losses (absence from paid/unpaid work) 
associated with differing lengths of rehabilitation/functional status; other patient out-of-pocket 
expenses (e.g. travel costs); impact on social care services (both publicly and privately funded; 
community and domiciliary care). 
In the UK, the ODEP[53] (section 2.1.3) provides a rating for prostheses based on data submitted 
by the manufacturers. For example, the Charnley cemented cup and stem both have a rating of 
10A, designating strong clinical evidence of prosthesis survival at 10 years (NICE 
 
20
 A version of this chapter has been published in a peer reviewed journal[66], a parallel piece of work on knee 
prostheses was published as an editorial in 2009[67]. 
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benchmark)[20]. However, to date, no studies have systematically summarised current economic 
evidence to compare the impact of different types of prostheses on costs and cost-effectiveness.  
This chapter specifically aims to: 
1. Assess the completeness of the evidence base for resource use, costs and cost-effectiveness; 
2.  Assess the applicability of the available evidence to inform resource allocation decisions in 
the UK NHS. 
Section 4.2 describes the methods used; section 4.3 describes the identified studies and their 
results; section 4.4 discusses and section 4.5 concludes. There are also four appendices 
(Appendices 3-6). 
 
4.2 Methods  
The search strategy criteria to identify relevant papers and approach to data extraction is 
described below: 
4.2.1 Criteria for considering studies for this review 
Types of studies:  Full economic evaluation studies (cost-effectiveness analyses, cost-utility 
analyses or cost-benefit analysis), defined as the comparative analysis of alternative courses of 
action (e.g. healthcare treatments) in terms of both their costs and their consequences (e.g. 
clinical effects)[78]. Partial economic evaluation studies which compare alternatives in terms of 
their costs only (i.e. cost analyses)[78]. (See figure 1. Chapter 1.) 
Types of participants: Adults 18 years or over. 
Types of Interventions: Any THR surgery using any type of hip prosthesis (using any surgical 
technique) compared to THR surgery using any other type of prosthesis (any surgical 
technique)21. [11] 
Types of outcome measures:  
 
21
 Cost effectiveness studies comparing THR surgery with 'no intervention' were not included in the review. This 
review is concerned with the alternative prostheses used in THR surgery and their comparative success. Arguably, in 
fact surgery is the only real treatment option for patients with end stage joint degeneration of the hip [11]. 
2.

1. Direct medical resource use: prosthesis, operative time, post-operative care, length of post-
operative hospital stay (los), management of surgical/ implant/post-operative complications, 
medication, use of therapy services, use of adult social care services, revision surgery within 
follow-up period, long-term revision surgery (prosthesis failure) 
2. Non-medical resource use: productivity losses (sick days, lost wages) - patient: productivity 
losses (sick days, lost wages) - informal carer(s): other patient/family out-of-pocket expenses 
(travel to hospital visit) 
3. Health effects; Post-operative pain, surgical/implant/post-op complications, physical 
functioning, health related quality of life (HR-QoL), mortality/survival, quality adjusted life 
years (QALYs),  
Note that direct assessments of revision and bilateral surgery are excluded as they are not within 
the scope of the thesis. 
 
4.2.2.Search methods for identification of studies 
Electronic searches 
I searched MEDLINE (1950 to May 2010); EMBASE (1980 to 2010 week 20) Cinahl (1971 to 
May 2010);  The Cochrane Library (Issue 5, 2010): The Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews; Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE) and Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) database; Health Economic Evaluations Database (HEED) (1992 to 6 June 
2010); the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (NHS EED) (1992 to 6 June 2010)  and the 
European Network of Health Economic Evaluation Databases (EURONHEED) (2000 to 6 June 
2010).  
A search strategy was developed and adapted for use in each electronic database. An example of 
the search strategy used in OVID Medline is provided in Appendix 3. 
Searching other resources  
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Grey literature searching was outside the scope of this review. However, I reviewed 
bibliographies of the included economic evaluations to identify additional eligible economic 
evaluations.  
4.2.3. Data collection and analysis  
Selection of studies 
The titles and abstracts of the literature search results were screened for eligible economic 
evaluations. Full text reports of all eligible studies were sought. Excluded studies were listed 
with the reasons for their exclusion. Articles published in languages other than English were 
excluded since translation was outside the scope of the current review.  
Data extraction and management 
Data extraction was carried out using a two-stage process[79]. First, risk-of-bias in generating 
clinical effect estimates utilised in each economic evaluation (if applicable) was assessed using a 
tool endorsed by the Cochrane Bone, Muscle and Joint Trauma Group[49]. Study quality was 
assessed using a more general tool, the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklist 
for: (i) cohort studies [80]  and (ii) randomised controlled trials[81].  Next, an overall assessment 
of the methodological quality of each economic evaluation was made, informed by applying the 
guidelines for authors and peer reviewers of economic submissions to the British Medical 
Journal (BMJ)  and, in the case of model-based full economic evaluations, a checklist for best 
practice guidelines in decision-analytic modeling[82]. An example of a completed data 
extraction form is presented in Appendix 4. 
Data Synthesis 
The extracted data were synthesised by summarising the methodological quality of each study in 
tables, these tables were then supplemented with a narrative summary. All estimates of costs 
reported in the literature were converted to British currency values (GBP) using exchange rates 
based on Purchasing Power Parities and inflated to 2008 prices using a web-based conversion 
tool[83]. Results are reported according to: study type, perspective, comparator, study design, 
time horizon, data sources, health benefit measures, discount rate, uncertainty and sponsorship.  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Description of studies  
Results of the search 
3,270 papers were retrieved by electronic searches (Figure 4.1). Of these, 194 potentially eligible 
abstracts were retrieved for further screening. Papers were excluded if they did not compare two 
or more prostheses, or were not a full or partial economic evaluation.  16 studies identified for 
possible inclusion are not reported in English and in some cases did not include an English 
language abstract, these studies are not included in this review. A total of 17 potentially eligible 
studies were identified amongst the 194 abstracts and are therefore included in this review.  
2

Figure 4.1 - Quorum statement flow diagram 
[79]
 
Records of reviews & protocols 
containing economic terms: 
n = 3,270 
Abstracts retrieved for further 
screening: 
n = 194 
Records of reviews excluded 
because the abstract did not 
include economic references or 
comparison of 2+ prostheses: 
n = 3,076 
Records of reviews with usable 
information: 
n = 32 
Records excluded following 
inspection of full-text: 
n = 160 
Records to be reviewed: 
n = 17 
Records in foreign language: 
n = 16 
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Included studies 
Appendix 5 provides a summary of the 17 included studies based on the Drummond et al 
checklist for economic evaluation studies [84]. A narrative summary of the characteristics and 
methods of included studies is presented below.  
Study Design: Ten studies are classified as full economic evaluations (cost-effectiveness analyses 
[85-89]  and cost-utility analyses [22, 90-93]; no eligible cost-benefit analyses were identified. 
These studies either employ the survival rate of the prosthesis as the measure of health benefit 
[85-89], or combine survival and HR-QoL measures to calculate QALYs [22, 90-93]. Nine 
studies are model-based evaluations and these can be further classified into two sub-groups: (i) 
deterministic models (e.g. Daellenbach et al [87]) and (ii) probabilistic Markov model (e.g. 
Briggs et al [22]).
 
The stated purpose of some of these studies is largely methodological [22, 86, 
87, 92]; they aim to develop a methodology which can also be applied to other healthcare 
interventions, using THR and the specific prostheses as an illustrative example to demonstrate a 
more widely generalisable modelling approach.  However, this fact does not limit the reliability 
of the findings of these studies.  Indeed, results from Briggs et al [22] have been used to inform 
NICE guidelines on hip prostheses [20]. One CUA is a retrospective cohort study conducted 
using additional questionnaire data [93]. 
Seven studies [94-100] are classified as cost analyses. Average total costs per patient by 
treatment group (surgery or prosthesis type) are the main outcome measures reported in these 
seven studies.                                                                                                                                                 
Country: Seven studies were based primarily on UK data, with the others based primarily on data 
from Australia, USA, Sweden, New Zealand, Germany, Italy Israel and Belgium.  Full economic 
evaluations using revision rates for prostheses derived from populations outside of the UK [22, 
86, 87, 93] would need to be further examined for differences in patient characteristics and 
surgical implantation techniques before results could be applied to the UK setting. Cost analysis 
studies [94, 96, 98, 100] using data from outside of the UK are based on different health care 
systems with differing study populations, thus generalisability of these results to the UK setting 
are of limited use other than to explore cost variation of prostheses as a component of THR 
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surgery. Furthermore, some of the older studies using UK data are of limited use in terms of the 
relevance to current NHS practice[101]. 
Interventions: Only one full economic evaluation conducts a head-to-head comparison between 
two specific brands of hip prostheses[22]. Four studies compare the Charnley prosthesis with an 
unspecified alternative (Appendix 5) and ten studies report the comparison as either ‘cemented 
vs cementless’ or ‘cemented/or hybrid’ (see Appendix 5), with no brand information.  Scheerlink 
et al[96]
 
make cost comparisons across three different brands of prostheses and an unnamed 
‘other’. 
Time horizon: NICE[77] recommends using a time horizon sufficiently long to reflect all 
important differences in costs and outcomes between the alternatives under evaluation. In this 
case, hip prostheses can last for up to approximately 20 years following implantation[53]. As 
Appendix 5 reports, a variety of time horizons are used for model-based economic evaluations 
included in this review, ranging from five years[91] to 60 years[22, 90, 92].  
Analytic perspective: General guidance on conducting an economic evaluation recommends 
adopting a broad societal analytic perspective as the gold standard, but it is widely recognised 
that a narrower analytic perspective (e.g. health care system) may be sufficient if the purpose of 
the evaluation is to inform decisions that will be made within a narrower constituency (e.g. 
health care system)[84]. All studies identified in this review consider only those costs (resource 
use) relevant from the perspective of the health care system. One study[87] mentions the wider 
perspectives of society and the patient but resource use and costs that would be relevant from 
these perspectives are not included in the analysis.  
Outcome measures of health gain: Five of the full economic evaluation studies report survival 
rate of the prosthesis as the primary measure of health benefit; either as an observed rate (see 
Appendix 5), or a rate statistically extrapolated over a longer time horizon. Three studies[88-90] 
report survival rates for prosthesis types, varying the length of years through sensitivity analysis 
of the extrapolated survival rates at which survival was recorded.  In general, there is a lack of 
long-term prosthesis survival data. In order to overcome this difficulty, studies employ statistical 
extrapolation of prosthesis survival data over a longer time horizon. Briggs et al[22] examine a 
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range of parametric survival models and conclude that the Weibull distribution fits best to the 
data; the data are then extrapolated over 60 years. 
While survival is a useful measure of health gain, QALYs have the advantage that they combine 
length of survival with quality of life. Thus they enable comparisons between different health-
care interventions in terms of a single measure of relative efficiency (i.e. cost per QALY), 
informing resource allocation decisions based on considerations of allocative efficiency across 
interventions[102]. Five economic evaluation studies used QALYs as their composite measure of 
health benefit[22, 90-93]. However, only Briggs et al[22] and Givon et al[93] conducted primary 
research on HR-QoL in a THR patient population  to inform QALY estimates. Briggs et al used 
the EQ-5D questionnaire and Givon et al used the Rosser index to inform QALY estimates.  
Direct medical resource use, unit costs and costs 
Table 4.1 records the unit costs of the prostheses reported in each study: it shows the range 
between the cheapest and most expensive for the two broad types of prosthesis, and then for 
specific named prostheses within each type. In general, cemented prostheses were cheaper than 
cementless, ranging (in this literature) from £691 (Multicentre)[99] to £2,845 (Beuchel 
Pappes)[99] for cementless, ranging from  £455 (Stanmore)[99] to £1,693 (Titan)[99] for 
cemented.   
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  Min cost  (literature) Max cost (literature) 
CEMENTED (Mean) £515 [21] £1,084 [30] 
Charnley £395 [8] £943 [29] 
Stanmore £455 [33] £990 [29] 
Titan £1,693 [33] £1,693 [33] 
CEMENTLESS (mean) £1,819 [31] £5,785 [34] 
Multicentre £691 [33] £960 [33] 
Spectron £903 [8] £1,134 [22] 
Buechel Pappes £2,845 [33] £2,845 [33] 
HYBRID (mean) £1,886 [32] £4,452 [34] 
Table 4.1 - Prosthesis costs (rebased to 2008 prices, in GBP) [83] 
The average total cost of the THR procedure per patient reported in the studies ranges from 
£4,599[89] to £8,078[96]. Most studies reporting resource use and costs alongside the cost of the 
prosthesis assume these to be equal for each prosthesis type[99]. 
According to Scheerlink et al[96] implantation of the prosthesis (including the prosthesis itself), 
accounts for the second largest component of the total cost of THR surgery (21.3%), with 
hospital length of stay (LOS) being the largest component. The reported range of mean LOS in 
days is from 7.3[99] to 23[97] with mean costs varying from £2,101[89] to approximately 
£7,081[88] (obtained through sensitivity analysis).  
The range for duration of surgery (theatre time) is 60 to 246 minutes[96]. Unnanuntana[94] is the 
only study to report duration of surgery separately for cemented, cementless and hybrid (femoral 
stem), finding that operative time for a cementless stem is approximately 20 minutes less than for 
both hybrid and cemented stems. Reported costs for duration of surgery show wide variation 
from £1,128[90] to £6,176 (obtained through sensitivity analysis) [88]. Scheerlink et al[96] 
reports medication costs as approximately 9% of the total cost of the procedure, breaking them 
down according to prosthesis brand, but reporting no apparent differences.  
Non-medical resource use: No studies report non-medical resource use. However, it is 
anticipated that if they were included in an economic evaluation, the overall impact would be to 
increase the cost-effectiveness of THR surgery as an intervention. However, it is not anticipated 
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that this would lead to large additional variations between the alternative prostheses because the 
majority of patients receiving surgery are of retirement age and their main costs incurred are 'out 
of pocket' expenses such as cost of travel and alternative medicines. These costs are not 
anticipated to differ dramatically between alternative types of prostheses.Ideally it would be 
good to confirm this nonetheless. 
Data sources used to populate the model: Nine studies used primary research to inform their 
analysis (for example, as discussed above, Briggs et al elicited HR-QoL data from THR 
patients). The remaining eight all used purely secondary data sources. 
Sensitivity analysis: Only one of the full economic evaluation studies [93] does not conduct 
sensitivity analysis to address uncertainty. In their 2009 guidance, NICE describe three types of 
potential selection bias or uncertainty to consider: Structural uncertainty (categorisation of 
different states of health and the representation of different pathways of care); source of values to 
inform parameters and parameter precision (uncertainty around the mean health, and cost inputs 
in the model).  
Daellenbach et al[87] perform sensitivity analysis on the ‘less-reliable’ input data defined as: the 
intangible costs of re-operation surgery (implicitly including those of the patient) and the 
expected failure rate of the prosthesis.  Baxter and Bevan[88] perform sensitivity analysis on 
many of the parameters of their model, identifying the main cost drivers (hospital costs, 
prosthesis price and revision rates). Gillespie et al[86] conduct sensitivity analysis on the ‘break-
even price ratios’ for hypothetical prostheses at various years using four hypothetical rates of 
prosthetic failure. Briggs et al[22] and Spiegelhalter and Best[92]  use probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis (PSA) applied to parameter uncertainty in the model, conducting sub-group analysis by 
age and gender. Marinelli et al[91] also perform sensitivity analysis on revision rates, prosthesis 
costs, preoperative mortality, infection rates and utility values, however the details of the 
approach employed are not fully reported.  
Risk of bias 
The reliability of any full economic evaluation depends  in part on its use of reliable clinical data, 
including data on beneficial and adverse effects, complications and secondary interventions[79]. 
Most of the included studies use observational data, such as from joint registries, to inform their 
2(

analysis. Although Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) are often thought of as the gold standard 
to inform economic evaluation studies[103], evaluation of THR is a context where the use of 
RCTs is of limited use in terms of the nature of the procedure, due to the long-term follow-up to 
observe time until revision surgery. Appendix 6 tabulates the assessment of risk of bias. No 
studies report blinding or randomization of participants. Appendix 6 shows that of the seventeen 
studies, inclusion and exclusion criteria are stated in five studies, and the intervention and 
outcome measures are defined in thirteen and fourteen respectively.   
Discount Rate: All but one[93] of the full economic evaluation studies use a discount rate to 
account for time preference of costs and benefits which accrue in the future, varying from 5 to 
6% for costs and 1.5 to 6% for benefits. 
 
4.3.2 Summary of main findings 
Table 4.2 reports the Incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs)22 for economic evaluations 
studies which report them[22, 91, 92]  (the extra cost per unit of outcome obtained, in comparing 
one treatment with another)[104].[93] It is important to note here that the limited reporting of the 
methods for Marinelli et al[91] makes the strength of their findings difficult to assess. Although 
Speigelhalter and Best[92] calculate they state that their results should “not be taken as 
contributing in any way to guidance as to an appropriate prosthesis” (pg 3692) as they use . The 
remaining 13 studies do not report ICERs as they do not include a HR-QoL outcome in their 
study. The results in table 4.2 reveal that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from these 
disparate results. 
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 All ICERs reported in this table are incremental costs per QALY gained. 
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Study Age of patient (yrs) ICER Age of patient ICER 
  Males Females 
Briggs (2004): Charnley 
vs Spectron 
80 years    3,768 70 years  673 
 90 years    11,697  80 years  7,000 
    90 years    18,839 
Spiegelhalter (2003)**: 
Charnley vs hypothetical 
alternative 
55-64 years     581 55-64 years     537 
65-74 years     5,190  65-74 years     4,710 
75-84 years     13,220 75-84  years    12,030 
> 84 years  21,830 > 84 years 18,790 
  
Pre-op QALY score 
at baseline 
Cemented Cementless Hybrid 
Givon (1998)***: 
cemented vs hybrid vs 
cementless with and 
without hydroxyapatite 
coating 
0.50 7,749 10,241 10,352 
0.60 10,329 13,108 13,290 
0.70 15,484 18,203 18556 
0.80 30,732 29775 30,732 
Marinelli (2008): 
cemented vs cementless 
broad types 
Cementless prosthesis  £48 
*Costs rebased to 2008 prices, in GBP [83] 
** illustrative only, authors state results should “not be taken as contributing in any way to guidance as to an 
appropriate prosthesis” [92] 
*** reported at baseline assessment. 
Table 4.2, Incremental cost effectiveness ratios from reported studies 
 
Other Results 
Daellenbach at el[87] conclude that the higher cost cementless prostheses must last 6 to 9 extra 
years before revision surgery in order to yield the same expected present value as a cemented 
prosthesis. Fitzpatrick et al[90] report that of the cemented prostheses, the Charnley, Stanmore 
and Exeter perform relatively well in terms of time until prosthesis failure. Based on their model, 
they report that a cementless prosthesis costing approximately 300% more than the Charnley or 
other established prostheses was unlikely to reduce the revision risk sufficiently to produce any 
cost savings. Two studies[88, 89] report results for the Stanmore and Charnley by calculating the 
total expected cost of the prostheses over 20 years, reporting that the Stanmore is slightly more 
cost-effective than the Charnley.   
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4.4 Discussion  
This review has systematically searched for, assessed and summarised literature on the costs and 
cost-effectiveness of using alternative prostheses in THR surgery. It has identified several 
methodological problems in the literature including a lack of observed long term prosthesis 
survival data, limited up-to-date UK based evidence and exclusion of patient and societal 
perspectives.  
Several limitations of this systematic review should be highlighted when interpreting these 
principal findings. Foreign language studies were considered outside the scope of this review, 
thus sixteen studies were excluded. For all foreign language studies, English language abstracts 
were sought to further determine whether the study met the inclusion criteria, in some cases no 
abstract at all or no English language abstract was available. In the remaining cases it was not 
clear from the abstract whether or not the study would meet the inclusion criteria. From 
screening titles, all foreign language studies appear to be partial economic evaluations and thus 
the generalisability of the study to the UK context (for the purpose of this review) is anticipated 
to be limited due to international differences in health care settings. Hand searches and grey 
literature searches were not undertaken. 
 Only seven studies were based primarily on UK data, with some of the older studies being of 
limited use in terms of the relevance to current NHS practice. Where studies were non-UK 
based, revision rates for prostheses derived from populations outside of the UK require further 
detail of patient characteristics and surgical implantation techniques before results can be applied 
to the UK setting. Cost analysis studies have generally been based on different health care 
systems with differing study populations, thus limiting the applicability of these results to the 
UK, NHS context.  
One of the methodological limitations of the studies identified in this review is the different 
types of economic models used, making comparability across studies difficult: none of the 
studies compared alternative models to answer the same question. The main difference between 
the types of model identified in this review is in the description of disease progression.  Markov 
modelling[22, 90-92] involves dividing a patient’s possible prognoses into a series of health 
states. The probabilities defining the transitions between each of these states are specified over a 
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single cycle of the model[90].  The model is then run over a number of cycles to view how a 
typical patient would move between states over a specified time period, consisting of several 
cycles. The transition probabilities reported in the Markov models in this review are calculated 
based on data obtained from a range of different sources, including life tables, clinical trials and 
other published sources. Crucially, because the empirical studies typically observe data used to 
generate transition probabilities over a limited follow-up period, the authors also employ 
statistical methods to extrapolate beyond the time horizon of observed data, for example the risk 
of revision. The Markov models identified in this review, are also fully probabilistic in their 
approach to managing uncertainty in the model parameters, NICE now requires the use of PSA 
for all cost effectiveness submissions[77]. 
On the other hand, the deterministic cost-effectiveness models (Daellenbach et al)[87] use more 
simplified assumptions.  A key difference relates to the treatment of prosthesis survival rates.  
While studies using a Markov approach allow for the possibility that a prosthesis may fail at any 
point in time (according to a probability distribution), deterministic models assume a range of 
values for the expected life of a cemented prosthesis, and then determine, for each of these 
values, the increase in the expected life of a cementless prosthesis required in order for the two to 
have the same net present value cost (for various age groups). This assumes that a prosthesis will 
fail at a specific point in time. Other studies[85, 86, 88, 89] use a similar approach. Faulkner et 
al[89] estimate expected costs over twenty years using data from other studies and using 
statistical extrapolation to predict future revision rates.  
A significant knowledge gap and challenge to research in this area relates to observed survival 
rates.  NICE currently define their benchmark for revision rate as being 10% at 10 years[20]. 
Some studies in this review have employed methods of extrapolation of the data in order to 
estimate survival rates into the future. However, these are based on very short time periods of 
observed data. This highlights the need for more trials comparing different prostheses with long-
term follow up. Only one full economic evaluation carried out a head-to-head comparison 
between two different manufacturer named prostheses[22]. Further economic evaluations of the 
prostheses according to their manufacturer rather than type (cemented/cementless) are needed, 
given the large number of prostheses, the likely variability within specific types of prostheses 
and the technological changes that have occurred over time. It is recommended that clinical trials 
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should include an economic evaluation  during pre-trial modeling (employing a Bayesian 
iterative approach), which would inform the trial design and subsequent extrapolation of trial 
data[105]. 
In order to comprehensively assess whether an intervention provides value-for-money, 
information on non-medical resource use and productivity losses should also be sought and taken 
into account, even though not required in assessment guidelines for some agencies (e.g. NICE).   
Failure to take into account these costs and benefits may hide the fact that they are being merely 
shifted onto another sector[106]. We have identified very limited consideration of the patients’ 
and society’s costs and resource use in the literature. Baxter and Bevan[88] recommend further 
research combining prosthesis survival and HR-QoL. 
This review also highlights the lack of up-to-date published studies using UK data, fourteen out 
of the seventeen studies included in this review were conducted over five years ago.  The recent 
development of the NJR will provide an opportunity to produce more up-to-date analysis using 
data from England and Wales. 
Finally, the range of costs of prostheses from table 4.1 provides an interesting perspective 
regarding the NHS national tariff for primary THR (an individual tariff is derived for each 
hospital patient episode, represented by the average cost of providing a particular 
procedure)[107]. This tariff specifies how much hospitals are reimbursed for treatments, in 
2008/9 this was £5,220 for cemented and £5,587 for cementless prostheses (2008/9)[108].  The 
tariffs include a component for length of stay (currently £4,262 and £4,193 respectively)[108], 
implying very low tariffs for the surgical procedure itself (about £1,000 and £1,400 respectively).  
This is deserving of further research, to understand the potential tradeoffs that could occur across 
the range of prostheses in terms of ‘profit’ versus effectiveness.    
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This review highlights the need for more clinical trials including economic evaluations [109] and 
comparing different prostheses with long-term follow up.  The establishment of the NJR for 
England and Wales provides a unique opportunity to address this gap as the registry collects 
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longer term data into the future. It also enables international comparisons of those countries with 
existing joint registries. Moreover, the recent introduction of PROMs (Patient Reported Outcome 
Measures) nationally for hip and knee replacement surgery will help to address the observed gap 
in the literature on the perspective of the patients undergoing surgery.  
The next chapter explores methods for extrapolating current survival rates into the future in order 
to address the problem of lack of long term survival data on hip prostheses. 
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Chapter 5, Extrapolating survival curves to predict future prosthesis 
failure23 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 explained that the NJR was established to provide data on prosthesis survival, 
but that, to date, the registry only has published survival rates of up to 5 years post surgery which 
is insufficient to inform us about the long term survival of a prosthesis. As a consequence, 
chapter 4 provided a review of the published economic evaluation literature on hip prostheses, 
concluding that it is hampered by the lack of long term survival data on brands of hip prostheses. 
Although ODEP provides summarised evidence on the survival of prostheses used in England 
and Wales, this evidence is dependent on the manufacturers submitting data and also on the 
published literature. Thus there are some prostheses which are widely implanted but with no or 
little evidence of their success in terms of survival rate. The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
whether the techniques of survival analysis can be employed to forecast long-term survival of 
prostheses on the basis of only relatively short-run data. 
Survival analysis, which is concerned with the time until the occurrence of an event, is widely 
used in medical research,[110] and in other academic disciplines for analogous purposes. 
Typically, at any point in time, many individuals in the dataset have not had the event of interest: 
this is known as right censoring of the data.[111] Standard non-parametric survival analysis 
methods are used to handle this, such as the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. Semi-parametric 
methods, such as the Cox proportional hazards model can be employed to allow survival to 
depend on patient characteristics[111], and for descriptive purposes these are entirely 
satisfactory. However, they are of limited use for extrapolation and predictive purposes because 
they leave the baseline hazard function unspecified.[110]  Instead, parametric models which 
assume a baseline hazard can be fitted to the data and then used to extrapolate into the future. 
There are a range of alternative parametric distributions which vary in how precisely the baseline 
hazard is modelled. 
 
 
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 A version of this chapter has been submitted and reviewed by Medical Decision Making, it is currently under a 
'review and re-submit' status. 
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5.2 Aims 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the accuracy of survival analysis in projecting future revision 
rates beyond the sample estimation period. A previous well-known study[112, 113] is used, 
which is the only paper to have extrapolated prosthesis survival rates comparatively using 
registry data, theirpaper contributed to the NICE guidance on hip prostheses in 2000[114]. The 
original dataset used in that study has been extended to include eight years more data and thus 
enables assessment of the accuracy of predictions which would have been made in 2000, in the 
light of a longer time series, up to 2007. More specifically, extrapolations of the original 
estimated parametric curves are used to predict the outcomes over the subsequent years, and then 
compared with the actual outcomes. Since the predictions prove to be disappointing, I investigate 
three possible explanations: (i) the proportionality assumption is inappropriate for modeling 
differences between prostheses, (ii) the survival curves do not follow the Weibull distribution, 
(iii) the Weibull may be appropriate, but its parameters cannot be estimated accurately with only 
little early data. 
 
5.3 Methods 
The purpose of Briggs et al.[112, 113] was to construct a probabilistic Markov cost-effectiveness 
model for primary total hip replacement.  An important requirement for this model is information 
on the transition probabilities between states of the model.  Briggs et al. derive these by 
estimating survival functions for two illustrative prostheses, the Charnley (cemented) and 
Spectron (cementless).  It is these estimated survival functions which are the focus of this chapter 
– examining how well they predict the subsequent survival of the prostheses for the period 2000-
2007. 
Briggs et al. model the risk of revision using the Weibull survival function, and in order to 
compare two alternative prostheses, they make a proportionality assumption with respect to the 
effect of prosthesis type. That is, they assume that the survival of each prosthesis could be 
described by a Weibull distribution with the same Gamma parameter (γ), but allowing the 
Lambda (λ) parameter to differ between the prostheses.  To aid interpretation, recall that the 
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Weibull distribution is characterised by two parameters: λ (scale) and γ (shape), with a hazard 
function: h(t) = γλtγ-1, which reduces to the exponential distribution h(t) = λ, if γ =1. 
Briggs et al. make a distinction between ‘early’ and ‘late’ failures: early failures are identified 
with reasons such as primary deep infection and dislocation, while late failures are due to failure 
of the prosthesis itself (general ‘wear and tear’). They employ data on late failures from the 
SHAR to estimate survival: and use them alongside health outcomes QALYs and cost data to 
assess the relative cost-effectiveness of the two prostheses.    
Recall from chapter 2, that SHAR contains information on prosthesis type, surgical procedure, 
patient characteristics, health outcomes (such as the EQ-5D), time to event data (prosthesis 
failure and revision surgery), and reasons for revision.  Briggs et al. employ data from SHAR for 
the period 1992-1999, for all patients receiving either a Charnley or Spectron prosthesis.  Both 
the Charnley and the Spectron prostheses are implanted in England and Wales, although the 
Spectron cementless cup has more recently been updated and renamed 'Reflection'. The NJR 
only reports ratings for the Spectron cemented stem and not the cementless stem. Survival rates 
from SHAR and NJR annual reports are not easily comparable as SHAR reports survival rates at 
5 and 10 years (96.4% at 5 years and 92.5% at 10 years and 97.6% at 5 years and 93.3% at 10 
years for the Charnley and the Spectron respectively), and the NJR reports 3 and 5 year survival 
rates for the Charnley stem only (98.7% at 3 years and 97.9% at 5 years). The NJR reports 
ODEP ratings for the Charnley cup and stem as 10A (10 year data, failure of 10% or less) and 
7A (7 year data, failure rate of 7% or less) for the Reflection cementless cup and 10A for the 
Spectron cemented stem. Thus exact comparison of the rating/rates of the two prosthesis types 
for the two countries is not easily possible, although it does indicate rough similarity and so 
confirms the appropriateness of applying Swedish data to patients in England. 
 For the purpose of this thesis, I have been provided with - access to an additional eight years 
subsequent data was possible, extending the period to 2007. Appendix 7 provides a detailed 
description of the process of obtaining these updated data.  
As a first step, I recovered those patients who would have appeared in the original Briggs et al. 
dataset, that is having had their primary surgery before 2000. I then constructed two forms of the 
dataset for this sample: 
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SHORT which shows their outcome as it would have appeared at the end of 1999 
LONG which shoes their outcome as it appears at the end of 2007. 
Thus, both forms refer to the same set of patients, but LONG differs from SHORT in that those 
prostheses which are shown as surviving at the end of 1999, are now revised – recording a date 
of revision if this subsequently occurred between 2000 and 2007, or date of patient death, or 
continued survival if the patient had still not required a revision by the end of 2007.  This allows 
me to undertake non-parametric, and parametric analysis over both an 8 year period (for 
SHORT) and a 16 year period (for LONG).  
For clarity below, I will also refer to: 
ORIGINAL which is Briggs et al’s original sample of patients.  If I was able to perfectly match 
the data sent to me with the sample originally used by Briggs et al, SHORT would be identical to 
ORIGINAL. 
My analysis is undertaken in five stages.  First, I assess whether the matched 8 year dataset for 
1992-1999 (SHORT) appropriately replicates the original Briggs et al. sample (ORIGINAL).  I 
do this by comparing patient characteristics, revision rates, the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier and 
results of the Cox proportional hazards model.  
Secondly, the same non-parametric methods are applied to the extended LONG dataset for the 
same patients for 1992-2007 (LONG).  This provides a comparison between K-M and the Cox 
model computed on 8 and 16 years of observations, and allows a test of Briggs et al.’s original 
assumption of proportionality with respect to prosthesis type.  
The third stage involves re-estimating Briggs et al’s parametric models.  Focusing on just the 
late failures Briggs et al. use parametric approaches to quantify the baseline risk and extrapolate 
beyond the observed eight years to a lifetime time period.  They fit six alternative distributions 
(Weibull, Exponential, Gompertz, Log-logistic, Log-normal and Gamma) to the data, and 
compare the ‘goodness of fit’ using the AIC (Akaike's Information Criterion) and Cox-Snell 
residual plots. Their chosen alternative is the Weibull distribution.  Therefore in this stage I fit 
the Weibull distribution to the extended LONG data and compare parameters (I also test the fit of 
the other distributions). 
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Since a key finding in the third stage is that the assumption of proportional hazards for prosthesis 
type is rejected, this is dropped in the fourth stage, and the Weibull model is re-estimated for 
each prosthesis separately for LONG and SHORT.   
Finally, the fifth stage assesses the predictions of the original Briggs et al model, by comparing 
the estimated Weibull equations for the SHORT and LONG data. Ideally of course, the 
extrapolations (predictions) from Briggs et al.’s model should be assessed against the actual 
survival rates for 2000-2007, but in practice, this is infeasible given that predictions depend on 
the characteristics of individual patients, and will therefore differ across all patients in the 
sample24.  Therefore I employ a more practicable alternative approach by taking an illustrative 
patient (a female aged 60 years old without a fracture) and compare her predicted survival curve, 
projected from SHORT with the within-estimation period predictions for the years 9-16 taken 
from LONG.  This is conducted in two alternative ways.  First proportionality is assumed, as do 
Briggs et al, then the proportionality assumption is relaxed, that is the original model 
specification is used, but estimated separately for the Charnley and Spectron.  The first approach 
assesses the predictive performance of Briggs et al.’s original estimated equations, while the 
second assesses what their predictions would have been, had they not assumed proportionality.   
5.4 Results  
5.4.1  Matching data and replicating Briggs et al.’s results 
98.3% of all the patients in ORIGINAL were successfully identified. The remaining 1.7% 
(n=350) is due to occasional minor coding discrepancies between the form of the data originally 
made available to Briggs et al. and the form in which I received it. In all such cases, caution is 
exercised, by omitting these patients (i.e SHORT has 350 fewer patients than ORIGINAL). 
Table 4.1 reports the sample size, patient characteristics and number of revisions in the 
ORIGINAL and matched (SHORT) datasets. The descriptive statistics show that the two samples 
are virtually identical in terms of patient characteristics, age and gender.  
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 Even in quite large samples, the number of patients displaying a specific set of characteristics will often be too 
small to compute meaningful survival curves. 
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ORIGINAL* SHORT 
  
Charnley Spectron Charnley Spectron 
Patients 18,505 1,990 18,178 1,967 
Mean age (sd) 72 (9.2) 74 (8.1) 71 (9.2) 74 (8.1) 
Age distribution (%)     
   <40 years 70 (0.4) 5 (0.3) 66 (0.4) 5 (0.3) 
   40-50 years 264 (1.4) 16 (0.8) 251 (1.4) 15 (0.8) 
   50-60 years 1,418 (7.7) 60 (3.0) 1,389 (7.7) 60 (3.0) 
   60-70 years 4,836 (26.1) 391 (19.7) 4,753 (26.1) 385 (19.6) 
   70-80 years 8,090 (43.7) 1,014 (51.0) 7,945 (43.7) 1,000 (51.0) 
   80-90 years  3,630 (19.6) 481 (24.2) 3,581 (19.6) 479 (24.3) 
   >90 years 197 (1.1) 23 (1.2) 193 (1.1) 23 (1.2) 
Gender (%)     
   Female 12,337 (66.7) 1,472 (74.0) 12,108 (66.7) 1,453 (73.9) 
   Male 6,168 (33.3) 518 (26.0) 6,070 (33.3) 514 (26.1) 
Initial diagnosis (%)     
   Osteoarthritis 12,970 (70.1) 1,348 (67.7) 12,826 (79.5) 1,329 (69.8) 
   Fracture 1,692 (9.1) 319 (16.0) 1,662 (10.3) 317 (16.6) 
   Other 3,843 (20.8) 323 (16.2) 1,628 (10.1) 258 (13.5) 
Revisions (%)  
   1992-1999 552 (2.98) 22 (1.10) 528 (2.90) 21 (1.07) 
   1992-2000 - - 1,255 (6.90) 98 (4.98) 
*Source: Briggs et al.[113] Table 2, p. 42 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics 1992-9, Briggs et al.* compared to matched data  
 
With comparability of the two datasets confirmed, the next stage is to attempt to replicate Briggs 
et al.’s non-parametric survival analysis. Figure 5.1 shows the Kaplan-Meier (KM) survival 
curves by prosthesis. These are identical to those reported in Briggs et al.[113] for the matched 
data. Crucially, as found by Briggs et al., there is a clear separation of the two survival curves. 
The significance of this separation is confirmed using a log-rank test for equality of survivor 
functions, which shows a highly significant difference (p<0.001), as is also found in Briggs et 
al.[113] (cf. Table 1, pg. 42). The results of the reduced form proportional hazards model 
(including age, gender, and fracture as covariates in addition to prosthesis type) for SHORT are 
also very similar, to those for ORIGINAL (the first two columns of Table 5.2). Note that the 
different hazard ratios for fracture merely reflect a changed coding used in the new database: it 
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appears that there has been a change in how fracture is classified, this results in fracture in 
SHORT having a smaller hazard ratio than in ORIGINAL) 
 
Figure 5.1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for matched sample, 1992-1999 (SHORT) 
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ORIGINAL* SHORT LONG 
  
Hazard Ratio SE Hazard Ratio SE Hazard Ratio SE 
Spectron 0.435† 0.095 0.437† 0.097 0.876 0.092 
Age 0.974† 0.004 0.977† 0.004 0.968† 0.002 
Male 1.785† 0.15 1.715† 0.147 1.683† 0.092 
Fracture 1.718† 0.221 1.217 0.167 1.009 0.009 
* Source:  Briggs et al.[113] Table 3, p.43 
† significant at the 5% level 
Table 5.2:  Cox proportional hazards model  
 
Thus, this matched sample (SHORT) generates substantively identical results to Briggs et al. in 
terms of the KM survivor function and Cox regression results and nothing appears to have been 
lost by excluding the 350 unmatched patients.  Their headline conclusion is confirmed: the 
Spectron is unambiguously and significantly25 superior to the Charnley.  This justifies 
proceeding with the subsequent analysis, in which the success of extrapolations from SHORT are 
examined over the years, 2000-7. 
5.4.2 Re-estimation using the extended dataset (LONG) 
Figure 5.2 shows the KM curves taking account of the extra 8 years data for the years 2000-7 
(thus the total time period is 1992-2007).  The striking contrast with the KM curves in Figure 5.1 
for the initial 8 year period is that the curves for the two prostheses now cross after 
approximately 15 years. In other words, contrary to expectations from Briggs et al., the Spectron 
survives less well than the Charnley after 15 years.  Closer examination of Figure 5.2 reveals that 
the difference between prostheses widens over time up to eight years (as in Briggs et al.), but 
thereafter, the gap narrows fairly rapidly, until the crossing at 15 years. The log-rank test for 
equality of the two survivor functions still shows a significant difference between the two curves 
at the 2% level; this reflects the fact that the Spectron curve lies above that for the Charnley for 
most of the 16 years. However, this test no longer has any real meaning, given the crossing of the 
curves.   
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 In the Cox proportional hazards model all statements on statistical significance relate to the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient in question has a true value of 1. For example, in this case, the coefficient on Spectron is significantly 
different from 1, indicating its superior survival (relative to the Charnley). 
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Figure 5.2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for matched sample, 1992-2007 (LONG) 
 
The impact on the proportional hazards model of extending the dataset on the sample covariates 
is presented in the last column of Table 5.2.  While the hazard ratios (for ORIGINAL and 
LONG) are almost identical for age and gender (differing for fracture due to the different coding 
system used in the new database), the hazard ratio for the Spectron is twice as large, but no 
longer significant, implying no significant difference between the two prostheses. Moreover the 
test of Proportional Hazards is now rejected at the 1% level for the Spectron. 
5.4.3 Parametric analysis of LONG 
In the original paper by Briggs et al, six alternative parametric distributions were fitted and Cox-
Snell residuals were calculated and plotted to consider the fit of the distributions to the data. 
They found that the fit of most of the models looked very similar, with the lognormal assumption 
for survival times providing a particularly poor fit to the data. They were also unable to fit the 
generalised Gamma to the data due to a lack of convergence, resulting in no standard errors for 
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the estimated coefficients. The Additional (Aikake's) Information Criterion (AIC) was also 
calculated to test the fit of the distributions. Their Table 5, p.44[18], reports that, after the 
Gamma (which did not converge), the Weibull had the lowest AIC, although they point out that 
there is little to choose from between the models.  
For the purpose of the current analysis, the same six parametric distributions are tested on the 
LONG data. Five are shown in figures 5.3a-e (the Gamma is not reported as it did not converge 
and thus could not be used). Figures 5.3 explore the relative fits of the five remaining alternatives 
by examining Cox-Snell residuals. Here, closer fits are indicated the nearer is the curve to the 45 
degree line [111]. As can be seen, the best fits are provided by the Gompertz and Weibull - in 
that order, but with little difference between the two.  Therefore, for comparability with Briggs et 
al. I proceed with the Weibull distribution. Table 5.3 reports the results of fitting a Weibull 
model to the extended dataset and compares with the results reported in Briggs et al. As can be 
seen, the estimates of γ are very similar: 1.402 (SE 0.021) for LONG and 1.454 (SE 0.069) in 
ORIGINAL. However, the coefficient of Spectron clearly differs between the two: 0.957 (and 
not significant) for LONG as opposed to 0.258 (p<0.001) in ORIGINAL.  This is not unexpected 
given the non-parametric results from the KM curves above and Cox Proportional Hazards 
model.  It is clearly inappropriate to make the proportional hazards assumption regarding 
prosthesis type as did Briggs et al.; in other words, it cannot be assumed that the Spectron 
survival function is simply an upward shift of the Charnley function. 
  
(

Figures 5.3: (a) Weibull 
 
(b) Log-Normal 
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(c) Log-Logistic 
 
 
(d) Gompertz 
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(e) Exponential 
 
 
 
  ORIGINAL* LONG 
  
hazard ratio (SE) p-value hazard ratio (SE) p-value 
Spectron 0.258 (0.099) <0.001 0.957 (0.119) 0.73 
Male 2.177 (0.238) <0.001 1.806 (0.119) <0.001 
Age 0.963 (0.005) <0.001 0.959 (0.003) <0.001 
Fracture 1.303 (0.251) 0.17 0.840 (0.099) 0.14 
Gamma 1.454 (0.069)   1.402 (0.021)   
* Source: Briggs et al.[113]  Table 7, p. 45 
Table 5.3:  Weibull survival functions, proportionality assumed 
  
5.4.4 Dropping the proportionality assumption 
Table 5.4 reports the results of now re-estimating the Weibull model separately for both the 
Charnley and Spectron using the LONG dataset.  The results confirm that there is a noticeable 
difference in the γ parameter estimates: 1.356 for the Charnley and 2.521 for the Spectron. In 
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other words, while the γ for the Charnley is little changed from the γ estimate in Table 5.3, it is 
noticeably increased for the Spectron.   
  Charnley Spectron 
  
hazard ratio (SE) p-value hazard ratio (SE) p-value 
Age 0.962 (0.00) <0.001 0.911 (0.01) <0.001 
Male  1.882 (0.12) <0.001 0.981 (0.25) 0.94 
Fracture 0.879 (0.10) 0.29 0.388 (0.17) 0.03 
Gamma 1.356 (0.03)   2.521 (0.25)   
Table 5.4:  Weibull survival function: LONG, without assuming proportionality 
5.4.5 Assessing predictions 
The results call into question the robustness of Briggs et al.’s model for predicting the future 
survival of the two prostheses over the subsequent years, 2000-2007.  In order to test this,  
prostheses specific survival rates are estimated for an illustrative patient (female, age 60, non-
fracture) using the most appropriate specification, that is with the extended dataset (LONG) and 
not assuming proportionality (as presented in Table 5.4). These within-estimation period 
predictions can be interpreted as a proxy for the actual values or, less speculatively, simply as 
‘better’ predictions because they are based on 16 years’ data and without the inappropriate 
proportionality assumption.  These predictions are then compared to the predictions using the 
initial dataset as available to Briggs et al., first assuming (as they did) proportionality and then 
relaxing this assumption.   
Figure 5.4 shows the results of the first attempt (assuming proportionality) at assessing the 
predictive ability of Briggs et al. For LONG, these are all within-period predictions estimated 
from the equations presented in Table 5.4.  For SHORT, years 1-8 are within-period (Table 5.3, 
first column), while 9-16 are beyond period, from the equations in Table 5.3 (final column).  As 
can be seen, the Weibull for the Charnley predicts future survival very accurately, the difference 
is never more than 0.33%.  For the Spectron however, a difference of nearly 5% has already 
emerged by year 8, and this then increases dramatically as we move into the extrapolation 
period.  By year 16, the original Briggs et al. model predicts survival at nearly 98%, compared to 
only 71% from the revised LONG Weibull without proportionality. An error of more than 26% 
percentage points could lead to considerable errors in any cost-effectiveness evaluation.   
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Figure 5.4: Estimated Weibull survival curves: SHORT assuming proportionality (as in 
Briggs et al.) compared to LONG without proportionality* 
(a) Spectron 
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(b) Charnley 
 
*For late failure, female, aged 60, non-fracture.  
Fitted values are within-period estimates for LONG, within-period for years 1-8 but beyond-period extrapolations 
for SHORT for years 9-16 
 
  Charnley Spectron 
  
hazard ratio (SE) p-value hazard ratio (SE) p-value 
Age 0.970 (0.00) <0.001 0.966 (0.05) 0.51 
Male 2.101 (0.23) <0.001 2.192 (1.81) 0.34 
Fracture 1.072 (0.20) 0.71 1.339 (1.50) 0.79 
Gamma 1.471 (0.07) -  1.629 (0.55) -  
Table 5.5:  Weibull survival functions: SHORT re-estimated without proportionality 
To apply the second approach, I first re-estimate the Weibull using the SHORT data but now 
without making the proportionality assumption.  These results are shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 
5.5 shows the predictions. These should be interpreted as the predictions Briggs et al. would have 
derived had they not assumed proportionality.  In fact, the predictions are almost unchanged 
from Figure 5.4; the Weibull continues to predict without noticeable errors for the Charnley, but 
over-predicts substantially for the Spectron. For instance the ‘error’ by year 16 is 25%, only 
slightly lower than that presented in Figure 5.4.   
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Figure 5.5: Estimated Weibull survival curves: SHORT without proportionality compared to 
LONG without proportionality* 
(a) Spectron 
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(b) Charnley 
 
*For late failure female, aged 60, non-fracture. 
Fitted values are within-period estimates for LONG, within-period for years 1-8 but beyond-period extrapolations 
for SHORT for years 9-16 
 
5.5 Discussion 
The analysis identifies that, with the addition of eight years more data, it is no longer the case 
that the survival of the Spectron prosthesis is superior to that of the Charnley prosthesis.  After 
about 15 years, the survival rate of the Charnley is found to be similar, if not, better than the 
Spectron. This finding is supported by a recently published SR annual report,[115] which reports 
10 year survival rates of  92.7% for the Charnley and 92.0% for the Spectron, notably the 
confidence interval around this survival rate is larger for the Spectron (1.5%) than the Charnley 
(0.4%). 
Of course, whether these results are generalisable to other prostheses still remains to be seen and 
should be the subject of further work. However, the predictions for the Charnley prostheses do 
appear to have been robust in comparison to those for the Spectron. This suggests the cautious 
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conclusion that newer prostheses, where only a few have been implanted, or where they involve 
using a new technology, are those which maybe less robust to this methodology.  
In the original work by Briggs et al, a full cost-effectiveness analysis was carried out comparing 
the Charnley and Spectron. The results were based on mean costs and QALYs and indicated that 
the Spectron is cost effective in younger patients, with the probability of the Spectron being more 
cost-effective than the Charnley ranging from 70% to 100%.  It is likely that using the new 
estimates (LONG), the cost effectiveness of the Charnley will be enhanced. The new results 
suggest that the Charnley is more likely to be generally preferred. In particular, the deterioration 
of the Spectron from 15 years on will be most relevant for patients with longer own life 
expectancy (typically the young). For older patients this may be less relevant since they are less 
likely to outlive their prostheses, but even the original Briggs results already show the Charnley 
to be more cost-effective than the Spectron for older patients. In other words these new results 
mainly reinforce the superiority of the Charnley for the old, but call into question the superiority 
of the Spectron for younger patients.  
Relating this to the methods used by Briggs et al, the assumption of proportionality by prosthesis 
for the Charnley and Spectron is violated, and their original estimate of the key parameter, γ, is 
substantially revised upwards for the Spectron.  Moreover, extrapolations of the estimated 
Weibull curve (as given in Briggs et al.) yield very poor predictions for the survival of the 
Spectron in the 8 years after the original estimation period;  the magnitudes of the ‘error’ is about 
25% by year 16. 
In section 5.2, I raised three possible sources of error and I now re-visit them. First, as just 
mentioned, it is now clear that Briggs et al.’s assumption of a proportional impact of the 
prosthesis type is inappropriate – this is revealed very clearly by the crossing of the KM curves 
in Figure 5.2.  This finding implies that such a specific assumption should probably not be 
employed in future comparative studies of this type, although in itself, it does not invalidate the 
use of survival analysis.  
Secondly, turning to the performance of the Weibull distribution, there is no evidence that any of 
the alternative distributions suggested by Briggs et al. would have performed any better.  Indeed, 
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for the Charnley prosthesis, the originally estimated Weibull ‘predicts’ remarkably accurately 
(Figures 5.4 and 5.5); the problem is confined to the Spectron.   
Third, I raised the possibility that, while the Weibull distribution may be appropriate, its 
estimated parameters are unstable – in the sense that their magnitudes are sensitive to the 
addition of more data.  For the Charnley, this is not the case: without assuming proportionality, 
the estimated γ and other coefficients appear to be fairly robust between the eight and sixteen 
year data: γ = 1.471 (SHORT) and γ = 1.356 (LONG) (Tables 5.5 and 5.4 respectively). 
However, for the Spectron, the γ estimate rises substantially from 1.629 for SHORT to 2.521 for 
LONG.  This appears to be the crux of the matter – such a substantial shift in the γ parameter 
would inevitably lead to large revisions in predicted values.  This also explains why the 
assumption of proportionality might be acceptable with only 8 years data, as in Briggs et al., but 
then rejected in the light of 16 years of data (the γ for Charnley and Spectron are similar using 
the SHORT dataset, but very different when using LONG.) 
Finally, in this chapter I have used this specific case comparison, between the Charnley and 
Spectron prostheses, to illustrate a general point: however, if the interest were also in this 
specific case per se, then the results do raise some doubts about the general trend to implant 
cementless prostheses (shown earlier in chapter 3) [116, 117].  It should be remembered that the 
Spectron was a relatively new prosthesis at the time of the Briggs et al. study, so it is possible 
that the prosthesis itself was experiencing some unexpected 'teething troubles' during this period, 
and that high failures rates in post-1999 reflect some unforeseen deterioration in the prosthesis 
itself.  In this respect, some very indirect evidence is provided by returning to the Swedish 
registry but now examining the survival of Spectron implants made between 2000 and 2007, i.e. 
after the Briggs et al. estimation period and therefore not considered in the above analysis.  
Figure 5.6 compares the Kaplan-Meier curves for the Spectron for this set of patients compared 
to the Briggs et al. cohort. Quite clearly, survival in this later cohort is much poorer.  The causes 
can only be speculated, however, these results are highly suggestive of confounding by 
indication – as the use of Spectron has increased, so the outcomes appear to have deteriorated. 
There may also be some confounding by intensity i.e. a wider range of less specialized, lower 
volume providers such as community hospitals) This would suggest that relatively new 
prostheses (and more generally any new intervention where the event of interest occurs at a point 
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far into the future) should be handled more cautiously than more established prostheses (and 
interventions) for which both clinical learning and effectiveness may be more established.  
Figure 5.6: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the Spectron: Briggs et al.’s cohort (SHORT, 
1992-1999), compared to a new cohort (2000-2007) 
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In summary, two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.  First, when estimated using 
a large sample of patients (Charnley, with 18,000+ observations), the Weibull survival curve 
appears to provide accurate predictions of future survival rates when using the first 8 years after 
implant.  However, when estimating survival using a smaller number of patients (about 2,000 
Spectron prostheses were implanted) predictions are unstable and we argue should not be 
extrapolated.  Secondly, when comparing alternative prostheses, the assumption that prosthesis 
type has a simple proportional impact on survival is extremely speculative and potentially 
dangerous. Thus it can be concluded that it is more robust to estimate separate survival curves 
for each prosthesis. 
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Generalisation of these results should be qualified by emphasizing that this analysis focuses only 
on data from one country, Sweden, and only on two brands of prostheses, with a relatively small 
dataset for one of them.  Further research is called for.  Unfortunately, there is very little other 
evidence in the existing literature on extrapolation of prosthesis survival rates[74, 75].  
Fitzpatrick et al. use 14 year observed survival data on two prostheses to extrapolate to a 60 year 
time horizon, but provide no tests of the extrapolations[118]. An alternative approach is to 
assume a range of alternative values for the expected life of a prosthesis, estimating for each 
value the increase in the expected life of a cementless prosthesis required for the two types of 
prostheses to achieve the same expected net present value cost.[119]  Most studies, however, 
merely use the observed or existing survival data from published sources, and thus do not 
extrapolate to a lifetime horizon;[120, 121] but this approach can only be used when long term 
follow-up data already exists.   
It is obvious that future research will require more long-term follow-up data, and the  
introduction of the NJR in 2003/4 will provide an invaluable source for data to conduct future 
economic evaluations of alternative prostheses. However, as I have shown, predicting prosthesis 
survival based on data from a registry of five/six years is unlikely to be sufficient to provide 
robust extrapolations.  This was also the implication of the comparison of 3 year and 5 year 
revision rates in chapter 3 (section 3.3.1). Further research should identify and consider more 
reliable ways to extrapolate revision rates into the future in the absence of longer follow-up data. 
The adoption of a Bayesian evidence synthesis approach which employs registry data on a range 
of prostheses from different countries and combines this with other routinely collected data is 
one option. This should more fully exploit the data by considering linkage of registry data-sets 
together, such as the NJR, SHAR and perhaps the New Zealand Registry. This would help to 
overcome the problem that because there are so many alternative prosthesis options, even in an 
extensive registry such as the NJR, the actual numbers using a particular prosthesis may still be 
quite small.  
In terms of what this implies for how decisions between alternative prostheses should be made in 
the mean-time i.e. until more and longer data become available, these results do not offer any 
direct answers. Here the purpose has been confined to assessing whether the methodology used 
by Briggs et al is a viable option for dealing with the short-term data available from the NJR to 
predict future revision rates for economic evaluations of alternative prostheses. The answer to 
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this question is that it does not appear to be a robust method for newer prostheses where there is 
short-follow up with a small number of patients who had it implanted. Of course, for decision 
makers or NICE guidance this finding is unhelpful. The implication is that current decisions will 
still have to be beased on whatever existing evidence is available from joint registries and the 
literature, based on the NICE benchmark of 10% at 10 years where possible, or 3 years revision 
rate experience if their performance is consistent with the benchmark of a 10% revision rate at 10 
years. Future work should also further determine the value of this methodology to other 
prostheses and settings and establish models for incorporating multiple international evidence 
sources.The results of this and the preceding chapters suggest that there are considerable doubts 
as to whether current methods can satisfactorily be used to answer 'what prosthesis should be 
implanted'. This continues to be unresolved, given the problems of limited long term survival 
data and unreliable methods of extrapolating. As a consequence, the remainder of the thesis turns 
the focus of the thesis from what 'should be' to 'what is' implanted using the NJR data as a 
primary data source.  
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Chapter 6, Actual choices in the NHS: the potential for buyer and 
seller power? 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters focused on choice prescriptively, in the sense of exploring analytical 
techniques designed to establish which prosthesis should be implanted.  In this and the next 
chapter, the emphasis is changed to examining the choices which are actually currently being 
made within the NHS in England and Wales. Unfortunately, I am unable to test the effects on 
price as there is no published or national data on costs of prostheses (other than the NHS 
reference costs, which are at an aggregate level for THR - see chapter 3). However, I can 
investigate the pattern of purchases, in particular, exploring a previously overlooked issue, which 
is how the structure of the main buyer (the NHS) interacts with the structure and nature of 
competition within the supplying industry (the manufacturers of THR) to influence choice at the 
hospital level.  In order to do this, I will draw on the analysis and methodologies of Industrial 
Organisation, which is the branch of Economics which underpins most of Competition 
Economics and Policy.  The purpose of this chapter is to introduce, and in some instances 
measure the theoretical concepts used in Industrial Organisation, and this provides the 
background for the econometric estimation of models designed to test a number of hypotheses in 
the next chapter. 
This chapter is organized into six sections.  Section 6.2 discusses what is meant by patient 
choice, and some of the relevant recent policy literature; it concludes that choice in this context 
is usually not by the individual patient, but by their 'agent' (the surgeon, hospital or NHS). This 
raises the possibility that patients may benefit from the considerable buyer power which the NHS 
has in the market (as in other health care markets.) This is true, at least in principle, because the 
NHS is overwhelmingly the main buyer. Section 6.3 discusses whether the NHS is actually able 
to exploit this potential.  This takes the discussion into the area of public procurement – the 
ability of the NHS to exploit its power depends on how it organizes its purchasing policy.  
However, the buyer must obviously transact with the sellers, in this case the manufacturers of 
THR prostheses.  Industrial Organisation Theory provides a framework in which to explore how 
a (potentially) powerful buyer may interact with potential powerful sellers.  This is discussed in 
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section 6.4.  Section 6.5 then turns to the supplying industry and establishes a statistical 
description of the nature of its market structure – in the terminology of IO, a near duopoly 
market dominated by two large Multinational Firms, Depuy and Stryker.  Section 6.6 considers 
the implications for relative market power, and this forms the basis for the econometric 
estimation of the next chapter.  Section 6.7 concludes. 
 
6.2 Patient Choice under the NHS 
6.2.1 Brief history of recent policy on patient choice 
In the present context, the main concern is with the choice (by patients) as to which prosthesis to 
have implanted and in which hospital.  ‘Patient Choice’ has been increasingly an issue in the 
policy and political debate, but, as will be seen, currently is really only concerned with choice of 
hospital. 
Patient Choice was first emphasised by the Conservative government as part of their 'internal 
market' reforms in 1989. They aimed to provide patients with better health care and a wider 
choice of services regardless of where they lived within the UK. However, subsequent research 
[122] found that, contrary to this intention, in practice, the choice of in which hospital the patient 
is treated lay largely with the GP who would make the choices on behalf of the patient.  
Patient choice and the introduction of competition to the health care sector was not initially a 
focus for the Labour government which came into power in 1997. Their main focus was still 
more on choice over the date and time of hospital appointments rather than which hospital. In 
2002, it published a 'progress report' called' Delivering the NHS Plan, this was their first step in 
offering patients on waiting lists, the opportunity to choose an ‘alternative’ hospital provider 
with a shorter waiting time. However, patient choice was expanded in January 2006, when 
patients were offered a choice of four or five providers at the point of GP referral; by May of the 
same year, this had further expanded to include a choice of providers across England including 
Foundation Trusts (FTs) and Independent Sector (IS) Treatment Centres and, in August 2006, IS 
hospitals as well. Patients now made their choice through the 'choose and book' facility and 
choice was firmly established in the NHS Constitution 2008/9) so thatall choices should be 
made from a national position. The Kings Fund has carried out some work to identify whether in 
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practice this choice is taking place at the patient level, they cite that 44% of patients referred for 
treatment in May 2007 could recall being offered a choice by their GP, an increase from 30% in 
May 2006. However, they point out that this still compares poorly to the DoH’s 80% target, set 
in April 2007 [122].  
Extending  policy on patient choice beyond just choosing their provider of treatment, i.e. also to 
which GP, choice of treatment or pharmaceutical, is still undeveloped [122]. However, the recent 
annual report by NHS choices [123] states a continued commitment to patient choice by the 
Coalition government. This is set out clearly in the current consultation document: Liberating the 
NHS: Greater choice and control. A consultation on proposals[124] 
In the present context, the choice of hip prosthesis to be implanted is mediated as follows: a GP 
refers the patient to a specific surgeon when a need for THR is identified. At the point of referral, 
the patient is given a choice of hospital and thus some choice in surgeon. When the patient goes 
for a consultation with the surgeon, the choice of which prosthesis to implant is made.  
6.2.2 Theoretical perspective 
There is a very limited literature on patient choice between different interventions, and this is not 
surprising as patients are very often poorly informed about the alternatives. This is a classic 
example of what is known in economic theory as asymmetric information "a situation in which 
one side of an economic relationship has better information than the other" p.17,[125] . Thus, 
we need to be able to define 'who' is making the choice of prosthesis to implant, bearing in mind 
that the patient has no information from previous experience (as this is the first time they are 
undergoing this type of surgery) and they have not usually sought information, which if they had, 
would not be easily accessible or comprehensible to the lay person. This is the principal-agent 
problem, which refers to an economic relationship in which one party, the principal, hires a 
second party, the agent, to perform some task on the party's behalf [125]. There is vast Economic 
literature on the Principal-Agent problem[126]. Within the context of this chapter, there are two 
dimensions to the problem: firstly the patient is the principal and the surgeon or the hospital are 
the agent, making the choice of which prosthesis to implant on behalf of the patient[127, 128]. 
Secondly, the surgeon is also effectively the agent for the funder, the NHS, choosing what 
prosthesis to purchase/implant.  
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Thus, while current policy has focused on reducing the asymmetry of information between 
patient and GP (where the GP is acting as the patient’s agent and also of the third party payer) by 
providing patients with greater information on the performance of hospitals[129], the success of 
such measures is still not clear. Either way, this has no obvious implications for the choice 
between services/pharmaceuticals/medical devices.  Here, the principal-agent problem is still 
very apparent. Surgeons hold technical medical knowledge which the patient lacks. This means 
that the patient demands two different services from their GP or surgeon, they require both 
information and then the intervention itself which relies on the surgeon, acting as the agent, 
recommending what is in their best interest. 
6.3 Procurement in the NHS 
From now on, the assumption made is that the decision about which prosthesis to implant is 
taken largely or exclusively by the surgeon/hospital, on behalf of the patient. While it would be 
expected that this decision will be based on the patient’s characteristics, in terms of their need 
and ability to benefit from a specific prosthesis[130], it is also likely that surgeons have their 
own preferences for a specific brand of prosthesis due to their experience and training together 
with their own clinical results, and that they may, or may not, bear in mind  different budgetary 
constraints. 
Turning then to the second dimension of the principal-agent problem – the surgeon/hospital as 
principal of the NHS, more information is needed on the choices made by the surgeon or 
hospital, and how this relates to the purchasing decisions of hospitals. This moves into the area 
of Public Procurement - the purchase of goods and services by the public sector.  This is of key 
policy interest, since public procurement accounts for a large proportion of public sector 
expenditure and demand in the UK economy – ranging from 11 to 18% of GDP[6].  Public 
procurement is increasingly attracting the interest of competition authorities[131].  This requires 
further theoretical examination and also in depth research on the procurement processes within 
the NHS.  
Broadly speaking, the demand for health care services in the UK is dominated by a single buyer, 
the NHS.  It follows that any analysis of a particular market in this sector should start with the 
recognition that this is, in principle, a monopsony market.  The NHS is a large national 
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institution, which accounts in this case for the large majority of purchases of hip replacement 
prostheses.  Economic theory informs that, if the NHS was to act as a profit maximizing 
monopsonist, with considerable buying power, it should be able to force down price.  Where 
there is a large number of suppliers, a monopsony buyer should be able to negotiate with its 
suppliers to pay no more than the perfectly competitive price.  Where there are relatively few 
suppliers, then the situation becomes oligopolists selling to a monopsonist, and theory provides 
no clear-cut predictions – it depends on the relative bargaining strengths of the two sides, 
although the threat to switch to alternative suppliers may still be credible.  In general, more 
bidders (suppliers) in a procurement setting should equal more competition, although the design 
of the public procurement process can also affect the likelihood of firm collusion. Where the 
number of bidders increases, there is less opportunity for collusion (where firms "coordinate on 
their jointly preferred equilibrium")[37], which is also the case if the there is transparency in 
bidding process[131].  
Amongst other things, the outcome will depend on their ‘outside options’ – can each side 
threaten not to transact at all because they can easily find alternative buyers/sellers?  On the 
demand side at least, there are no other feasible large buyers – if a manufacturer wants to sell at 
all in England and Wales, it must sell to the NHS in order to achieve sizeable sales!.  In other 
words, the NHS is potentially able to exercise considerable buying power if it acts as a single 
entity in its procurement policies.   
When applying these theories in the present context, it should be recognised that public sector 
buyer power may be quite different to that of the private sector - for legal and regulatory reasons.  
It may differ significantly from the private sector because the public sector may be more risk 
averse about new patterns of purchasing or suppliers. As with other comparisons between private 
and public sector, public sector procurement decisions may not driven by a desire to maximize 
profits, although the public sector should be just as intent on minimising costs.  
Turning from the theory to the practice, it must be recognised that, for many purposes, the NHS 
is not a single monolithic entity - it is dispersed according to location and specialty, and 
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 As will be seen below, in this market (similar to pharmaceuticals), most of the suppliers in this market are 
diversified multinational firms, for which the UK THR market accounts for only a small share of their worldwide 
sales. However, withdrawing from the UK, will have considerable ramifications in other markets.  So in principle, 
although they could threaten to withdraw from the UK market, this seems unlikely except in extreme circumstances. 
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individual hospitals having different degrees of market power. Purchasing in the NHS (termed 
Commissioning) has undergone considerable reform in the past two decades.  
As part of the ‘new Labour’ NHS package on public procurement, the 2005 'Framework for 
Health Reform in England' established the following major reforms with implications for NHS 
purchasing:  
• Demand side reforms giving PCTs the responsibility for commissioning, 
• Supply side reforms, establishing NHS Foundation Trusts (FTs) (discussed in chapter 6) 
as autonomous entities, not performance managed by the SHAs, and 
• Transaction reforms, moving from negotiated contracts with hospitals i.e. block and cost 
and volume contracts to the system of PbR where hospitals are paid on a 'per case basis' 
and the prices are fixed nationally.  
A further key recommendation for how the NHS purchases was made by the The Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) in 2007, regarding the purchasing of pharmaceuticals[132]. They recommended 
that the government reform the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) of profit and 
price controls and replace it with a value-based approach to pricing. The OFT report suggested 
that this new approach would both benefit the patient and encourage innovation in the drug 
industry.  
The change in government from Labour to the ‘Coalition’ (Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
parties) in the summer of 2010 has led to proposals for further reforms of the NHS with 
particular reference to NHS commissioning. The Coalition health reforms entitled: ‘Liberating 
the NHS’ (July 2010)[133] sets out to move budgets from PCTs to new ‘GP consortias’ who will 
be statutory bodies, supported by and accountable to the new NHS Commissioning board. These 
reforms are still yet to be confirmed at the time of writing, and they have undergone considerable 
criticism including a debate by the British Medical Association (BMA) on whether to have a 
vote of no confidence in the proposed bill. Most recently, these criticisms have led to reported 
likely concessions by the current health secretary[134].   
Alongside the proposed reforms of commissioning, two high profile reports on procurement in 
the public sector have been published since the establishment of the Coalition. The first, a report 
by Sir Phillip Green and commissioned by the Coalition government on efficiency at the Central 
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Government level[43], does not refer specifically to the NHS but nevertheless, identified large 
scale inefficiencies at the Central government level. The second was published by the National 
Audit Office (NAO) in February 2011, titled "The procurement of consumables by NHS Acute 
and Foundation Trusts"[42]. This pivotal report details current procurement practices within the 
NHS set alongside the backdrop of the necessity to make £15-20 billion of annual savings by 
2014-15. The report includes medical and surgical devices within its definition of ‘consumables’, 
which account for 49% of the nearly £4.6 billion  (see figure 5, in [135]) spent on consumables 
per year, thus reiterating the theme of this thesis of ensuring value for money when purchasing 
hip prostheses by the NHS. The report summarises that, under the recent policy reforms of 
devolved responsibility (introduction of FTs), the majority of NHS Trusts are outside the DoH’s 
direct control, meaning that hospital trusts have complete freedom to make decisions about 
which consumables to purchase and how they go about doing so. Within this, they can choose to 
involve regional collaborative procurement hubs and the NHS Supply Chain (national supplies 
and distribution organisation). However, this collaborative involvement is not compulsory and 
there is no mechanism to secure commitment by the separate trusts to purchase in a 'collective' 
manner.  The report suggests that this means that "significant economies of scale are being lost 
across the NHS". As a consequence of fragmented purchasing, understandably, the report 
identifies widely varying prices for the same items taking place under small purchasing orders. 
Thus, the implication of the NAO report for this thesis is that the NHS is not able or willing to 
act as a single purchaser of consumables and exploit the buyer power resulting from its potential 
monopsony role in the market. This leaves it firmly open to the possibility that the main 
prostheses manufacturers may be able to exploit their potential for market power.  
The report interestingly provides a case study (shown in figure 6.1): an example of 'savings from 
the pan-London framework for replacement hip and knee joints’).  
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Figure 6.1, NAO Case Study - pan London framework for hip and knee prostheses 
Savings from pan-London framework for replacement hip and knee joints in July 2008, the London 
Procurement  
Programme, in conjunction with Epsom and St. Helier NHS Trust and the Elective Orthopaedic Centre established a 
pan-London framework for orthopaedic hip and knee implants. The aim of the new framework was to ensure that the 
prices trusts paid for implants would be low enough to enable trusts to recover the cost of procedures, for which they 
are paid standard (NHS tariff) rates. London Procurement Programme gathered evidence to show that trusts were 
paying too much for implants and were undertaking procedures at a loss, to influence trusts to join the contract. In 
2009-10 the contract generated savings of £1.9 million on purchases of almost 6,000 hip and knee implants – a total 
spend of £11.5 million after savings. In early 2010, 18 trusts of the 24 London trusts which carry out orthopaedic 
surgery had joined the contract. Source: London Procurement Programme  
Source: Figure 16, p.32, [70] 
It explains that this particular framework has ensured that the prices trusts paid for implants 
would be low enough to enable the trusts to recover the costs of the procedures for which they 
are paid the standard NHS tariff rate (under PbR). The programme found that trusts were paying 
too much for prostheses and they used this to encourage trusts to join their programme. This 
example is evidence of how, by operating as a single united buyer with associated increased 
buyer power, enables the trust to negotiate better purchasing contracts. Future work could 
usefully extend this case-study to a more comprehensive assessment at the national 
level27Chapter 7 (amongst other things), builds on the NAO findings, determining how 
specialisation of individual hospitals compares with the NHS as a whole and whether there is 
evidence that smaller hospitals tend to be more or less specialised in their choice of prostheses 
than large ones.  
Given the findings of the NAO report, there are some indications that the NHS is not acting as a 
monopsonist and thus not exploiting its buyer power. However, as mentioned above, this may 
not matter if the supply side i.e. the manufacturers of prostheses, is a perfectly competitive 
market.  This motivates the further examination of the supply side industry below. 
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 This type of agreement could be viewed as collusive oligopsony and thus introduces the possibility that this type 
or agreement could breach competition laws. However, there does not appear to have been any evidence that 
arrangements of this type having been considered within the practice of competition laws in Britain. It is anticipated 
that it would not breach competition laws as the individual hospitals all form part of the same organisation in 
Britain: the NHS. 
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6.4 The Supply side 
6.4.1 Previous literature 
Very little literature currently exists on competition and purchasing within the hip prostheses 
market. In fact there is very little on purchasing and competition in medical devices in general 
(of say, diagnostics equipment, implants such as coronary stents and so on).  Thus, it may be 
helpful to look first for parallels and contrasts with the Pharmaceutical industry which is more 
widely documented and researched within both Health Economics and Industrial Organisation. 
As will be shown below, the UK market for THR is dominated by just a few large firms, and the 
same is true in most parts of the Pharmaceutical Industry: for most drugs, there are only a few 
suppliers (the top ten firms accounting for 58.8% of the entire sector share in 2002[136]). Much 
of the competition in the drug industry takes place through innovation and the development of 
new drugs[137], rather than price. Uncertainty is also a key feature in pharmaceuticals – in terms 
of whether Research and Development (R&D) will generate a useable product, and also about 
the drug’s long-term effectiveness.  As discussed in earlier chapters, uncertainty is also a major 
issue with hip prostheses, with the long-term survival of hip prostheses unknown for 10 to 20 
years post primary surgery. 
The European Commission Competition website[138] includes many cases where firms 
(including drug companies) with market power have abused their position in a variety of ways, 
preventing or delaying competition[138]: Recent examples include investigations of AstraZeneca 
and other firms, who, it was believed, may have acted individually or jointly, notably to delay 
generic entry for a particular medicine[139]. AstraZeneca were also investigated by the 
Commission in 2005,  for abusing the patent system by “delaying competition to a blockbuster 
drug from generic and parallel imported pharmaceuticals” for which they were fined 60 million 
Euros[140]. A similar case was recently investigated by the UK OFT on Reckitt Benckiser, who 
were alleged to have restricted competition for Gaviscon by de-listing the generic version from 
the NHS prescription channel[141]. 
Another area where pharmaceuticals companies have acted in an anticompetitive way is the use 
of ‘kick-backs’ to prescribing Doctors. This issue has received much attention in the US, even 
leading to the establishment of the website ‘no free lunch’[142], reportedly run by health care 
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providers who ‘believe pharmaceutical production should not guide clinical practice’. The issue 
has also been highlighted by the BMJ in a recent article by Melanie Newman[143] who discusses 
the repeated kickbacks by drug companies in the US such as Pfizer and AstraZeneca. However, 
the literature is not confined to the US, in 1986, the then editor of the BMJ, Dr Richard Smith, 
highlighted the very same issue[144].  
A third area where drug companies’ have been frequently investigated in competition policy is 
merger cases.  Although these do not necessarily raise a 'problem' for competition, the reason 
they are so frequently investigated is that they occur in highly oligopolistic markets with the 
potential for market power.  A recent high profile example is the merger of Bayer and Schering 
2006, investigated by the EU Commission[145].  
In contrast, there are very few examples of abuse of market power in the medical devices sector, 
and more specifically, hip prostheses. The European Commission (EC) provides a web page on 
medical devices, stating that: "The EU's involvement concerns mainly the regulatory framework 
for market access, international trade relations and regulatory convergence, all aiming to ensure 
the highest level of patient safety while promoting the innovation and the competitiveness of this 
sector."[47]. However, this web page does not include information on issues of competition in 
the medical devices field.  In 2009 the EC also published a report: "Exploratory Process on the 
Future of the Medical Devices"[146], part of which focused on' competitiveness and innovation 
of the medical devices industry'; this investigated the global innovation and competitiveness 
challenges faced by the industry including R&D, emerging technologies and green economy. 
This report recommended that focus be on, along with two other areas: supporting the 
competitiveness of the EU medical devices sector with an emphasis on supporting Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs). It highlighted procurement procedures and reimbursement, 
suggesting that the duration of the supply contracts can inhibit competition by creating barriers to 
entry for other manufacturers; it also identified a tendency to centralise tenders with increased 
size (buyer power) suggesting that this might reduce competition and block the uptake of 
innovation. However, this reduction in competition should be less the case where commissioning 
takes place at the local level, as encouraged by both recent policies by the coalition government 
and previously by New Labour (section 6.3 above). Although this report includes no evidence or 
case history, it does demonstrate an increasing interest in competition issues and raises the 
6

profile of economic issues related to medical devices.  This is echoed in the health economics 
literature, for example volume 4 of the 'Value in Health' journal had a particular focus on 
whether economic evaluation of medical devices should be the same or different to those 
methods used for drugs[147].  
There is also some evidence of kickbacks in medical devices: the website ‘Pharmalot’ has posted 
an example including: Johnson and Johnson (J&J) Depuy settling a kickback charge in 2007, and 
more recently, a general discussion of the	Undisclosed conflicts among Docs and device makers' 
was posted [148, 149] 
The European Commission has also investigated two merger cases in THR: Johnson and Johnson 
and Depuy in 1998, which was not opposed by the Commission, and Smith and Nephew’s 
attempt to acquire Centerpulse in 2003, which again was not opposed.  However, in the second 
case, Zimmer made a more aggressive take-over bid later in the year to acquire CentrePulse.  
These reports are used below in the discussion of market definition.   
The fact that there are few documented cases of anti-competitive practices in medical devices 
may simply mean that these rarely occur. But it might also be because medical devices tend not 
to be as high profile as pharamaceuticals.  In the rest of this chapter and the next one, I will 
explore the possibility that anti-competitive practices might exist in the context of hip prostheses, 
by applying the theory and methods of Industrial Organisation to the THR supplying industry.  
6.4.2 An Industrial Organisation Theory perspective 
The theory of Industrial Organisation (IO) is the basis of competition policy.  This section draws 
on two recent advanced textbooks in this area: Motta, [37] for an applied policy perspective, and 
Belleflame and Peitz[150] for the underlying theory (see also section 1.4.2 in chapter 1). 
One of the key concepts in IO is that of market power.  Market Power can be defined as ‘the 
ability of firms to set prices above the marginal costs’ (Motta p. 39).  As well as raising price to 
the consumer, the existence of market power can have various other negative impacts on 
competition, by lowering quality, restricting choice and slowing innovation, introducing barriers 
to entry of new firms[151], and not minimizing costs. Market Power depends on many things, 
including the structure of the industry – concentration (as a measure of the degree of oligopoly), 
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barriers to entry, product differentiation, buyer power.  Monopoly is the most extreme form of 
dominance and market power[37]. However, it is always stressed that where there is only one or 
a few, big firms in the market, this does not necessarily lead to a welfare loss, there are cases 
where it would not be in the consumers’ best interest to keep less efficient firms active in the 
market: "competition policy is concerned with defending market competition in order to increase 
welfare, not defending competitors"[152]. It may sometimes be that firms are monopolies or 
have few competitors simply because their products are superior to those of any other firms. 
In the real world, pure monopoly is rare.  In practice, most markets have at least a small number 
of different firms, i.e. oligopoly.  Under oligopoly, market power can still exist however.  In 
some cases, it may be that firms do not feel it necessary to compete actively on price and quality, 
but in other cases, firms may either explicitly or tacitly agree not to compete, sometimes referred 
to as collective dominance[151].  
In the case where firms have formed a formal collusive agreement, this is known as a cartel, 
where the cartel itself will maximise profits if it acts as a monopoly, with all the harmful effects 
associated with monopoly, i.e. higher prices, lowering quality, restricting choice, slowing 
innovation, introducing barriers to entry of new firms and not minimizing costs. In most 
countries in the world, including the UK, the EU, and the US, cartels are illegal and thus viewed 
as not in the consumer's best interests. Most of what is known about how cartels behave is based 
on reports on illegal cartels discovered by the competition authorities (e.g. the European 
Commission or the OFT).  The standard theory of cartels is based on a repeated game between a 
small number of players, which shows that it is possible to identify a set of market characteristics 
which make the existence of cartels more likely (chapter 14,[150], chapter 4,[37]).  These are 
described at length in the above references, but briefly include, amongst other things: 
• High concentration, with a small number of similar firms.  This is because agreement 
between them is easier to form and sustain when there are fewer parties, while the gains 
from cheating on agreement are relatively higher when there are more firms.  Agreement 
is also easier when firms are similar (e.g. have similar market shares).  This is because all 
firms have similar incentives, and individual firms are less tempted to undercut the others 
because they realize that their rivals can easily match their lower prices. 
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• There are barriers to the entry of new firms.  This is because it is harder for the cartel 
to maintain higher prices if there is the potential for new firms to enter the market and 
undercut them. 
• There is no buyer power.  This is because large strong buyers are more able to bargain 
down high prices and threaten to use alternative suppliers, as well as to detect 
coordination amongst suppliers. 
 
From empirical studies based on the reports of competition authorities on prosecuted cartels [38, 
153]  it is known that members of cartels agree to: (i) share information on prices and quantities, 
and to (ii) fix prices and/or (iii) share the market.  In markets where contracts are the subject of 
auctions or tendering, cartels rig the bidding so as to share contracts out.  Market sharing can 
take one or more of three forms:  (i) territorial market sharing, where the firms share out 
amongst themselves the right to be monopolies in different national or regional markets; (ii) 
customer allocation, where firms agree not to compete for the custom of each other’s 
customers, and (iii) quota market sharing, where the cartel sets out specific stable quotas for 
each firm’s market share, which they then agree to not exceed. 
 
However, it is usually accepted that explicit cartels are relatively rare, although of course we 
only know about those ones which are actually detected by the authorities.  Nevertheless, even 
where there is not explicit illegal collusion, it is argued that firms may sometimes ‘tacitly’ 
collude, so as to stay within the law.  ‘Tacit collusion’ is said to occur where firms behave in 
much the same way as a cartel, but without explicitly meeting to share information and to agree 
on price and/or market sharing.  In practice, this may take the forms of carefully watching other’s 
prices, ensuring they move in parallel ways, avoiding price wars and/or aggressive behaviour 
towards each other.  This is discussed and described alongside cartels by both Belleflume and 
Peitz ([150]chapter 14), and Motta([37] chapter 4).  Again, the theory of tacit collusion is based 
on the theory of repeated games.  This predicts that tacit collusion is more likely under similar 
conditions as listed above[154]. The results of tacit collusion are similar to those of cartels (high 
price, lower quality, less choice), and while there may be no explicit sharing of the market, it 
may still be reflected by firms not competing in each other’s territories and implicitly accepting 
not to compete for each other’s customers.  
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6.5 The Hip Replacement Supplying Industry 
In order to establish whether market power of the sort described above side may be a concern in 
this case, I provide a detailed description of the supply side industry for hip prostheses.  
6.5.1 Market definition 
The initial step in assessing the degree of dominance and market power in any industry is to first 
define the market. With the market defined, the structure and the potential for power in that 
market is assessed, by taking into account various features of the supplying firms (e.g. their 
market shares), their buyers and the nature of the product. There are two standard dimensions to 
defining the market: Product definition and Geographic definition.  In this case, these were both 
defined by the EC in two key merger cases [68, 69], which I will use to guide my own empirical 
work. 
The Product Market  
The EC defined the relevant product market as the market for hip prostheses for primary total hip 
replacement surgery. It identified the two broad types of hip prosthesis, as described in chapter 2: 
cemented (where the prosthesis is fixed with cement) and cementless (where the prosthesis is 
secured through biologic fixation i.e. bone grows into and through the pores in the prosthesis). 
However, there is a high degree of substitutability between the two and therefore both should be 
included in the market as one broad product market EC[68]). 
The Geographic Market  
In Europe, the responsibility for making a judgment on whether to allow any merger rests with  
the EC if the merger affects the market in more than one member state.  This was the case in J&J 
and Depuy; for example table 6.1 reproduces the market shares of the merging firms in those 
countries where they would have a combined market share of 40%6[68]. As is clear from both 
EC merger reports, most of the manufacturers are multi-national firms, present in multiple 
international markets, although this table illustrates that some manufacturers have a much higher 
presence in some countries than others: an extreme example of this is Biomet, who had a market 
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 This report is the most recent source of geographic market shares by manufacturers located in a literature search. 
Company annual reports report sales not market shares. 
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share of 25-35% in Portugal, but only 1-10% in the UK and no market presence at all in Ireland.  
The EC judged that the relevant geographic definition of the market is the individual member 
state as opposed to a single European market.  It justified this on the grounds that prices and 
market shares of the main manufacturers differ from country to country, and argued that the 
extent of the manufacturer’s presence in the market, in terms of training and assistance with the 
prosthesis, is an important factor to the purchaser (hospital/surgeon). The differing 
reimbursement systems across countries will also impact on the differences in the international 
markets - for example, England moved from a block contract system pre. 2004/5 to a DRG type 
reimbursement system (PbR), bringing it more in line with some other EU countries (Germany 
and France).  
Thus, for the purpose of the rest of this thesis, the market is defined as hip prostheses in England. 
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** referred to as Howmedica in the report 
*** Zimmer (includes Sulzer market shares) 
Table 6.1 - Market shares of 4 main manufacturers 1998 
 
6.5.2 The Leading Firms 
The EC’s merger report on J&J and Depuy, identified 6 major players in Europe in 1998: Depuy 
(previously owned by Roche), J&J, Howmedica (previously Pfizer and since acquired by Stryker 
Howmedica Osteonices (Stryker)), Zimmer, Sulzer (acquired by Zimmer in 2003) and Biomet.  
It found that a merger between Depuy and J&J would give it a combined market share of 40 to 
50% in the UK compared to 15 to25% for Stryker-Howmedica (the second largest player).   
In Table 6.2, I use the NJR database to identify the main players in England and Wales, 2003-8. 
The NJR data used in this and the next chapter are compiled from data supplied to me by 
Northgate Information Systems in March 2009, explained in more detail in Appendix 2, 
including a discussion of the variables available on the NJR. This data includes observations up 
to the end of the financial year 2008/9. NJR data for 2009/10 has since become available which 
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has been used in the aggregated form in chapter 3. In total there are 25 manufacturers, but only 5 
(Stryker, Depuy, Zimmer, JRI and Biomet) have a market share consistently over 5%.  Of these, 
Stryker, Depuy, Zimmer and Biomet are all American based multi-nationals and are all 
conglomerates (i.e. hip prostheses are only part of their overall product range).  It follows that 
hip prostheses in England form only a small part of their world wide activities.  JRI is the 
exception: it is owned wholly by the British Furlong Research Charitable Foundation, and 
appears to only be present in the UK market (based on a small web based search and search of a 
sample of 4 other national joint registries) producing orthopaedic implants and surgical 
instrumentation only.     
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* Market shares measured by volumes of prostheses, displayed as percentages 
** There are 14 other manufacturers, none of which has a market share of more than 0.25% in any one year  
Source: the authors calculations, based on primary NJR data 
Table 6.2 The Leading Suppliers to the market in England and Wales: market shares* (%) 
2003-8 
 
Table 6.3 shows the world’s largest manufacturers. Where appropriate, figures have been 
converted into UK sterling and inflated into 2011 prices[16]. All four US manufacturers are 
based in Indiana, where most early US innovation in this industry took place, their UK 
headquarters are all in the South/South-West with the exception of Depuy, who are based in the 
North of England, Leeds.  
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Manufacturer Headquarters UK office Annual worldwide sales 
(£million)* 
Stryker [44] Warsaw, Indiana, USA Newbury, Berkshire £4,666 
(J&J) Depuy [45] Warsaw, Indiana, USA Leeds £3,728 
Zimmer[46] Warsaw, Indiana, USA Swindon £2,842 
Biomet Orthopaedics[47] Warsaw, Indiana, USA South Wales & Swindon £1,492† 
Smith & Nephew[48] London, UK London £1,155†* 
B Braun Medical 
Limited+[49] 
Sheffield, UK Sheffield, UK £1,300†* 
Smaller UK firms 
JRI Ltd [155] Sheffield, UK Sheffield £86†* 
Corin[50] Cirencester, Gloucester Cirencester, Gloucester £43‡ 
* converted to UK £ from US $, price year 2009 inflated to price year 2011[16];  † converted to UK £ from US $;  
Price year 2006 inflated to price year 2011[16];   ‡ price year 2009 inflated to price year 2011;   †* price year 2008 
inflated to price year 2011;   +part of B Braun Aesculup 
Table 6.3, The world’s top manufacturers 
Depuy is part of the wider diversified Johnson & Johnson group (J & J), while Stryker is more 
specialised in hips, knees, spine and trauma, which accounts for approximately 61% of their 
overall sales (of which hips account for approximately 15%). Stryker has the world's largest 
single market share for hip prostheses (Depuy 13%, Zimmer 10%, Smith and Nephew 8%, 
Biomet 6% and others 28%)[156]. Zimmer and Biomet are also  U.S based multinational firms 
who both report the majority of their sales taking place in the US[157, 158]. The other four 
manufacturers shown in table 6.3 are based in the UK, although Smith & Nephew and B Braun 
Medical Limited have a presence in the US market[159], with Smith & Nephew, basing the 
Orthopaedic part of the company (which includes hip prostheses) in Memphis Tennessee in the 
US[160]. For comparative purposes, the table shows the two much smaller UK firms, Corin and 
JRI, who are relatively large in the UK (see table 6.2). Corin is also present in European markets, 
with only a 5% presence in the U.S market[161].  Corin is based in Cirencester, England and JRI 
is based in Sheffield, England.  
 
6.5.3 Concentration of sellers 
A key feature of market structure is the level of concentration.  This is roughly a measure of the 
degree of oligopoly.  Table 5.2 shows that there is a duopoly of two large firms, Stryker and 
Depuy, who between them, account for 69% of the market. There are three other large firms, but 
with much smaller shares of 5-7% (Zimmer, Biomet and JRI), and then a fringe of very small 
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players who together account for little more than 10%.  As mentioned above, Depuy companies 
(formerly part of Roche) was acquired by the Johnson & Johnson group in 1998, following 
clearance by the EC. There have been a number of other smaller acquisitions during the time 
period used in this chapter, most notably: Zimmer acquired Centerpulse in October 2003, 
increasing their international market share by approximately 3%, and Smith and Nephew 
acquired Medical Technologies in March 2004, increasing their international market share by 
0.01% (Midland Medical Technologies is more focused on the hip resurfacing market). 
In IO and Competition Economics, the concentration of sellers is measured by a variety of 
different statistical indices.  The two most common are as follows.   
HHI: The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index of concentration, defined as the sum of squared market 
shares of all firms[162]. 
 
HHI = Σsi2 for i=1…..N     (1) 
 
The HHI can vary from 1/N to 1: the lower limit occurs if there are N different manufacturers, 
each with an identical market share (1/N each); the upper limit occurs if there is only a single 
manufacturer in the market (i.e. a monopoly).  For presentational purposes, the index is 
sometimes expressed in a reciprocal numbers equivalent form: 
N(HHI) = 1/HHI      (2) 
This translates the distribution of firms into a hypothetical number of equal sized firms – the 
number of equal sized firms who would record that value of HHI if they had equal shares (see 
below for examples) 
The other most common concentration measure is the concentration ratio[163], which records 
the combined market shares of the largest firms.  Here, we use: 
CR2: the two firm concentration ratio which measures the combined share of the two largest 
firms in the market, and 
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CR5: The five firm concentration ratio, which shows the combined shares of the top five 
suppliers. 
Table 6.4 reports the values of each index on a yearly basis.  As can be seen, the HHI has 
remained fairly constant throughout, at around 0.26, indicating a consistently highly oligopolistic 
market: in terms of its numbers equivalent, equivalent to a market of just four (equalised) firms.  
CR2 is also consistently 68-70%, and CR5 shows that the top five manufacturers account for 
approximately 90% of the market. 
Table 6.4: Seller Concentration in England and Wales, 2003-8 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
HHI 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 
CR2 69% 68% 69% 68% 69% 70% 
CR5 90% 89% 89% 90% 90% 89% 
Source: Authors calculations, based on primary NJR data 
Table 6.4: Seller Concentration in England and Wales, 2003-8 
 
6.5.4 Firms’ Product Portfolios: the Prostheses 
Table 6.5 lists the leading brands for cups and stems.  These include 6 stems and 10 cups. The 
‘best-selling’ brand is the Exeter V40 (Stryker), which is a cemented stem and accounts for 
approximately 36% of all stems. For reference, Appendix 1 reports the combinations of different 
cups and stems which are most often used in England Wales – usually the cups and stems are 
produced from the same manufacturer which may reflect regulatory approval, technical 
compatibility  and complementary marketing of the products  (only 5 out of the 26 combinations 
listed use cups and stems from different manufacturers). The most common cup and stem 
combination (by almost 4,000) procedures is the Pinnacle cementless cup with the Corail 
cementless stem, both manufactured by Depuy. 
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Brand Manufacturer Prosthesis 
Type 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
2003-8 
Exeter V40 Stryker  Stem 31% 34% 38% 37% 36% 35% 36% 
Corail Depuy Stem 3% 6% 8% 11% 16% 21% 21% 
Contemporary Stryker Cup 7% 7% 11% 9% 11% 12% 8% 
Pinnacle Depuy Cup 5% 3% 7% 11% 15% 19% 10% 
Charnley stem Depuy Stem 17% 13% 10% 7% 5% 3% 8% 
Elite Plus 
Ogee 
Depuy Cup 10% 9% 9% 8% 8% 7% 8% 
Trident Stryker Cup 2% 4% 6% 9% 11% 12% 8% 
Trilogy Zimmer Cup 8% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 
CSF JRI Cup 6% 7% 7% 7% 6% 4% 6% 
C-Stem Depuy Stem 6% 7% 8% 7% 5% 3% 6% 
Furlong JRI Stem 6% 7% 7% 8% 6% 6% 7% 
Charnley cup Depuy Cup 10% 8% 6% 4% 3% 2% 5% 
Charnley 
Ogee 
Depuy Cup 9% 7% 5% 3% 3% 2% 4% 
CPT  Zimmer  Stem 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 5% 5% 
Elite Plus  Depuy  Cup 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 
Exeter 
Duration 
Stryker  Cup 7% 6% 5% 5% 4% 3% 5% 
Other     69% 66% 58% 53% 53% 55% 58% 
Source: Authors calculations, based on primary NJR data 
Note: all market shares represent shares of the total for each component type, e.g. the Exeter V40 has a 36% share of 
al stems. For this reason, each column sums to approximately 200%. 
Table 6.5, Market shares for the top 16 brands, 2003-8 
 
 
The HHI index of concentration for prosthesis brands is 0.161 for stems and 0.057 for cups 
which is equivalent to approximately 6 equal sized stems and 17 equal sized cups.  This suggests 
a fair amount of diversification of brand choices within the NHS on average, although there is 
clearly more specialisation/concentration higher in stems.  In the next chapter, it is convenient to 
refer to a single measure of specialisation for each hospital, and I will use the average of the 
index for cups and stems.  At the national level, the average of the above HHIs for stems and 
cups is 0.109, which translates into roughly 10 equal sized brands. 
Figures 6.2(a-d) depict the volumes implanted for these main brands. 
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Figures 6.2a-d 
Figure 6.2 a - Number of prostheses implanted for the main 6 brands of cemented cup 
 
Figure 6.1 b - Number of prostheses implanted for the main 6 brands of cemented stem 
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Figure 6.1 c - Number of prostheses implanted for the main 6 brands of cementless cup 
 
Figure 6.1 d - Number of prostheses implanted for the main 6 brands of cementless stem 
 
 
What now becomes clear is that Stryker appears to be dominant in the cemented market, 
particularly with the Exeter V40, which has grown its market share from 40 to 60% of stems, but 
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also in cemented cups, its Contemporary model has increased its share from 10 to 30%.  
Stryker’s growth in the cemented market, means that it has been able to maintain a 35% overall 
share (Table 6.2), despite the fact there is the general trend to implant cementless prostheses, in 
which it has a much smaller presence.  However its cementless cup (Trident) has also grown in 
market share from 6 to 21% by 2008. 
In contrast, Depuy is clearly dominant in the cementless sector with a rise in their cementless 
stem, Corail.  This is clearly at the expense of the JRI’s Furlong which starts off fairly dominant 
with 38% of the market share compared to Corail's 17%. However, by 2008, Corail has risen to 
46% while Furlong has fallen off to only 18%. In cementless cups, Depuy has gained some 
market share with the Pinnacle growing from 2 to 33%, alongside Stryker's Trident, both of 
which appear to have been at the expense of Zimmer's Trilogy which drops from 23 to 12% by 
2008. 
Overall, it appears that Stryker and Depuy are both dominant, but separately in the cemented and 
cementless sectors respectively. JRI still has an important presence in the cementless sector both 
for cups and stems, but its market share has reduced year on year in the face of the rises by 
Stryker and Depuy in this sector. Other manufacturers such as Zimmer, Biomet and Smith and 
Nephew have some prostheses in each sector which have stayed fairly constant around the 2-3% 
of market share, with the Exceed cementless cup (Biomet) rising from 1 to 4% - the only real rise 
for any manufacturer other than Stryker and Depuy. 
 
6.6 Implications for market power 
These values of the concentration indices indicate a highly concentrated market.  For example, 
all of the leading competition authorities in the UK, EC and UK designate a market as 
‘concentrated’ if HHI>0.10, and ‘highly concentrated’ if HHI>0.20[164]  
When identifying whether individual firms are dominant, there does not appear to be one clear 
rule: a market share of 50% or more would usually be interpreted as evidence of dominance, 
while the OFT in their "Assessment of Market Power" guidelines state  that below 40% it is 
unlikely that a firm is considered dominant [37].  In this case, neither Depuy nor Stryker would 
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be considered to be singly dominant, but a combined market share for the top two of nearly 70% 
might be interpreted as potentially ‘collectively dominant’, especially bearing in mind Depuy’s 
strength in cementless and Stryker’s in cemented.  
As discussed earlier (section 6.4.2), high concentration is considered to be a necessary condition 
for firms to be considered dominant, and a market to be considered as uncompetitive, or in 
extreme cases, open to collusion.  However, high concentration alone is not sufficient for this 
conclusion, other evidence is required. Even very large firms may not be able to exploit their 
strong market shares if entry into the market by new firms was potentially easy, or if a strong 
buyer could use its buyer power to resist high prices/poor quality or to threaten switch to 
competing suppliers. The two EU Commission merger reports mentioned above [68, 69] found 
that in the European market for medical devices, there had been expansion by the current 
manufacturers into new products and countries, and an absence of significant entry barriers 
(establishment and transport costs, distribution networks, patents and R&D etc.). However, this 
may not be the case at the national market level, where in England, as we have seen, there are 
only two main suppliers (perhaps jointly dominant), few small firms and very little evidence of 
new entrants in the period covered by the NJR.   
Of course, clear evidence would be necessary before concluding that firms in a given market 
were colluding.  This would require evidence of price fixing and/or some form of market 
sharing.  In this case information on prices is not available (as acknowledged in the NAO report 
on procurement  in the NHS[135]). However, the NJR data will allow at least some preliminary 
analysis to identify any indirect evidence of market sharing. Recalling the discussion in 6.4.2, 
market sharing could be observed through one or more of the following: territorial market 
sharing at the international or regional levels - for the purpose of this thesis, this might be 
observed at the regional level within England; allocative market sharing - certain hospitals 
purchasing only from specific manufacturers; and general quota market sharing - the 
manufacturers agree on retaining a stable quota division of market shares between them.  One of 
the purposes of the next chapter is to look for any indirect evidence of this. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter indicate that potentially a dominant duopoly 
exists in the UK market (Stryker and Depuy) and these two manufacturers appear to be 
maintaining their grip over time.  They have achieved this by consolidating the shares of their 
established brands and by growing the market shares of their newer brands (e.g. Corail and 
Pinnacle by Depuy). 
As already explained, large or very large market shares are not necessarily a cause for concern.  
The strength of the leading brands (and therefore firms) may simply reveal that they are superior 
technically, and that surgeons and hospitals in the NHS are recognizing this, for example the 
clinical evidence for Stryker’s Exeter hip and Depuy’s Corail hip show that both are ODEP 10A 
rated (these two components are virtually the only femoral components that have 15 year 
survival outcomes data available from generalisable registry data and the peer-reviewed 
literature[165, 166]).   Although there is not much evidence of significant entry of new firms into 
this market, it must be remembered that if there were a dominant buyer in the UK - the NHS - 
then this might be sufficient to constrain the potential market power of the two main 
manufacturers in this market.  However, if as indicated by this chapter and the findings of the 
NAO report, the NHS is faced with sellers with considerable potential selling power, then the 
question is how should the NHS conduct its procurement with respect to these suppliers? The 
next chapter turns to a deeper analysis of the choices made within the NHS, at the level of the 
individual hospital, and attempts to identify and explain any patterns which emerge from the 
disaggregated data. 
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Chapter 7, Hospital choice of hip prostheses 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 to 6 highlighted the large number of hip prostheses on the market. Using NJR data, 
the previous chapter (6) identified that the prosthesis industry as a duopolistic or concentrated 
oligopolistic market, suggesting that the NHS could be faced with sellers with significant selling 
power. As outlined previously, if the NHS purchases as a single homogenous entity then it may 
be able to exploit its buyer power to attempt to overcome the seller power and achieve efficient 
purchasing of joint prostheses. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the NHS is currently purchasing at a disaggregated, local level and thus 
has the potential to suffer inefficiencies.  
This chapter builds on the preceding chapters, empirically testing choice of hip prostheses at two 
levels, first in terms of patient choice: how well the characteristics of the patient explain choice 
and beyond this, choice at the hospital level to determine whether the NHS acts as a homogenous 
powerful entity, or whether the manufacturers of prostheses are able to exploit their potential 
seller power. It is organised in five sections: Section 7.2.1 sets out the hypotheses which will be 
tested empirically. Section 7.2.2 discusses the theoretical model, Section 7.3 describes the data 
set. Section 7. describes the methods of analysis – the specification of dependent variables and 
estimating equations and the econometric estimators. Section 7.5 reports the main results and 
section 7.6 re-visits the original hypotheses to provide a discussion of the main results. Finally, 
section 7.7 summarises the main conclusions and sets out an agenda for future work.  
7.2.1 Hypotheses 
The analysis is structured around the following hypotheses: 
 
1. Choice of prosthesis is largely determined by the characteristics of the patient. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the agent is the surgeon/hospital, choosing which 
prosthesis to implant on behalf of the patient (the principal).  If it is found that it is mainly patient 
characteristics that determine which prosthesis they receive, then this implies little or no 
discretion on the part of the agent, and it is as if the agent’s (surgeon) role is merely to identify 
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the ‘correct’ prosthesis for that patient, i.e. the one the patient would have chosen herself if she 
were fully informed. This is tested at the aggregate level, i.e. just between broad prosthesis type 
(cemented or cementless) – if it is not confirmed at that level, it would be pointless to conduct 
further tests at the level of individual brands of prosthesis. 
If this hypothesis was accepted, then there would be little need for any further analysis. 
However, if the hypothesis is rejected (which it overwhelmingly is), then the subsequent stages 
in the analysis are devoted to explaining prosthesis choice, having controlled for patient 
characteristics, in terms of the following hypotheses. 
2. The NHS is a homogenous entity in its prosthesis choices – the extent of specialisation 
is similar across all hospitals 
If the NHS is a homogenous entity then it might be expected that individual hospitals replicate 
the same degree of specialisation as the aggregate national for England and Wales observed in 
the previous chapter.  In that case, individual hospitals would be like ‘mini-clones’ of the NHS as 
a whole. 
However, it is very unlikely that this could apply to smaller hospitals29, simply because of the 
low number of patients implanted – previous chapters have shown that within the NHS as a 
whole there have been large numbers of different brands implanted, and it would be impossible 
for a hospital with, say, only 50 patients to employ such a large number. Therefore, a more 
plausible secondary hypothesis is that:  
3. Larger hospitals are less specialised than smaller hospitals, and, as hospital size grows, 
specialisation tends, at the limit, to the national level 
Thus, evidence is sought that, although smaller hospitals are inevitably more specialised in their 
choice of prostheses than large ones, this effect declines as activity increases. This might be 
expected if there are scale purchasing discounts, and/or a 'learning curve effect' by consultants 
(so that it is best for them to use only a single prosthesis when they only undertake a small 
number of operations.)  On the other hand, there may be an offsetting effect because the biggest 
 
29
 Throughout this chapter, I equate hospital activity or size with the number of patients implanted. 
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hospitals present the suppliers with the largest and most profitable potential sales opportunities, 
and suppliers might attempt to tie the biggest hospitals into exclusive purchasing deals.  
4. There are predictable differences between various ‘segments’ within the NHS 
While it may be that there is considerable variability within the NHS as a whole, it may be that a 
large part of this can be accounted for by (i) systematic regional differences or by (ii) the 
type/status of hospitals (identified here by strategic health authorities (SHA) regions); and 
hospital status (here I distinguish, FTs from NHS Trusts, IS and ISTC's because their different 
financial structure may affect their purchasing policies.) 
5. Part of the observed variation in choice is the result of systematic behaviour by the 
manufacturers.  
It was shown in the previous chapter that the supplying industry is dominated by two large 
suppliers, DePuy and Stryker.  It was suggested that this might lead to ‘tacit collusion’ between 
them.  One of the effects of tacit collusion is that price will tend to be higher.  This cannot be 
tested with the current data-set since it does not include any information on the prices paid by 
individual hospitals.  This is one of the intended areas of future research. 
However, another potential effect of collusion is for firms to share out the market in some 
systematic way.  In extreme forms of collusion (cartels) firms may even make formal agreements 
in which each of them is allocated certain territories or customers (see previous chapter.)  There 
is no reason to think that a cartel exists in this market, but it may be that the suppliers informally 
accept that some regions or hospitals are ‘their territory’, while others are the territory of other 
suppliers. At a superficial level at least, it is worth recalling Table 6.3 and noting that Stryker  is 
located in Berkshire (30 miles or so from Central London), while Depuy is located in Leeds (in 
Yorkshire, North England). Examination of whether the ‘market shares’ of Depuy and Stryker 
are systematically  different by hospital status, size, and the region of the hospital (SHA) will 
provide indirect evidence of this30. If there is evidence of this sort, then future research will make 
 
30
 Although it should be noted that Depuy is located in Leeds, having moved to the headquarters of the Chas F 
Thackeray company which it acquired in 1990 and Stryker are based in the Thames valley after it acquired 
Howmedica. Both manufacturers provided training to surgeons in their original implants, with training focussed 
initially in  the area of their regional base. 
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a deeper analysis for the potential evidence that the manufacturers are exploiting their seller 
power in the form of market sharing either by region or hospital.  
 
6. Finally, when examining each of these hypotheses, the potential effects of the 
introduction of PbR in 2006/7 will also be considered. 
Expectations of the likely effects are not clear-cut.  At this stage, the main purpose on this is to 
establish whether the introduction of PbR has led to any significant changes in the purchasing 
behaviour of individual hospitals.  The causes of any such changes, if any, will be the subject of 
future research. 
 
7.2.2 The economic model 
In order to test the above hypotheses, this chapter applies a series of econometric tests based on 
the following theoretical model. 
The model draws on random utility theory, using a discrete choice model, first developed in the 
analysis of consumer behaviour31. Discrete choice models of consumer behaviour describe the 
decision makers' choices between all the alternatives. If the decision maker is assumed to be the 
consumer, then this specific type of model establishes the link between consumer preferences 
and the aggregate demand function.  
In the context of this thesis, unlike in standard consumer theory, there is a principal-agent 
dimension to the model, where the patient is the principal and the agent is the hospital/surgeon 
(at this stage, the identity of the agent is not specified).  
Therefore, I proceed in two steps - first specifying the principal's utility and then the agent's. I 
assume that actual choice is based on the latter. In a general form the following describes the 
    
 
 
31
 For a deeper discussion of random utility theory with discrete choice models, see: 167. Nevo, A., Mergers with 
Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2000. 
31(3): p. 395-421, 168. Berry, S.T., Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 1994. 25(2): p. 242-262. 
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utility patient i would derive from prosthesis j. For expositional convenience, the potential 
subscript t, for date of implant is suppressed. 
 
Uij =  βijXi + µij           {1} 
 
where: 
Ui is principal i’s utility 
X is a vector of patient characteristics (some of which maybe unobserved by the  econometrician), and βij  
and µij are effectively ‘taste’ parameters. Thus βijXi refers to the utility  patient i would derive from 
brand j given its vector of characteristics Xi. Note that βij may vary  
across  patients and prostheses. 
 
The prosthesis which is most appropriate is the one which maximizes the principal’s utility. However, as 
described in section 6.2.2, in this context, it cannot be assumed that this is necessarily the prosthesis 
which is actually implanted, because the 'principal' is not fully informed and effectively it is the agent that 
makes the choice.  
In making this choice I assume that the agent will take account of cost, and therefore the price of the 
treatment should appear positively in what is now the net utility function for agent k:  
 
 Uijk =  βijkXJ – αkPj +γjk Zk _+  µijk        {2} 
 
 where: 
 Zk is a vector of the characteristics of agent k 
 Pj is the price of the prosthesis 
 βijk is the agents perception of the principal's 'taste' 
 It is assumed that the agent chooses the prosthesis which maxmises his/her utility function. This 
is the equation which implicitly underlies all the following empirical work. In the first part of the 
empirics, it informs the equations identifying the choice between cemented and cementless 
prostheses in terms of the patient characteristics. In the later parts it supports the chosen mix of 
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prostheses at the hospital level which is implicitly based on an aggregation of the choices at the 
individual patient level. 
To specify the variables in the patient characteristics vector, I draw on the list of characteristics 
often included in previous studies of THR. 
 
 
Principal (patient) characteristics:  
*Age – It is expected that younger patients are more likely to receive a cementless prosthesis, as 
reported in section 2.2.4. 
*Gender – It is expected that males are more likely to receive a cementless prosthesis, as 
reported in section 2.2.4 
BMI 
Height 
Weight 
*Pre-operative health status 
Socio-economic status 
Marital status 
Dependents 
*Employment 
Side of surgery 
Bilateral surgery 
Position during surgery  
 
In the present context it is not obvious that all of these variables will have an impact on the 
choice of prosthesis. The variables which potentially are most important are starred in the above 
list with my prior expectations of their likely effect. In the other cases I have no strong priors.  
 
Clearly some assumptions need to be made regarding who the 'agent' is. However, for the 
purpose of this thesis, I must remain agnostic as to the identity of the agent pending future work 
on decision making in hospitals for hip prostheses. At this stage, the agent will be equated to the 
(
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hospital32, although it is accepted that the hospital is the aggregation of all surgeons within the 
hospital, and ideally, some recognition would be made of heterogeneity between sugeons within 
individual hospitals. 
 
Agent (hospital) characteristics:  
Hospital status (NHS trust, Foundation trust and so on) 
Supplier (manufacturer) preference 
Hospital teaching status 
Regional location of hospital 
Socio-economic status of the region of hospital location  
Size of the hospital (with respect to scale of hospital and volume purchases) 
 
I have no strong priors as to how these characteristics will impact on choices. The purpose here 
is largely descriptive - to identify what the data reveal. 
 
A key limitation for the empirical model is that data on a number of these variables is not 
available, including price of prosthesis and the identity of the surgeons who are working within a 
hospital. Addressing these omissions will be an area of future work. 
 
7.3  Data 
The analysis utilizes the individual patient level data received33 from the NJR and HES (hospital 
episodes, collected from all hospital admissions in England). These data cover the period 2003-
2008.  The data are used in two forms for the analysis of this chapter: 
 
1. At the individual patient level (NJR and HES linked data-sets).  This is used for the initial 
stage focusing on the role of patient characteristics 
 
32
 Further work will aim to disentangle this issue. 
33
 Note that this does not include 2009 because this year was unavailable at the time (March, 2009). The analysis in 
the earlier chapter 2 does include 2009 in aggregate form because that chapter was written after the publication of 
the 2009/10 NJR Annual Report.    
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2. Hospital level data (using only just the NJR, aggregated to the hospital level for each 
year).  This will be used to test the hypotheses relating to hospital specialisation and 
purchases from the two leading manufacturers. 
The cleaning and merging of the NJR and HES linked databases is explained in detail in 
Appendix 2. However, in brief, it unavoidably involved dropping a large number of patient level 
observations due to differences in the sizes and make-ups of the data-sets provided: I was 
provided with 199,457 individual patient level observations from HES, and 350,238 individual 
patient level observations from the NJR, thus the merging process inevitably involved losing 
some of the NJR observations. Patients in Wales and the Independent Sector patients were 
dropped because they are included in the NJR database, but they do not appear in HES, this 
accounted for the majority (n=167,502) of the 'lost' observations. These lost observations mean 
that any results are confined only to a population of patients in England who are NHS funded. It 
would be inappropriate to generalise any findings to the population of all patients in England and 
Wales, without further investigation of whether these exclusions might lead to selection bias (for 
example, in terms of patient mix). The final linked HES and NJR data-set contains 145,870 
patient observations. The strength of the linked HES data-set is that it contains more patient 
characteristics variables than the NJR. However, as will be shown, patient characteristics explain 
very little of the choice of prosthesis, and consequently the decision was taken to use the NJR 
data-set only for most of the analysis since this covered far more patients: 278,063 individual 
patient level observations34, including patient characteristic variables for only: gender, age and 
side of surgery. These NJR data were then aggregated up to the ‘hospital-year’ level, for 
example: the number of Exeter V40 prostheses implanted in a given hospital in a given year. 
When aggregated to the hospital level, the dimensions of the resulting panel are as in table 7.1. 
below: 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
No. Hospitals 306 341 341 350 344 336 1948 
No. Patients 22061 41512 46042 46214 51152 51088 258069 
Table 7.1, Dimensions of the hospital-level data-set 
 
34
 71,175 individual patient level observations were dropped from the original 350,238 NJR data-set for the 
following reasons: they were revision or resurfacing procedures or they were incorrectly coded as knee procedures. 
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7.3.1 Dependent variables 
As explained below, the analysis is structured into three stages. In the first stage, the dependent 
variable refers to the identity of the prosthesis implanted in the individual patient data-set; the 
second stage analyses the extent of specialisation in choice of prostheses by the individual 
hospital; and the third stage examines what determines the extent to which the hospital 
concentrates its purchases on the two main suppliers (Depuy and Stryker).  The precise 
specification and measurement of these dependent variables is described in section 7.4.  
 
7.3.2 Covariates 
The explanatory variables to be employed include a vector of patient characteristics and a vector 
of hospital characteristics  
Patient characteristics 
For each patient, I have data on 9 characteristics: age, gender, side of surgery (left or right), 
patient position during surgery[169], ethnicity, whether bilateral surgery was carried out, primary 
diagnosis of osteoarthritis, whether Minimally Invasive Surgery was used[170], and whether 
Image Guided surgery was used[171]35.  The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7.2(i).   
  
 
35
 Minimally invasive surgery (MIS) and Image Guided Surgery (IGS) are surgical techniques. MIS  uses a single 
small incision to avoid damage to muscles and tendons, using specially designed retractors and customised 
instruments to expose the hip joint[160]. The NJR annual report 2010, reports that less than 5% of all hip procedures 
in 2009/2010 used MIS[8]. Image guided surgery is the use of sophisticated computer technology for the 
optimization of surgical performance[161]. 
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 Mean 
Mean patient age (years) 69 
Proportion of Female Patients 62% 
Proportion of patients receiving right side prosthesis 55% 
Proportion of patients positioned laterally 85% 
Proportion of patients classed as 'white' 99% 
Proportion of patients undergoing bilateral surgery 0.2% 
Proportion of patients receiving minimal invasive surgery (MIS)  5% 
Proportion of patients receiving image guided surgery (IGS) 0.4% 
Proportion of patients with a primary diagnosis of Osteoarthritis  87% 
Table 7.2(i) Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in the individual patient level panel 
(n=145,870) 
 
  Mean or % 
Mean patient age (years) 70 
Proportion of Female Patients 63% 
Proportion of patients receiving right side prosthesis 45% 
  
 
Hospital Size (number of implants) 336 
  
 
NHS Trust 78% 
NHS Foundation Trust 11%. 
Independent Sector 6% 
NHS Trust Treatment Centre and 'Other' 3% 
Independent Treatment Centre 3% 
  
 
South East 11% 
East 13% 
East Midlands 7% 
North West 17% 
London 11% 
Yorkshire 9% 
South West 9% 
South Central 8% 
West Midlands 10% 
North East 5% 
Table 7.2(ii) Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables in hospital panel (n=1948) 
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In the hospital-panel form, these variables are measured as the averages or proportions of all 
patients receiving implants in each hospital in a given year.  Unfortunately, only three of the 11 
above characteristics (age gender and side of surgery) can be employed as these are the only 
characteristics reported in the NJR data-set – see Appendix 236. There is also a small number 
(70) of missing observations on patient age and gender in the NJR, and these have been dropped 
from the hospital panel. The descriptive statistics of the remaining 1948 hospital panel 
observations are shown in Table 7.2(ii). 
  
Hospital characteristics 
Hospital size (THR activity) 
Hospital ‘size’ here is measured by the number of prostheses implanted by a hospital in a given 
year; therefore this should be interpreted as a measure of the extent of a hospital’s hip 
replacement activity, rather than as a measure of its more general size. Table 7.3 shows the size 
distribution of hospitals according to this measure    
It is important to reiterate here that 2003 was an incomplete year for data coverage in the NJR, 
hence the pattern for hospital activity differs somewhat from the subsequent years.  Apart from 
this, the mean number of implants per hospital has remained fairly steady across the years.    
Most hospitals implant between 50 and 300 prostheses in a given year, but there is also a few 
very active hospitals (>300), while roughly half are fairly small (<100).  
 
  <50 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400+ Average no. patients per 
hospital 
2003 145 96 48 12 2 3 306 
2004 98 90 93 41 10 9 339 
2005 69 87 114 51 9 11 341 
2006 87 99 95 46 7 16 350 
2007 75 95 87 52 19 16 344 
2008 63 87 101 57 13 15 336 
Source: NJR data[9, 58, 64-67, 172]  
Table 7.3,  Size distribution of hospitals: size measured by number of implants 
 
36
 The NJR includes data on patient height, weight and BMI. However, there were considerable missing 
observations for these variables and would have significantly reduced the data-set size had they been included in the 
regressions. 
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Status of hospitals 
Table 7.4 distinguishes five broad types of hospitals37: About 80% are NHS Trust hospitals, 11% 
are FT, and 6% are Independent Sector (IS) hospitals. As can be seen, there is a continuing rise 
in the number of FTs, after their introduction in 2003/4. The final row shows the number of 
hospitals who have changed their status from NHS Trust to FT in each year - most of the 
switches take place in 2006/7 which is consistent with the data provided on FT by Monitor (the 
regulator for FT) [173]. 
Status 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Trust 278 302 286 279 241 223 1,609 
Foundation 2 14 23 41 74 77 231 
Independent 18 24 22 17 17 25 123 
Other provider & NHS 
Treatment Centre 
7 8 12 9 8 8 52 
Independent Treatment Centre 3 4 8 12 13 16 56 
TOTAL 308 352 351 358 353 349 2,071 
Switches 1 12 10 22 32 9 86 
Source: NJR data[9]  
Table 7.4,  Hospitals by type 
 
Geographical location of hospitals  
Dummy variables are also constructed for the region where the hospital is located, and these 
correspond to the SHAs[174]38. 
 
7.4 Structure of analysis, specification and estimators 
The analysis is structured in three stages, to follow the sequence of hypotheses in section 7.2. 
 
2
Information on provider type is included in the HES data-set, but not in the NJR. Fortunately, it was possible to 
map provider type into the panel using information on linked patients. But this was not possible in all cases. This is 
one reason for the loss of some patients from the NJR in the panel. These are patients for whom it was impossible to 
identify hospital type. In order to avoid categories with too few observations, NHS treatment centre's and others are 
combined.
38
 SHAs were introduced in 2002 to manage the NHS locally and provide a link with the DoH, in 2006 these were 
refined from 28 regions to 10[164].  
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Stage 1 Choice of prosthesis type for the individual patient  
This stage is designed to establish how far the choice of prosthesis for the individual patient is 
explained purely in terms of the patient’s characteristics (hypothesis 1 above).  If there is more or 
less uniform national decision-making, it would be expected that patient characteristics are the 
dominant factor, but if there are important differences between hospitals, then this establishes 
that further analysis at the hospital level is needed.  In principle, this stage could be conducted 
across all the many different brands of prostheses.  However, it turns out to be sufficient to 
consider only the very basic choice between the broad cemented and cementless types.  As will 
be seen, patient characteristics provide only a very limited explanation of even this most 
aggregate of choices, and there is therefore nothing to be gained by disaggregating down to the 
level of the individual prostheses within these two broad types.      
The model to be tested is39: 
 P(yi = 1) = Φ (β0 + β1Xi + β2ti)     i - 1,...,n     (1) 
      
where  
yi =1 if  patient i receieved a cementless prosthesis; 0 otherwiseXi is a vector  characteristics of 
patient i (including age, gender, etc.), as above (age, gender etc) 
ti is a set of dummy variables indicating the year in which patient i received the prosthesis. 
Φ (.) is the standard cumulative distribution function.  
 
In this equation, and all following ones, t is measured using 5 year dummy variables (2004-8) 
with the omitted default 2003.  This is to control for changes over time, which are of particular 
interest with respect to the impact of the introduction of PbR and the national tariff in 2005/6. 
Time is included in the form of year dummies, rather than as a continuous time trend, to allow 
for the possibility that trends may not be smooth or even monotonic. 
This equation is fitted initially to the individual patient level data (145,860 patient observations); 
the dependent variable is measured in binary form, taking the value 1 if patient i receives a 
 
39
 This is the probabilistic equivalent to the principals utility function described in section 7.2.2. 
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cementless prosthesis at time t, or 0 if cemented. Standard probit and bi-variate probit models are  
used to estimate the equation[175, 176]40. Since more than one choice is being estimated, the 
bivariate probit model maybe more appropriate because it allows for the choices to be correlated 
due to unobserved characteristics. – 
For comparability, the model is also tested on the hospital-panel form of the database41.  In this 
case, the dependent variable becomes the proportion of patients implanted with cementless 
prostheses in hospital i at time t, and the X vector now denotes, for each characteristic, the 
average (e.g. for age), or the proportion (e.g. of females) across all patients in i at t.  This is 
estimated using the random effects panel Tobit model42, as the dependent variable is confined to 
the range 0 and 1 with a fairly large number of observations at the two bounds (see the next 
section for more discussion) [175, 176] . 
All statistical analysis in this chapter is carried out using STATA SE version 11. 
 
Stage 2 Hospital Specialisation  
This stage explores the determinants of the extent to which individual hospitals specialize in their 
choices across brands and manufacturers.  This is of relevance to heterogeneity within the NHS 
(hypothesis 2 above), whether specialisation decreases with the size of the hospital (hypothesis 
3), whether there are systematic differences by region and hospital status (hypothesis 4),.and 
whether there are significant changes over time, especially with respect to the introduction of 
PbR (hypothesis 6). 
The model fitted is: 
 
   yit  =  βo +β1 Xit +β2Zit + β3T +uit + vi  (2) 
 
40
 Alternatively, the Logit model might equally be used.  As explained by Cameron and Trivedi[165] , Probit and 
Logit invariably give qualitatively very similar results, and this is the case here.  My preference is for the Probit, as 
it is based on a preference for the normal, as opposed to logistic assumption: the Central Limit theorem provides a 
strong reason for assuming normality, while the logistic assumption is more ad hoc[166].  
41
 Here this is based on the probability equivlalent of the agents utlity function. 
42
 The option to use fixed effects Tobit is unavailable in STATA. 
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where Xit is the vector of average patient characteristics as above (age, gender, side of surgery) 
Zit is a vector of hospital characteristics (hospital size, hospital type, region of hospital) 
T is the vector of time dummies (2003 to 2008) 
uit is a conventional idiosyncratic disturbance term 
vi  is a random time invariant hospital effect 
The dependent variable, yit, measures the extent to which hospital i at t specializes its purchases 
on a small number of, first, brands, and then manufacturers.  Various different indices might be 
used to measure specialisation, but for consistency with how concentration is measured in 
chapter 6, the HHI is again used.  In the context of brand specialisation, it is now referred to as 
SPB and is defined by: the sum of squared shares of the hospital’s total purchases accounted for 
by brand j: 
     SPBit = ∑ 

	    (3) 
where  is the share of hospital i’s total purchases accounted for by brand j where j=1…N, and 
N is the total number of possible brands. Higher values of SPB indicate more specialisation by 
the hospital.  The upper limit is 1, which occurs if the hospital purchases only a single brand, the 
lower limit is (1/N), where it purchases equal amounts of all N different brands.  Because each 
patient will receive both a cup and a stem, the value of the index for each hospital is calculated as 
the average of the cup and stem index values; in other words, SPB=1 would indicate that the 
hospital purchases only one brand of stem and one brand of cup. 
 
The equivalent index of hospital specialisation across manufacturers is SPMit , defined  as in (3), 
but with j now denoting a manufacturer.  This is estimated using the hospital panel data, again 
using the random effects panel Tobit model43, as the dependent variable is confined to the range 
0 and 1. 
 
  
 
43
 The option to use fixed effects Tobit is unavailable in STATA. 
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Stage 3,  Hospital market shares of the leading manufacturers: Stryker and Depuy   
The third stage focuses on the extent to which the hospital concentrates its purchases on the two 
leading suppliers (the above specialisation indexes merely indicate the extent of its 
specialisation, regardless of the identities of the firms it buys from.).  In this case, the dependent 
variables are the proportion of the hospital’s purchases that are from Stryker, and the proportion 
of the hospital’s purchases that are from Depuy, and, as a residual, the proportion of the 
hospital’s purchases that are from all other suppliers.  This is relevant to hypothesis 5 above.  
The previous chapter showed that both firms has about a third of the national market, and we 
now examine whether these high market shares occur roughly equally across all hospitals or 
whether it is because some hospitals have a strong preference for one manufacturer, while 
another hospital prefers another manufacturer.   
In this stage, the estimated model can still be described by equation 2 above, but now the 
dependent variable denotes the share of hospital i’s purchases that are from Stryker, Depuy or 
Others.  In addition, these equations will also be estimated at a disaggregated level for each of 
cemented cup, cemented stem, cementless cup and cementless stem.  These disaggregations 
should provide insights into the sources of the two firms’ dominance in the different segments of 
the market, and this can often be equated with individual leading brands: for example, Stryker’s 
dominance in cemented stems is largely accounted for by the Exeter, and Depuy’s dominance in 
cementless stems, accounted for by the Corail (both of which have a 10A rating from ODEP).   
 
In this stage, the panel Tobit model is again used because the dependent variables are bounded 
between 0 and 1.  Since this stage involves a system of 3 equations in each case, this would seem 
to suggest using a Seemingly Unrelated regression model (SUR). However, as explained below 
in section 7.5.3, this turns out to be unnecessary[175].  
 
7.5 Results   
This section reports the results of estimating the various equations described in the previous 
section.  To avoid undue repetition, the comments after each equation are relatively brief, 
emphasising signs and significance of individual coefficients, with a wider discussion of  their 
implications for the research hypotheses of section 7.2 provided in section 7.6. 
)(
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7.5.1 Stage 1 , The relative importance of patient characteristics  
In order to assess the impact of as many characteristics of the patient as possible, it is necessary 
to first use NJR-HES linked data (HES contains information on more patient characteristics, see 
Tables 7.2). As explained in section 7.3, this NJR-HES linked data-set covers substantially fewer 
patients than the NJR panel data-set, due to the merging process, but when assessing patient 
characteristics, it provides a more comprehensive picture.  
Table 7.5(i) reports the results of separate regressions for cup and stem components using the 
individual patient-level data-set (n=145,870). As explained earlier, the dependent variable is 
binary, (cemented =1 and cementless = 0) and this is estimated using first the probit model and 
secondly the bi-variate probit modell.  Both equations are estimated with robust standard errors. 
 
 Explanatory variables Cementless cup Cementless stem 
Year (reference year 
2003) Coefficient  Marginal effects Coefficients  Marginal effects 
    2004 0.17956*** 
  0 .0715023 0.19329*** 0.06938 
    2005 0.31951*** 0.1269162 0.34702*** 0.12676 
    2006 0.48612*** 0.19179 0.48999*** 0.18047 
    2007 0.52390*** 0.2065461 0.58879*** 0.21556 
    2008 0.64488*** 0.2522949 0.76039*** 0.28113 
Age -0.04085*** 
-0.0162158 -0.03311*** -0.01147 
Right side 0.0048 0.0019046 0.01564* 0.00542 
Lateral position 0.32105*** 0.1247067 -0.06039*** 0.02115 
Female -0.11863*** 
-0.0471263 -0.122176*** 0.04265 
Non white -0.01229 
-0.0048763 -0.0147 0.00507 
Bilateral Indication 0.32086*** 0.1272336 0.18317* 0.06626 
Osteoarthritis diagnosis 0.06652*** 0.0263258 0.22673*** 0.07481 
MIS used 0.38647*** 0.1528167 0.64299*** 0.24516 
IGS used -0.03934 
-0.0155828 -0.16041** -0.05307 
Constant 2.01302*** 
 
1.16425***   
Log Likelihood -90878 
 
-82980   
Pseudo R2 0.096 
 
0.0825   
Number of observations 145,651 145,651 145,651 145,651 
legend: +, significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) *,  significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) **, significant at the 1% level 
( p<0.01)  ***, significant at the 0.1% level (p<0.001) 
Table 7.5(i) Determinants of the probability that a patient receives a cementless implant - 
probit model 
.
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 Explanatory variables Cementless cup Cementless stem 
Year (reference year 
2003) Coefficient  
Robust standard 
error 
Coefficients  Robust standard 
error 
    2004 0.17971*** 0.018185 0.20763*** 0.020126 
    2005 0.31602*** 0.017471 0.37004*** 0.019242 
    2006 0.48355*** 0.016979 0.52636*** 0.018699 
    2007 0.52190*** 0.016528 0.61610*** 0.018233 
    2008 0.64488*** 0.016621 0.78854*** 0.018272 
Age -0.03955*** 0.00036 -0.03330*** 0.000356 
Right side 0.00573 0.006876 0.01347* 0.007114 
Lateral position 0.32592*** 0.010357 -0.0304*** 0.010419 
Female -0.12060*** 0.007057 -0.12430*** 0.007264 
Non white -0.01229 0.037975 -0.00710 0.035989 
Bilateral Indication 0.31731*** 0.091063 0.19078* 0.0865 
Osteoarthritis diagnosis 0.08302*** 0.01016 0.17322*** 0.010521 
MIS used 0.38067*** 0.015911 0.63739*** 0.015592 
IGS used -0.03080 0.056946 -0.16344*** 0.061184 
Constant 1.89899*** 0.030618 1.17681*** 0.03134 
Number of observations 145,651 145,651 145,651 145,651 
legend: +, significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) *,  significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) **, significant at the 1% level 
( p<0.01)  ***, significant at the 0.1% level (p<0.001) 
Log-likelihood: -151854.89 
the log-likelihood ratio test of rho = 0 is significant 
Table 7.5(ii) Determinants of the probability that a patient receives a cementless implant - 
bivariate probit model
 
A test of the correlation between the error terms of the two equations reveals that it is positively 
significant (ρ =0.807, significant at the p<0.001 level), indicating that the results for the bivariate 
probit model in table 7.5(ii) are to be preferred. 
For both Cup and Stem, these equations confirm a number of expected results.  Cementless 
prostheses are more likely to be used for younger patients and for males, and they have become 
more likely in recent years (indicated by the successively increasing coefficients on the time 
dummies). There are also a number of other significant characteristics – MIS, IGS, bilateral 
surgery, diagnosis of OA, patient position and patient side (for stems).    
Table 7.5 also shows the corresponding marginal effects at the mean.  Generally in this chapter, a 
detailed discussion of the magnitudes of estimated coefficients is unnecessary, but in this case, 
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this serves to provide useful background. Patients are about 20% more likely to receive a 
cementless cup and stem in 2008 than 2003; females are 5% less likely to receive cementless 
than males; and as a patient ages, they are 1% less likely to receive a cementless for every year 
older they are.  
However, the most important result is that this vector of patient characteristics only explains a 
small part of the overall variance in whether patients receive cemented or cementless prostheses: 
for both components, less than 10% as measured by the pseudo R squared. Of course, inclusion 
of all the patient level characteristics listed earlier in the theoretical model may have improved 
the fit, although I would expect that age and gender (both included) would be the most important. 
Therefore, the equation is re-estimated now including fixed effects dummy variables for each 
individual hospital. This is shown in Table 7.5(iii): the signs and approximate magnitudes of all 
coefficients are largely unchanged from those in Table 7.5(i) (apart from right side of surgery, 
non-white and bilateral indication), but most importantly, there is a much improved overall fit of 
the model (from an R-squared of less than 10% to approximately 35%)44. Thus, much more of 
the overall variance of prosthesis type is explained by the hospitals themselves. This result 
almost certainly understates the impact of the inclusion of hospital dummies as necessarily, the 
model drops all patients in those hospitals which implanted only cemented or cementless 
prostheses (40 hospitals)45. Alternative measures of goodness of fit can also be estimated and a 
comparison of equation 7.5i and 7.5iii46 using the 'fitstat' option in STATA confirms the ranking 
reported for the  R-squared  (for example, equation 7.5iii has a lower AIC and a higher 
McFadden's R-squared). It should be noted here that an R-squared of 35% as reported for 
equation 7.5iii, still leaves 65% of the variance unexplained, thus there is still a lot of 
unexplained variance in the model. This could be better explained were the data-set to include 
more of the variables specified in the theoretical model earlier in the chapter. Nontheless, an R-
squared of 35% is still an acceptable level for probit analysis of this sort of data and so despite 
the data constraints, it justifies the conclusions and warrants the further analysis now described. 
 
44
 The bi-variate probit model does not report an R-squared, so the R-squared result from the Probit model is 
reported for comparison. 
45
 This is because, in these cases, the identity of the hospital is a perfect predictor of the choice of cementless or 
cemented. 
46
 The fitstat option in STATA will not run on the bivariate probit model, so can only be estimated on equations 7.5i 
and 7.5iii (probit models). 
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Explanatory Variables Cementless cup Cementless stem 
Year (reference year 2003)   
    2004 0.22969*** 0.24325*** 
    2005 0.37698*** 0.46165*** 
    2006 0.61346*** 0.73929*** 
    2007 0.71587*** 0.89546*** 
    2008 0.88452*** 1.10376*** 
Age -0.05753*** -0.04617*** 
Right side -0.00133 0.00969 
Lateral position 0.48359*** 0.18196*** 
Female -0.19340*** -0.19636*** 
Non white -0.16267*** -0.06334 
Bilateral Indication 0.17765 0.08571 
Osteoarthritis diagnosis 0.02052 0.21368*** 
MIS used 0.33037*** 0.50611*** 
IGS used -0.05809 -0.16090* 
Constant 2.92923*** 0.96042*** 
Pseudo R2 
-65992.58 -57942.39 
Log Likelihood 0.3392 0.3518 
Number of observations 145,651 145,651 
legend: +, significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) *,  significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) **, significant at the 1% level 
( p<0.01)  ***, significant at the 0.1% level (p<0.001) 
Table 7.5(iii) Determinants of the probability that a patient receives a cementless implant, the 
effects of including hospital fixed effects47
 
This establishes that patient characteristics alone provide a very limited explanation of which 
broad type of prosthesis is implanted for a given patient; it is clear that the choice significantly 
differs between hospitals, i.e. a given patient would receive a different type of prosthesis 
depending on the hospital of the surgery.  Remembering that this result relates to just the most 
basic of all choices (cemented versus cementless), there is little to be gained from disaggregating 
further down to the specific brand level in terms of just patient characteristics. Thus I am able to 
reject Hypothesis 1 above.  
Hospital-panel data-set 
For this reason, all of the following analysis in this chapter switches to the hospital-panel dataset 
in order to focus on differences between hospitals, while controlling for differing patient mixes 
(in terms of averages for age, gender and side.)   
 
47
 Equation 7.5iii is a probit model because the bivariate probit model will not run with the hospital fixed effects. 
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Before moving on to the other stages of the research, Table 7.6 reports the results of estimating 
the equivalent of the equations in Table 7.5 but now using the hospital panel, where the 
dependent variable is now the proportion of patients in a given hospital-year receiving a 
cementless (cup or stem) implant in a given year.  In the first equation, only age, gender and side 
and the year dummies are included.  The equation is estimated using a panel random effects 
Tobit model because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, with a significant 
number of observations at these bounds (100 observations at 0 and 32 observations at 1). 
Throughout this chapter the panel model used is random-effects Tobit because STATA has no 
command for a fixed-effects model[177]48. 
The signs of estimated coefficients are generally consistent with those in Table 7.5 (apart from 
gender which is now not significant): the proportion of cementless increases steadily from year 
to year, and hospitals with older patients (on average) implant fewer cementless prostheses.  
The second equation in Table 7.6 shows the results of adding the vector of hospital 
characteristics of region of location, hospital type and hospital size.  In this, and all subsequent 
equations in this chapter, the omitted year dummy is 2003, the omitted region is East Anglia and 
the omitted hospital type is Foundation Trusts.  This means that all significance levels on the 
included dummies refer to differences with respect to these defaults.  However, interpretation of 
results often requires a wider range of hypotheses tests for significance between estimated 
coefficients (and not just relative to the defaults).  This is done by conducting post-estimation 
Wald tests49, and these will be discussed when relevant in the text.  They are not shown in the 
Tables. 
A log likelihood ratio test (LLR=60.5), confirms a highly significant  (prob>chi2=0.000) 
improvement in the fit of the model by including the hospital characteristics. As can be seen, all 
of the year dummies are significantly different from 2003, but Wald tests reveal that they are 
significant (at the 5% level) successive increases year on year in the number of cementless 
prostheses implanted. Second, patients in the South East (significant at the 10% level) and 
London (at the 5% level) are significantly more likely to receive a cementless prosthesis, while 
 
48
 “there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood”[167] 
[165] p.631         
49
 Throughout the chapter Wald tests are reported at the 5% level of significance 
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those in the North-West are the least likely.  The remaining seven regions (including the default 
East Anglia) lie in between.  Third, the only significant result by hospital type is that patients in 
NHS trust hospitals are more likely to be implanted with a cementless prosthesis than those in 
the other types of hospital. Finally, there is no significant tendency for larger hospitals to fit more 
cementless prostheses. 
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Variable First equation Marginal 
effects 
Second 
equation 
Marginal 
effects 
Year (reference year 2003)   
  
   2004 0.06133*** 0.06133 0.05839*** 0.04224 
   2005 0.10297*** 0.10297 0.10068*** 0.07353 
   2006 0.15855*** 0.15855 0.1580*** 0.11633 
   2007 0.20101*** 0.20101 0.20161*** 0.14897 
   2008 0.26900*** 0.269 0.27087*** 0.20022 
Average Age of Patients -0.01294*** -0.01294 -0.01273*** -0.00915 
Proportion of Female Patients 0.03994 0.03994 0.04115 0.02926 
Proportion of right sided surgery 0.05605 0.05605 0.05175 0.03679 
Region (reference East Anglia)  
South East - - 0.08591+ 0.06280 
East Midlands - - 0.06486 0.04724 
North West - - -0.13288** -0.08947 
London - - 0.14717** 0.10895 
Yorkshire - - -0.01362 -0.00963 
South West - - 0.01501 0.01073 
South Central - - -0.05361 -0.03718 
West Midlands - - -0.00919 -0.00651 
North East - - -0.00927 -0.00658 
Hospital Type (reference FT) - -   
Trust - - 0.03077* 0.02169 
Independent Sector - - 0.01562 0.01118 
NHS Treatment Centre & other - - -0.02627 -0.01843 
Independent Treatment Centre - - -0.07073 -0.04841 
Hospital size - - 0.00832 0.00591 
Hospital size quadratic - - 0.00012 0.00009 
Constant 1.08112*** 1.08112 1.0326462*** - 
σ u 0.23844*** 0.23844 0.22322 - 
σ e 0.12160*** 0.1216 0.12099 - 
Log Likelihood 615.568 - 645.5922 - 
Number of observations 1948 1948 1948 1948 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001* 
Table 7.6: Explaining cementless as a proportion of implants  
!

7.5.2 Stage  2: Hospital Specialisation  
This stage now switches attention to identifying and explaining differences between hospitals in 
the extent to which they specialise their purchases - first by brand, and then by manufacturer. 
Brand level 
Figure 7.1, shows the distribution, pooled over 2003-8, of hospital specialisation by brand (SPB).  
It is roughly bi-modal, with one mode at around 0.25-0.4 and the other, to a lesser degree at 1. 
Thus, many hospitals implant the equivalent of 3 or 4 equal sized brands, but there are some  
hospitals (1.5%) which implant one brand only. The mean SPB is 0.44, indicating that the typical 
hospital implants the equivalent of just 2.27 brands. It should be remembered here that SPB is 
measured as the average of the separate SPBs for cups and stems.  In other words, the typical 
hospitals implants the equivalent of 2.27 brands of each component.  
Recalling Hypothesis 2 above, this hospital-level specialisation can be compared with 
specialisation at the national level.  The dotted line in figure 7.1 shows the mean HHI at the 
national level for brands, which is 0.109 (from Chapter 6, section 6.5.4), this can now be 
interpreted as the degree of brand specialisation at the national level.  In its numbers equivalent, 
NSPB=10, this is equivalent to 10 equal-sized brands.  If each individual hospital was a small 
replica of the national market, then this would be the mean hospital SPB. However, as we see, 
the mean hospital level value (2.27) is much lower.  In that sense, the typical hospital is 4 times 
more specialised by brand of prosthesis than the NHS as a whole, and as can be seen from the 
figure, virtually all hospitals are more specialised than the national level..  Thus I can reject 
Hypothesis 2.  
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Figure 7.1:  SPB hospital specialisation at the brand level  
 
* line depicts the national value of SPB (referred to as HHIB in chapter6, section 6.5.4) 
 
Figure 7.2 provides a first test of hypothesis 3 - that smaller hospitals will tend to concentrate on 
implanting just a few brands, and will therefore be more specialised than larger hospitals,. From 
visual inspection of the figure, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between 
specialisation and hospital size: many smaller hospitals have a low SPB of between 0.2 and 0.4, 
while some of the larger hospitals are highly specialised.  However, the hypothesis also raised 
the possibility that suppliers might target larger hospitals for exclusive contracts – in other 
words, an opposite effect.  To assess whether there is any evidence on these two conflicting 
effects, a quadratic line is fitted to the data as follows: 
SPBit  = 0.504  - 0.0706*** SIZEit + 0.00742*** SIZEit 2    R2 = 0.0143 (overall) 
where SIZEit is the number of implants in hospital i at t. 
Both hospital size and hospital size squared are significant at the 1% level, and the estimated 
coefficients imply a U shape with a turning point (minimum) at 475 patients.  In fact there is 
only a small handful of hospitals larger than 475 (see Table 7.3), and so only the downward 
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sloping part of the U really applies.  In other words, this is best summarised by concluding that 
there is a general significant tendency for brand specialisation to decrease as the size of hospital 
increases, but at a diminishing rate.  However, the large scatter in this figure, and the low R2, 
show that most of the variance is unexplained by hospital size.  Thus, in general, Hypothesis 3 is 
weakly confirmed, but the relationship is weak.  Nevertheless, in all remaining equations in this 
chapter, hospital size is included in quadratic form to examine whether this is also apparent in 
multivariate analysis. 
Figure 7.2 Specialisation at the brand level and hospital scale 
 
 
Table 7.7 shows that, on average, specialisation increased steadily 2004-7/8.  The higher initial 
value for 2003 seems out of line with this trend, but if may reflect the fact that the NJR had much 
lower coverage in its first year  (see section 2.2.1). 
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Year Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
2003 306 0.465 0.201 0.176 1 
2004 341 0.423 0.192 0.128 1 
2005 341 0.424 0.191 0.108 1 
2006 350 0.432 0.19 0.154 1 
2007 344 0.443 0.192 0.117 1 
2008 336 0.440 0.188 0.130 1 
Table 7.7 Hospital specialisation at the brand level: descriptive statistics by year 
 
Building on these descriptive results, Table 7.8 reports the results of multivariate analysis of 
SPB.  The choice of appropriate estimator requires some attention. By definition, the dependent 
variable is bounded between 0 and 1, and this suggests that a Tobit model might be most 
appropriate, although as shown in figure 7.1, there are no observations at the lower bound and 
only a small number (1.5%) at 1.  Further investigation shows that SPB has a slight positive 
skew50[178], which disappears if the variable is logged. As a consequence, three alternative 
forms of the model are reported in table 7.8: Model 1 reports the results of a panel 2-limit Tobit 
equation where specialisation is measured without logging. Model  2 reports a panel Tobit 
regression where SPB is logged (here there is only an upper limit of lnSPB=0); and model 3 is a 
standard random effects model (i.e. not Tobit), and in this case with robust standard errors.  
(Unfortunately, there is no option in STATA to estimate a panel Tobit model with robust 
standard errors.[179]) In principle, model 2 is the preferred form because it is most appropriate 
to use a Tobit model when the dependent variable is symmetric and broadly normal.  However, 
model 3 benefits from having robust standard errors, and the non-use of the Tobit may not be too 
inappropriate given the small number of observations at the upper bound. 
In fact, the results of the three models are very similar in terms of signs and magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients: the only exception is the sign on the ‘proportion of female patients’, but 
this is insignificant in all three forms of the model.   
  
 
50
 The Stata statistic for skewness is 1.01 when SPB is not logged and 0.12 when it is logged.  
A normal distribution has a skewness of 0  and an indicator of a normal curve requires a skew between +2 and –
2[168].   
The Stata statistic for kurtosis is 3.51 for non-logged and 2.5 for the logged dependent variable. The reference value 
for normally distributed data is 3[165].   
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Explanatory variables Model 1 
Panel Tobit, SPB 
Model 2  
Panel Tobit, lnSPB 
Model 3 
Panel lnSPB 
Year (Reference year 2003)    
  2004 -0.01566 -0.04428* -0.04489* 
  2005 -0.00575 -0.02711 -0.02822 
  2006 -0.00350 -0.01602 -0.01685 
  2007 0.01225 0.01769 0.01707 
  2008 0.00987 0.01743 0.01641 
Average Age of Patients 0.00142 0.00242 0.00252 
Proportion of Female Patients -0.00637 0.00850 0.01406 
Proportion of right sided surgery 0.02722 0.01035 0.00829 
Region (reference East Anglia)    
  South East 0.01992 0.06306 0.06271 
  East Midlands 0.04153 0.11372 0.11299 
  North West 0.00407 0.02700 0.02920 
  London -0.06932* -0.14772* -0.14421+ 
  Yorkshire -0.00669 -0.01287 -0.01544 
  South West 0.05754 0.14914+ 0.14744+ 
  South Central 0.05408 0.15643+ 0.15810+ 
  West Midlands 0.02219 0.07535 0.07617 
  North East -0.01386 -0.01586 -0.01269 
Hospital Type (reference FT)    
  Trust -0.01808 -0.06136* -0.06016 
  Independent Sector -0.03911 -0.10246+ -.010692* 
  NHS Treatment Centre &   
other 
-0.05127 -0.13426+ -0.13250 
  Independent Treatment  Centre 0.04110 0.06251 0.06242 
Hospital size -0.07315*** -0.15143*** -0.14611*** 
Hospital size quadratic 0.00726*** 0.01457*** 0.01399*** 
Constant 0.40788*** -0.92132*** -0.93863*** 
σ u 0.14942*** 0.33263*** - 
σ e 0.11556*** 0.25022*** - 
Log Likelihood 956.03538 -528.46832 - 
R-squared - - 0.05020 
Number of observations 1948 1948 1948 
Right censored observations 29 29 n.a 
Left censored observations 0 0 n.a 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001* 
Table 7.8 Hospital specialisation by brand: panel equations  
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In terms of significance of coefficients, Model 1 performs worse than Models 2 and 3, 
suggesting that the logged form of SPB is to be preferred, but Models 2 and 3 provide almost 
identical results, suggesting that little has been gained from using the Tobit. For that reason, the 
following comments refer to the results of models 2 and 3.  
The coefficients on the dummy time variables increase year on year, apart from the anomalous 
2003.  Putting 2003 aside as unexplained, I have conducted Wald tests for significant differences 
between the other years51. In particular, a Wald test identifies a significant difference (at the 7% 
level) between the three earlier years (2004-2006) on the one hand, and the two later years 
(2007/8)52, indicating a structural break in specialisation at the brand level, with the increase 
coinciding with the introduction of PbR in 2006/7. None of the three variables controlling for 
average patient characteristics are significant, indicating that there is no effect of average patient 
characteristics on the hospital’s specialisation (as one would suspect). The significant hospital 
size coefficients confirm the above result of a quadratic effect, indicating that larger hospitals 
tend to be less specialised in how many brands they implant up to some level, albeit at a 
declining rate53.  Amongst the  regions, Wald tests identify three significantly different groups. 
Five regions show no significant differences in specialisation relative to the reference region of 
East Anglia, and these six therefore form one group.  However, London hospitals are 
significantly less specialised, while the South West and South Central are significantly (at the 
10% level) more than the others.  All hospital types have negative coefficients other than ISTCs, 
indicating that they are less specialised than FTs, but depending on which model is selected, 
there are differing levels of significance, although the IS hospitals are significant in both model2 
and model3. A Wald test on NHS Trusts and ISTCs confirms a significant difference, although it 
should be noted that there are very few observations for ISTCs. 
Manufacturer level (SPM)  
The above analysis is now replicated for specialisation at the manufacturer level.  Figure 7.3 
shows that the distribution of SPM is also roughly bi-modal with modes at around 0.4/0.5 and at 
 
51
 Since the default year is 2003, the results of the significance tests shown in the table refer to differences between 
each later year and 2003, which is less interesting, given that the higher levels of specialisation in 2003 might be 
misleading given the much less complete coverage in 2003.  
52
 A Wald test for a significant difference between 2006 and 2007 is significant at the 5% level (Chi2= 5.37, 
Prob>Chi2=0.02) 
53
 The values of the coefficients in model 2 identify a turning point at hospital size = 0.151/(2*0.0146) = 520 which 
is virtually beyond the range of observed sample values. 
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1, and mean of 0.52.  Thus, there is a minority of hospitals (3%) that buy exclusively from just 
one supplier, but more typically hospitals purchase from two or three different manufacturers.   
The dotted line in the figure recalls the HHI (re-defined as SPM here) at the national level of 
0.26 (see Chapter 6, Table 6.4) - in its numbers equivalent form, NSPM=4, this indicates that at 
the national level the NHS buys from the equivalent of 4 equal sized firms.  This figure would 
also apply at the individual hospital level if each hospital was a small replica of the national 
market, but in fact the typical hospital (with SPM=0.5) is twice as specialised as the NHS as a 
whole, in terms of the number of manufacturers it buys from. 
Figure 7.3   Hospital specialisation at the manufacturer level 
 
 *Dotted line depicts the national SPM 
 
Figure 7.4 plots the scatter between hospital size (activity) and specialisation at the manufacturer 
level. The pattern is very similar to that observed above for brands – a wide scatter but 
nevertheless with a significant U shaped quadratic regression line.  In this case, the turning point 
is at Size = 408.  So again specialisation declines again as hospital size increases. In other words, 
there is a tendency for larger hospitals to buy from more different manufacturers (possibly 
because larger hospitals have a greater number of surgeons operating which increases the 
preferences for different prostheses) but at a diminishing rate, and as there are 16 hospitals of 
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size greater than 400, there is some limited evidence that the very largest hospitals may be 
slightly more specialised.  But again the fit is very low, and size alone leaves most of the 
variance unexplained. 
Figure 7.4 Specialisation at the manufacturer level and hospital scale 
 
 
Table 7.9 shows that, on average, manufacturer specialisation also increased steadily 2004-7/8.  
Again, a higher value is observed for 2003 but this may again reflect the fact that the NJR had 
much lower coverage in its first year. 
  Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
2003 306 0.535 0.219 0.14 1 
2004 341 0.509 0.213 0.157 1 
2005 341 0.52 0.216 0.123 1 
2006 350 0.514 0.214 0.144 1 
2007 344 0.53 0.223 0.15 1 
2008 336 0.536 0.222 0.142 1 
Table 7.9 Hospital specialisation at the manufacturer level: descriptive statistics by year 
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Explanatory variables Model 1 
Panel Tobit, SPM 
Model 2  
Panel Tobit, lnSPM 
Model 3 
Panel lnSPM 
Year (Reference year 2003)  
  2004 -0.00611 -0.01705 -0.01870 
  2005 0.00895 0.00864 0.00576 
  2006 0.00371 0.00333 0.00037 
  2007 0.02187+ 0.03244 0.03185 
  2008 0.02799* 0.04723* 0.04576 
Average Age of Patients -0.00026 -0.00143 -0.00168 
Proportion of Female Patients 0.02014 0.06424 0.07175 
Proportion of right sided surgery -0.05584 -0.09185 -0.07610 
Region (reference East Anglia)
  South East 0.08118* 0.16982* 0.16681* 
  East Midlands 0.06619 0.13581 0.13509 
  North West 0.06734+ 0.14396* 0.14468* 
  London -0.08402* -0.16858* -0.16175* 
  Yorkshire 0.11514** 0.23049** 0.22566** 
  South West 0.01174 0.02656 0.02774 
  South Central 0.00058 0.05092 0.05505 
  West Midlands 0.04699 0.12171 0.12245+ 
  North East 0.03714 0.07148 0.07576 
Hospital Type (reference FT)
  Trust -0.01752** -0.04554+ -0.04551 
  Independent Sector -0.07934 -0.16199** -0.16562** 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other -0.04617 -0.09440 -0.09161 
  Independent Treatment Centre 0.03376*** 0.02636 0.02184 
Hospital size -0.04999*** -0.08638*** -0.07981*** 
Hospital size quadratic 0.00530*** 0.00809** 0.00747* 
Constant 0.57764 -0.58681** -0.59005* 
σ u 0.17109 0.33089 - 
σ e 0.12860 0.24413 - 
Log Likelihood 
714.003 -502.058 - 
R-squared - - 0.0608   
Number of observations 1948 1948 1948 
Right censored observations 49 49 n.a 
Left censored observations 0 0 n.a 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001* 
Table 7.10 Hospital specialisation by manufacturer: panel equations 
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Table 7.10 shows the results from fitting the same three models for SPM. In this case, there is 
less evidence of non-normality of the dependent variable54, but for comparability I also report the 
results for the logged dependent variable. Again, by using the non-Tobit panel model I can report 
robust standard errors. Broadly speaking all three versions of the model report the same results 
and for that reason again, I will focus on models two and three.  The year 2008 is significant at 
the 5% level for model1 and model2, with 2007 at the 6% level in model1, suggesting that there 
may again be an effect of PbR, but later and less pronounced.  None of the patient characteristics 
variables are significant. In terms of the regional dummies, hospitals in the South East, North 
West and Yorkshire are significantly more specialised than all of the others, while London is 
significantly less specialised, confirmed by Wald tests for a significant difference. NHS Trusts 
and IS hospitals are less specialised than FTs with differing levels of significance depending on 
which model is chosen, as with SPB, ISTCs are more specialised and significant in model1. 
Hospital size and hospital size quadratic are again negatively and positively highly significant, 
confirming a U shaped effect.   
 
7.5.3 Stage 3: Hospital market shares of Stryker and Depuy 
The previous stage examined how far hospitals are specialised in their choice of manufacturers 
and brands; this stage goes further by examining how far this specialisation involved the two 
dominant manufacturers, Stryker and Depuy. The previous chapter showed that their national 
market shares are both roughly one third, and here I examine whether and how these shares vary 
between hospitals and over time. 
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Table 7.11  Pairwise correlations between manufacturers’ market shares 
* significant at the  p<0.001 level 
 
54
 Skewness = 0.68 non-logged, -0.08 logged. Kurtosis=2.51 non-logged and 2.46 logged. 
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Preliminary descriptive analysis of the market shares data shows two key points.  First the three 
pairwise correlations between Stryker’s, Depuy’s and the others’ shares are reported in table 
7.11. This shows that all three are substitutes for each other, for example, where a hospital uses 
relatively more Stryker prostheses, it uses relatively fewer Depuy, and relatively fewer Others.  
These negative correlations are not surprising - if the share of one manufacturer increases, the 
joint shares of all the others must decrease by the same amount. However, the sizes of the three 
correlations are almost identical, suggesting that increases in Stryker’s shares tend to affect both 
Depuy and Others roughly equally, and vice versa.  In this sense, all three seem to be equal 
substitutes for each other. 
Second, Table 7.12 shows how their market shares vary across hospitals.  Thus, for example, 
26% of hospitals do not buy Stryker at all, and another 8% buy very few (less than 5%) of their 
prostheses from Stryker; on the other hand, 30% buy more than half of their prostheses from 
Stryker. The proportions are similar for Depuy.  The figures for the residual show that in 50% of 
hospitals ‘Others’ account for fewer than 50%  - and therefore Stryker and Depuy combined 
account for more than 50% of prostheses.  
  Percentage of hospitals in which share (s) is: 
Market shares (%) Stryker Depuy Others 
s = 0 26 19 4 
0 <s <5 8 10 16 
5 ≤s< 10 4 6 8 
10 ≤s< 20 9 9 13 
20 ≤s <30 9 9 10 
30 ≤s <40 9 9 10 
40 ≤s <50 8 9 7 
50 ≤s <60 10 9 7 
60 ≤s <70 5 6 5 
70 ≤s <80 4 4 4 
80 ≤s <90 4 5 4 
90 ≤s <100 4 4 5 
s=100 2 2 6 
Table 7.12 Manufacturers’ shares in individual hospitals 
 
Against this background, Table 7.13 shows the results of fitting a panel 2-limit Tobit model, in 
order to identify how far these observed variations between hospitals can be explained by the 
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hospitals’ characteristics. In this case, normality tests of the dependent variables suggest non-
significant skewness or deviations from normal kurtosis. However, a relatively large number of 
observations lie at the lower bound (see table 7.12). Thus, I report only the model for non-logged 
panel 2-level Tobit. At first sight it would seem appropriate to estimate these equations as a 
system, using SUR (seemingly unrelated regression).  This is because (unobserved) variables 
which impact on one firm’s market share should also affect (in an opposite direction) the 
other(s).  In that case disturbances will be correlated across the three equations and statistical 
efficiency could be improved by incorporating that into the estimator.   However, as explained 
by Cameron and Trivedi [176], where the set of explanatory variables is identical in all equations 
(as they are here) there is no gain in efficiency and the results using SUR are identical to those 
not using SUR , thus table 7.13 reports the results of fitting 2-limit Tobit models 
Stryker  
From Table 7.13, there is a clear year by year trend for Stryker’s market share to be higher 
between 2005 and 2007 as shown by the positive and significant year dummy coefficients. Wald 
tests on 2004 and 2005,6 and 7 confirm this as a significant difference. There are also interesting 
regional differences: patients from the East Midlands are significantly less likely to receive a 
Stryker prosthesis, while patients in both the South West and South Central are more likely, 
confirmed by Wald tests of a significant difference. This result is particularly interesting when 
related to table 6.3, where I reported that Stryker's headquarters are in Berkshire, South 
England.On the other hand, there does not appear to be a hospital type effect. The coefficient for 
both hospital size and hospital size squared are significant at the 5 and 10% level, indicating a 
significant inverted U shape - as hospital size increases, generally they implant relatively more 
Strykers, but this effect tails off and then reverses once size exceeds 41855, i.e. very large 
hospitals tend to become less reliant on Stryker than large hospitals.  This is the opposite to the 
earlier finding (tables 7.8 and 7.10) that larger hospitals tend to be less specialised, except at very 
high levels. 
Depuy 
A number of the results in the Depuy equation are in direct contrast to the results for Stryker.  
The second column in Table 7.13 shows a significant decline in Depuy’s market share in the 
 
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years between 2005 and 2008 compared to 2003 and 2004, and a Wald test points to a significant 
break between 2004 and 2005.  Regionally, Wald tests show that patients in the North West, 
Yorkshire and the West Midlands are significantly more likely, and those from London less 
likely, to receive a Depuy prosthesis than those living in the other regions.  As found above for 
Stryker, these regions of strength for Depuy are geographically close to the firm’s headquarters – 
in this case, Leeds in Yorkshire (see Table 6.3.). By type of hospital, the only significant 
difference is that patients treated in an NHS Trust hospital are less likely to receive a Depuy 
prosthesis than those treated in FTs and other hospitals.  Finally, unlike for Stryker, there is no 
evidence of a hospital size effect. 
Others 
The third column in the Table, for Others, is included mainly for completeness, but it does 
include some additional findings of interest.  First, there is no evidence of a time trend in all 
other firms’ combined market share, which implies that the gains for Stryker in the early years 
are largely accounted for by the losses for Depuy.  Here, most of the regional coefficients are 
negatively significant, but these are all relative to the default, East Anglia.  The three exceptions 
are the South East, East Midlands and London.  The most appropriate way to interpret this, 
which is confirmed as significant by Wald tests, is that the ‘other’ manufacturers record 
significantly higher market shares in the three regions in the East of England: East Anglia, East 
Midland and the South East, compared to the rest of England; and that their share is even higher 
in London.  The potential causes of this strong geographical pattern deserve further investigation 
in future research.  Amongst the hospital types, patients treated in an NHS trust or IS hospitals 
are more likely to receive an ‘other’ prosthesis than those treated in an FT or other hospitals. 
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Explanatory variables Model 1 
Stryker 
Model 2 
Depuy 
Model 3 
Other 
Year (Reference year 2003) 
2004 0.00508 -0.04024 0.02260+ 
2005 0.07509* -0.07622* 0.00909 
2006 0.08064** -0.10340*** 0.02022 
2007 0.09997** -0.10492*** 0.01328 
2008 0.08748** -0.08638** 0.00899 
Average Age of Patients 0.00599 -0.00172 -0.00178 
Proportion of Female Patients -0.00362 0.02288 -0.01593 
Proportion of right sided surgery -0.27474* 0.03348 0.10853* 
Region (reference East Anglia) 
  South East 0.07407 -0.09532 0.02265 
  East Midlands -0.27882 0.21236 0.00142 
  North West 0.01216 0.52842*** -0.21027*** 
  London -0.12525 -0.26650* 0.14790** 
  Yorkshire -0.08246 0.47754*** -0.16993** 
  South West 0.37289* 0.16110 -0.17039** 
  South Central 0.55038*** -0.04059 -0.19065** 
  West Midlands 0.12420 0.44374*** -0.20241*** 
  North East 0.20365 0.10179 -0.11272 
Hospital Type (reference FT) 
  Trust 0.00870 -0.10520** 0.03825* 
  Independent Sector -0.02834 -0.08834 0.07580* 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other -0.00074 -0.05386 0.00702 
  Independent Treatment Centre -0.09641 -0.14277 0.05059 
Hospital size 0.05611* 0.01581 -0.00340 
Hospital size quadratic -0.00696* -0.00001 -0.00008*** 
Constant 0.02206 0.65118* 0.48611 
σ u 0.66859 0.58378 0.25899 
σ e 0.32315 0.31923 0.14895 
Log Likelihood -1160.49 -1136.08 315.12573 
Number of observations 1948 1585 1758 
Right censored observations 18 17 103 
Left censored observations 468 346 87 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*  
Table 7.13 Manufacturer’s hospital share: panel equations 
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Stryker’s and Depuy’s hospital market shares, disaggregated by segment 
Finally, the above market share equations are re-estimated separately for each of the four broad 
types: cemented cup and stem and cementless cup and stem.  In each of these four segments, the 
two major firms tend to have one or perhaps two leading brands, and so these equations can 
almost be interpreted as an analysis of the leading brand shares.  For example, Stryker’s 
dominance in cemented stems is largely accounted for by the Exeter V40.  Again, all equations 
are estimated using Panel Tobit with random effects. 
To avoid unnecessary duplication, the following discussion focuses only on the most important 
findings, referenced to Appendix 8, which reports the equations in full.  Figures 6.2 from the 
previous chapter also help to illustrate these results. 
 
Cemented cup (table 1, Appendix 8)  
Main brands: Stryker/ Contemporary56; Depuy/Elite and Charnley; ‘Other’/CPT 
In cemented cups, there is a steady significant yearly increase in Stryker’s market share and a 
corresponding negative time trend in Depuy’s cemented cup shares.  Patients treated in hospitals 
in the North West, Yorkshire and the West Midlands are more likely to have a Depuy and this 
seems to be mainly at the expense of ‘other’ manufacturers, but the opposite is true for London. 
This regional result is confirmed by significant Wald tests for the two regional groups for Depuy. 
The only significant result by hospital types is that NHS trust hospital patients are significantly 
less likely to receive a prosthesis from Depuy. There are no significant regional or type 
differences for Stryker, which suggests that the increasing dominance of its Contemporary 
prosthesis is widespread across all regions and types of hospital. 
 
Cemented stem (table 2, Appendix 8) 
Main brands: Stryker/ Exeter V40; Depuy/Charnley 
As with cemented cups, there is a steady significant yearly increase in Stryker’s market share of 
cemented stems at the expense of Depuy. There is also a regional pattern, with patients in the 
 
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South West and South Central being more likely to receive a Stryker and patients in the North 
West, Yorkshire and the West Midlands, more likely to have a Depuy57 (although this clustering 
may also occur for historical reasons, as discussed in footnote. This significant difference 
between regional groupings is confirmed by a Wald test. This is particularly interesting when 
referring back to table 6.3, which shows that Stryker is based in the South and Depuy in 
Yorkshire. However, patients treated in an NHS Trust hospital and an ISTC are the least likely to 
receive a Stryker. No hospital type coefficients were significant for Depuy cemented stem. These 
results capture the very dominant role of Stryker’s Exeter prosthesis, which has gained mainly at 
the expense of Depuy’s Charnley and C-Stem. 
 
Cementless Cup (table 3, Appendix 8) 
Main brands: Stryker/Trident; Depuy/Pinnacle; ‘other’/CSF  
In the cementless components, the time trends move in the opposite direction. There is a positive 
time trend in Depuy’s share of cementless cups accounted from 2005 onwards, and this seems to 
have been at the expense of other manufacturers, which shows a significant negative time trend 
for this period. Again, hospitals in the South East and South Central are significantly more likely 
to use Stryker and hospitals in the North West and Yorkshire and more likely to use Depuy, 
again confirmed by Wald tests. Interestingly, hospitals with older patients are less likely to use 
Depuy cementless cups. There is a weak indication that larger hospitals are more likely to 
implant a Depuy cementless cup (hospital size is weakly significant at the 7% level).  These 
results reflect the increasingly dominant role of Depuy’s Pinnacle, mainly at the expense of JRI’s 
CSF, rather than Stryker’s brands. 
 
Cementless stem (table 4, Appendix 8) 
Main brands: Stryker no one leading brand; Depuy/Corail; ‘other’/Furlong 
There is a similar positive time trend in the share of Depuy’s cementless stems but in this case a 
significant negative trend in Stryker’s share; Others’ share also declines significantly particularly 
after 2006. Again, patients living in the South East and South Central are more likely to receive a 
Stryker cementless stem, in addition to patients treated in the West Midlands, confirmed by a 
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Wald test. Patients living in the North West and South West are most likely to receive a Depuy, 
but those in South Central significantly less likely.  These results are again confirmed by a Wald 
test. Patients in NHS Trusts and ISTCs are more likely to receive a Stryker cementless stem than 
in other hospital types.  The significant negative results for Depuy in trusts is superficially 
misleading – remembering that Foundation Trusts are the default dummy, this should be 
interpreted as evidence of a particularly strong Depuy share in Foundation Trusts. The positive 
and weakly significant coefficient for hospital size in the Depuy equation suggests a weak trend 
for larger hospitals to implant a Depuy, but the negative quadratic coefficient, suggests that this 
tails off at very large sizes.  Again, these results largely reflect the rapid growth in Depuy’s 
Corail prosthesis.  This is largely at the expense of JRI’s Furlong.  However, in this sector, there 
are important differences between regions, so that, although Stryker is mainly in second place, its 
share is stronger in regions close to its main base. 
 
7.6 Discussion 
I now discuss the implications of these results for the original hypotheses in section 7.2: 
1. The choice of prosthesis is largely determined by the characteristics of the patient - 
rejected. 
At the individual patient level, patient characteristics play only a small part in explaining even 
the most basic of choices – whether to fit a cementless or cemented prosthesis.  It appears that a 
much larger role is identified by including hospital dummies, shown by the increased Pseudo R-
squared increase from approximately 10% to 35% with the inclusion of hospital fixed effects.  
This justifies the decision to focus the subsequent analysis on explaining differences between 
hospitals.  There is some evidence that the age of the patient determines which ‘type’ of 
prosthesis is implanted i.e. older patients are more likely to receive a cemented prosthesis (see 
age coefficient, tables 7.4 and 7.6), but this will not account for much of the differences between 
hospitals unless their patient mixes vary dramatically. Of course, it is worth noting that there 
may be some case mix differences by region, for example, there tends to be more elderly patients 
in rural or coastal regions, although the main evidence from the analysis is that there are large 
differences between hospitals.  
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2. The NHS is a homogenous entity- rejected 
The data reveal considerable differences between hospitals in the extent of their specialisation, 
and the extent to which they purchase from one or the other of the main suppliers.  Some 
hospitals buy most if not all of their prostheses from one or two suppliers, and only a few show  
diversification of purchases similar to the national market shares (figures 7.1 and 7.3.)  In other 
words the NHS is not made up of identical clone hospitals – much seems to vary from hospital to 
hospital. 
3. Larger hospitals are less specialised – weakly accepted, subject to a qualification 
There is a significant broad tendency for larger hospitals to be less specialised – both in the 
number of different prostheses and the number of suppliers it uses.  Further work is required to 
establish how far this might be explained by the fact that larger hospitals employ more surgeons, 
and that surgeons differ in their choices, even within the same hospital.  This is important for 
establishing whether choices are made at the hospital level, or at the individual surgeon within 
the hospital level. However, in both cases, this is reversed at high values of hospital sizes – the 
very largest hospitals are more specialised (see below.)   
4. There are predictable differences within the NHS between broad segments-largely 
rejected 
Table 7.6 reports that patients in NHS Trusts are more likely to receive a cementless prosthesis 
than those treated in a FT, which could indicate that the NHS reforms (discussed earlier) have 
had a direct impact on hospitals with financial autonomy (FTs) in that they are choosing to 
implant the cheaper type of prosthesis. The regression on specialisation of manufacturers at the 
hospital level does not provide strong results, other than that IS hospitals appear to be less 
specialised in their purchasing. The main finding on the market share regressions (aggregated 
and disaggregated - Appendix 8, tables 1-12) is that, in general, NHS Trusts are more likely to 
implant a Stryker prosthesis, particularly a cemented and cementless stem, compared to patients 
in FTs. The reasons why deserve further research. 
5. Part of the observed variation in choice is the result of systematic behaviour of the 
manufacturers – some suggestive evidence.  
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There are two main results that might point to market sharing understanding (even if only 
implicit) between Depuy and Stryker.  The first is the general tendency for Stryker to become 
increasingly dominant in the cemented category and Depuy in the cementless.  This became clear 
in the previous chapter, but it also shows through in Tables 7.13-15 (and Appendix 8) of this 
chapter.  The second is the results on the regional dummy variables. There are some significant 
regional differences in terms of specialisation (Tables 7.8 and 7.10): hospitals in the South-East 
and Yorkshire are more specialised than average in their choice of manufacturers, while hospitals 
in London are less specialised in their choices of manufacturer and brands.  But the most 
interesting results relate to the aggregated and disaggregated market share regressions (Tables 
7.13-7.15 and the Appendix).  These indicate that Stryker is particularly strong in the Southern 
regions (South-West and South Central) where it also has its headquarters in Berkshire (table 
6.3), and this is at the expense of other manufacturers. Depuy enjoys greater market dominance 
in the Northern regions where it has its headquarters in Leeds (table 6.3) (Yorkshire, the North-
West and also West Midlands), in each case at the expense of the other manufacturers.  On the 
other hand, ‘other’ manufacturers have larger shares in London, at the expense of both Depuy 
and Stryker. These results are also supported by the disaggregated regressions in Appendix 8. 
Despite the fact that the general use of cemented prostheses is declining in favour of cementless 
(chapter 6), Stryker remain a dominant presence in the aggregate market (cemented plus 
cementless), particularly because they are increasing their market share in cemented so quickly, 
with the Exeter V40. In contrast, Depuy's presence in the cemented market has declined year on 
year, but they have increased their dominance in the cementless sector.  
6. A potential impact of PbR – some evidence 
The inclusion of year dummies picks up any simple shifts over time. Most interesting would be 
any apparent shifts in or around 2007 which would imply that the PbR policy as had some effect 
on choice.  In fact, there do seem to have been various changes over time.  First, Tables 7.4 and 
7.6 both confirm the general trend over all the years towards increasing use of cementless 
prostheses (not related to PbR.)  More relevant is the results in Tables 7.10 of a positive 
significant difference between 2007 and 2008 and the earlier years.  This indicates that hospitals 
became more specialised in their choices of manufacturer from 2007 onwards, and this could 
possibly be a consequence of the introduction of the PbR policy i.e.  leading to more 
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specialisation in purchasing at the hospital level. From Table 7.13 there also appears to have 
been a shift from 2006 onwards in the use of Stryker’s prostheses, and a shift in 2005-8 away 
from Depuy.  In turn, this appears to have been due mainly towards implanting more Stryker 
cemented prostheses, detected in the disaggregated hospital market shares regression. (shown by 
the tables in Appendix 8).  It remains for future research to establish whether these changes are 
the result of PbR.  
 
7.7 Conclusions 
The determinants of choice of hip prostheses have been explored at both the patient and the 
hospital level. The results from this chapter and the previous one, reveal a purchaser with 
potentially significant buyer power (NHS) which is not currently being exploited and a supply 
side oligopoly.  On the supply side two dominant manufacturers are identified: Stryker and 
Depuy: they account for two thirds of the aggregate market. There is also evidence of increasing 
dominance by Stryker in the cemented and Depuy in the cementless market, both of which could 
indicate some form of mutual forbearance between the two main manufacturers. However, 
caution should be taken here, as these results could also be simply a result of the manufacturers 
responding competitively - for example, Stryker may have been more successful in innovating in 
cemented prostheses, but Depuy more successful in cementless with both promoting their 
prostheses to the NHS on the basis of long-term outcome evidence. 
More of the prosthesis choice appears to be explained by hospital characteristics as opposed to 
patient characteristics, contrary to what one might have anticipated and hypothesized in section 
7.2. There is also some evidence of increasing specialisation at the hospital level over time, 
particularly in 2007/8, which is around the time one might expect to see some evidence of the 
impact of the introduction of PbR. There is also an indication that NHS Trusts are more likely to 
implant the more expensive cementless prostheses than FTs which could be a consequence of the 
financial autonomy that FTs enjoy and their response to managing their own budget. The results 
also provide some evidence of larger hospitals being more diversified in their choices.  
The most intriguing result is the indication of a split in manufacturers strengths in the different 
parts of the country (Stryker in the South and South West, Depuy in the North West), and a 
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similar split in each broad type of prosthesis used in these parts of the country (Stryker are the 
main supplier of cemented type and Depuy, supplying cementless prostheses), this is also 
consistent with market sharing on behalf of the manufacturers . However, the association 
between the location of the supplier’s innovating hospital and the accompanying regional 
surgical training rotation58 may also account for some of this observed regional market sharing.  
The analysis in this chapter might be further enhanced by further disaggregation of explanatory 
variables: within the hospital type variables, an indication of whether the NHS Trust or FT are 
teaching hospitals (see [180]) and the regional dummies disaggregated further beyond the 
Strategic Health Authority categories to allow for further variations. It might also be worth 
considering any other potential patient characteristic explanatory variables, although the 
constraints of the current data-set restrict further analysis at this level. 
There are still a number of outstanding areas that require further work. Specifically, 
consideration of the relationship between the number of consultants carrying out THR surgery 
per hospital. For example, some smaller hospitals may only employ one surgeon to carry out all 
hip surgery, and that surgeon may only implant one or possibly two brands of cup and stem, 
given the learning curve associated with surgery. On the other hand, if a hospital employs a large 
number of surgeons to carry out hip surgery, this may lead to diversification of purchasing 
prosthesis brands and from manufacturers (i.e. differing surgical preferences and historical 
preference). Analysis at this level would allow for further exploration of the impact of hospital 
size on purchasing patterns. 
Further analysis of the impact of the PbR policy on prosthesis purchasing is also warranted. This 
has not been explored in detail in this chapter and there are only hints from the time trends that 
there may have been some change in purchasing behaviour. Including a variable indicating 
where a switch from NHS Trust to FT has occurred and when, would provide further opportunity 
of analysis at this level (this information is available from the Monitor website [173]). Beyond 
this, the impact of clinical guidelines on the choice of prosthesis implanted also warrants greater 
consideration, such as the NICE guidance of 2000. This has not been pursued in this thesis 
because data is not available for the time period immediately following the NICE guidance[181] 
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and other relevant clinical guidelines have not been identified which are directly relevant to this 
issue. 
The findings from this and the previous chapter report what choices are currently being made 
and have identified that choice of prosthesis is not explained by the characteristics of the patients 
alone. Convention may lead us to believe that the NHS is a homogenous single buyer in the 
health care market, however, the reverse appears to be the case. In the case of hip prostheses (and 
other consumables, see the NAO report[135]), the NHS is making choices and purchasing at the 
disaggregated hospital level, thus severely restricting the potential to exploit its buyer power 
(supported by the findings in the NAO report). Given the lack of homogeneity in purchasing 
patterns in the NHS, the finding of a highly concentrated, oligopolistic seller side of the market, 
suggests concern if the manufacturers are able to exploit their seller power. Potential evidence of 
this has been shown empirically in this chapter, particularly in the potential regional market 
sharing between the two main players: Stryker and Depuy59.  
.  
The findings in this and the previous chapter regarding what choice of hip prostheses are being 
made, may indicate inefficiencies in the current NHS policy on purchasing of hip prostheses, it 
also warrants deeper investigation of the supply side in order to establish whether true anti-
competitive behavior exits. However, these findings are speculative at this stage and warrant a 
deeper understanding regarding purchasing behaviour i.e. who is making the choices and why 
they are making them. Future stages in the work will be to explore the nature of the decisions 
being made by collection of further, perhaps more qualitative data, to provide greater 
understanding of the nature of this transaction. 
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This thesis has explored the choice between alternative THR prostheses from two different 
perspectives: 
a) The value of survival curve analysis in guiding how choices between prostheses should be 
made, bearing in mind that information is scarce on the long-term survival rates of different 
prostheses.  This was explored in chapters 2 to 5. 
b). The choices that are actually being made, and investigating what this reveals about the buyer-
seller relationship between the NHS and the large multinational firms who manufacture the 
prostheses. This was explored in chapter 6 and 7. 
 
8.1 Main findings 
Chapter 2 provided a background perspective for the thesis as a whole describing the 
technological development of hip prostheses and the evolution of the supplying industry over the 
last half century and, more recently, the pivotal establishment of the NJR for England and Wales 
in 2003.  
Chapters 3 to 5 explored the first of the thesis objectives – the analysis of survival rates for 
different prostheses.  Chapter 3 began by using the published NJR data to establish what 
conclusions can be drawn on the relatively short-term survival rates now observable from the 
NJR annual reports. It confirmed and updated the main finding of the only other paper to 
date[54] which has used NJR data to explore survival rates - cemented prostheses outperform 
cementless in terms of 5 year as well as 3 year survival rates, despite the fact that cemented 
prostheses have lost market shares to cementless. The depth of the analysis was then extended by 
examining revision rates for individual brands of prosthesis. The main findings were as follows: 
there are quite large variations in revision rates between different prostheses within each of the 
broad types; the three year revision rate is an imperfect predictor of the 5 year rate; there is no 
apparent tendency for the prostheses with the lowest revision rates to be the most commonly 
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implanted in the NHS; and the ODEP classifications do not appear to be closely related to the 
emerging evidence on revision rates from the NJR. 
Chapter 4 reviewed the published economic evaluation literature on the alternative prostheses. 
This assessed the completeness of the existing evidence base for resource use, costs and cost-
effectiveness, in order to determine whether the available evidence can inform current resource 
allocation decisions in the UK NHS. It clearly established that there is very limited data on the 
long term survival of hip prostheses in the public domain, concluding that more clinical trials, 
including head to head comparisons of hip prostheses with long term follow up are required. 
Relating these findings back to the first thesis objective, it is clear that lack of long-term survival 
rates of different prostheses is a key barrier to making informed choices between alternative hip 
prostheses. Chapter 5 then attempted to address this gap by exploring for a well known case 
study, whether extrapolating survival curves over a lifetime horizon using short term data can be 
used to compensate for the lack of long term data. Unfortunately, the findings were that 
prosthesis survival rates estimated using a short time series data cannot be reliably extrapolated. 
This suggests that reliable cost-effectiveness decisions deciding between alternative hip 
prostheses may be difficult – they cannot be made relying exclusively on currently observed 
published evidence on survival over a relatively short time period, or by methods which  
extrapolate short term survival rates into the future. However, and more positively, as the NJR 
accumulates a longer time series of data on survival rates, it will become an increasingly 
valuable resource for enabling robust decisions on the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
prostheses.  
Chapters 6 and 7 turned to the second main objective of the thesis, exploring what choices are 
actually being made, specifically, how the structure of the main buyer (the NHS) interacts with 
the structure and nature of competition within the supplying industry (the manufacturers of THR) 
to influence choice at the hospital level.   
Chapter 6 introduced, and in some instances measured the theoretical concepts used in Industrial 
Organisation, to provide the background and hypotheses for the econometric estimation of the 
various models in chapter 7. The descriptive statistics indicated that potentially a dominant 
duopoly exists in the UK market (Stryker and Depuy). These two manufacturers appear to be 
maintaining their share of the market over time by consolidating the shares of their established 
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brands (which report strong clinical evidence) and by growing the market shares of their newer 
brands (e.g. Corail and Pinnacle by Depuy). The chapter revealed a highly concentrated, 
oligopolistic supply side market alongside an NHS which is purchasing at the disaggregated 
hospital level.  
Finally, Chapter 7 empirically tested various hypotheses about the choice of hip prostheses in 
terms of the characteristics of the patient and beyond this at the hospital level, to determine 
whether the NHS is a homogenous entity or whether the manufacturers of prostheses are able to 
exploit their potential seller power. The empirical work revealed that patient characteristics do 
not explain much of the variation in prosthesis choice, and that there are large differences in 
prosthesis choice between different hospitals. It also identified considerable differences between  
hospitals in the extent of their specialisation (purchasing from a number of manufacturers) with 
larger hospitals tending to be less specialised, although this is reversed at very high values of 
hospital size – the very largest hospitals are more specialised. Interestingly, some evidence was 
found that might be consistent with potential market sharing by the manufacturers in terms of 
both regional and product markets. Thus Stryker is becoming increasingly dominant in the 
cemented sector, while Depuy is increasingly dominant in cementless prostheses. There is also 
evidence that Stryker achieves higher market shares in the part of the country close to its base, 
while Depuy achieves higher shares in regions near to its base, although the historical reasons for 
this clustering should also be taken into account. Finally, related to the introduction of the PbR 
policy, there was some evidence that hospitals have become more specialised in their purchasing 
(hospitals purchasing from fewer manufacturers) over time, especially around the time of the 
introduction of PbR. 
 
8.2 Contributions to the literature 
In terms of the existing academic literature, this thesis makes four main contributions.  First, in 
the area of economic evaluation, it shows that short term data on prosthesis survival rates may 
not be sufficient to make decisions regarding the long term cost-effectiveness of alternative 
prostheses. On the case study used here, it appears that extrapolations based on this short-term 
data are not robust and thus cannot be used to reliably predict prosthesis survival into the future. 
Second, although one might expect that the characteristics of the patient should explain much of 
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the variation in the choice of brand of prosthesis by hospitals, this does not appear to be the case.  
Instead, much of the variation in prosthesis choice can be explained in terms of the hospital in 
which the patient undergoes the surgery: this may be a reflection of a principal-agent situation, in 
which it is the agent who makes the decision, and different agents have different preferences.  
Third, the thesis has implications for the literature on public procurement.  In the context of the 
NHS, I confirm the findings from the recent NAO report - procurement in the NHS is not at all 
uniform, but appears to differ significantly between different hospitals at the local level.  This 
might suggest that the suppliers of hip prostheses have the potential to exploit their market power 
– rather than being faced with a single powerful buyer, they supply to a fragmented set of 
disaggregated purchasers. Fourthly, the thesis presents what is a rare case study of the nature of 
competition in a medical devices market.  Although the evidence presented here cannot be 
conclusive – further more detailed analysis is needed in the future – it does provide some 
evidence that is consistent with potential market power and possible market sharing by the main 
manufacturers of hip prostheses: the patterns of market shares observed are not inconsistent with 
the results of the theoretical and empirical literatures on collusion and cartels. This merits further 
investigation including consideration of other explanatory factors for regional clustering of 
hospital purchases.  
 
8.3 Main policy implications   
The thesis as a whole clearly underlines the value of the NJR, which will become an increasingly 
useful resource in guiding efficient decision making in this area as more data accumulates. 
However, it is important to highlight some of problems encountered when using the NJR in this 
thesis, these include: poor coverage of the NJR in the year 2003; the linkage of HES and NJR 
data-sets does not include patients from Wales60 or those patients funded from the independent 
sector. In that sense, it is not comprehensive. This thesis is also unable to establish how the 
current ODEP classification scheme reported in the NJR, is helping to inform decision making in 
the NHS - there are a number of prosthesis brands which are currently being implanted but for 
which there is no, or a relatively poor ODEP rating.  
 
60
 Although the NJR data-set can be separately linked the PEDW data-set (Patient Episode Data Set for Wales) 
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Second, this thesis serves to reinforce the main message to emerge from the NAO report on 
procurement in the NHS.  It does not appear that the NHS is exploiting its potential position as a 
buyer with considerable buyer power.  There are large variations in the purchasing patterns of 
prostheses across hospitals, and much of the variance appears to be unexplainable.  This raises 
the thought that procurement within the NHS deserves close attention and fact finding, and 
potentially a better informed overhaul.  This is clearly highly relevant to current reforms being 
proposed by the current government. 
Third, the implications of chapter 6 and 7, suggest that the UK competition agencies might take a 
close look at the supplying industry of hip prostheses to the NHS. Although the adjacent 
pharmaceuticals sector has often been the subject of investigations by the competition 
authorities, investigations in the medical devices sector are almost unheard of.  Given the 
duopolistic nature of this sector, and the patterns of purchasing observed in this thesis, this 
deserves some attention.  Similarly, it suggests that the NHS itself might widen its awareness of 
the potential for anti-competitive behaviour amongst its suppliers – it is not just in 
pharmaceuticals that the NHS is faced with a market which is dominated by a few large multi-
national firms.  
 
8.4 Areas for future work 
The results of this thesis inevitably leave open a number of areas where further work is required. 
Some of these are as follows. 
To further assess the impact of the introduction of the PbR on the choice of alternative 
prostheses, and in turn on the behaviour of the manufacturing industry. The thesis has already 
established some apparent structural breaks with respect to specialisation but further, more 
detailed analysis is required to identify whether PbR has encouraged or discouraged price and 
quality competition in the prosthesis industry.  
To further examine the market structure and nature of competition in the supplying industry.  
This should include a deeper analysis of what has been the impact of mergers, barriers to entry, 
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exclusive selling behaviour and the likely effect on the toughness (or otherwise) of price and 
quality competition amongst the suppliers.   
In order for economic evaluations of alternative prostheses to be conducted, more information is 
clearly needed on the wider costs of procedures using different prostheses. Ideally this should not 
just include the direct medical costs, but also the indirect costs to society, the patient and their 
family (including productivity losses, informal care costs and out-of-pocket expenses). The 
process of acquiring further information on costs should also involve an investigation of the 
determinants of the cost of THR at the individual patient level in terms of: patient characteristics; 
hospital specialisation, economies of scale and prosthesis costs. This will help to identify 
whether there is a growing gap between costs and reimbursement in the NHS.  
A major issue identified by the thesis and now warranting further investigation is the issue of 
predicting long term prosthesis survival for use in economic evaluation models. Further work 
might usefully explore the use of complex economic models which incorporate multiple sources 
of evidence, such as from the literature and various international joint registries.  This is 
necessary in order to provide more robust estimates of long term prosthesis survival into the 
future. It is also clear that the NJR should be exploited to its maximum potential to provide up to 
date information to patients, surgeons and the health service community on prosthesis survival 
rates as they become available. 
To contribute to the growing debate about regulation of medical devices (as very recently 
discussed on the Channel 4 programme ‘Dispatches'[182]). This will involve investigation of 
whether the same approaches for regulation of pharmaceuticals can also be used for medical 
devices, specifically hip prostheses. This will require careful consideration, including balancing 
the promotion of innovation and improving access to new hip prostheses with the need to control 
costs by restricting market power amongst the suppliers. 
An unavoidable gap in the data used in this thesis is the purchase price paid by the NHS to the 
manufacturers of hip prostheses. Such data is not available in the NJR, or more generally in the 
public domain.  This is not surprising because price is negotiated at the micro level (i.e hospital 
or PCT)  and is not routinely revealed. However, further work is essential to provide a fuller 
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picture of prices in particular, and procurement in general. Data on prices are required in 
virtually all of the areas identified above. Thus, analysis of the nature of competition requires 
evidence of the prices set by manufacturers. To investigate the purchasing behaviour of the NHS 
price information is also required, for example, to identify whether incentives or scale discounts 
are part of the procurement process. Finally, of course, price information is essential to inform 
economic evaluations of alternative prostheses. This will almost certainly require detailed survey 
research, particularly on the nature of the surgeon-supplier relationship and the procurement 
procedures taking place at the hospital level.  
I have been fortunate to secure an Arthritis Research UK post-doctorate Foundation Fellowship 
which funds three years further study, and this will provide me with the opportunity to pursue 
some of these areas in more detail.
 
  
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Appendices  
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Appendix 1, Cup and Stem mix for prostheses implanted in 2008/9 [9] 
This table reports the combinations of brands of cups and stems most commonly used in England 
and Wales in 2008/9. This provides the evidence for the statement made in 2.2.3 that most cup 
and stem combinations are from the same manufacturer: with the exception of 5 out of the 26 
combinations listed. The most common cup and stem combination by almost 4,000 procedures is 
the Pinnacle cementless cup with the Corail cementless stem, both manufactured by Depuy. 
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Cup Manufacturer 
Cup 
Stem Manufacturer 
Stem 
No. procedures 
(%) 
Mix and match 
Pinnacle Depuy Corail Depuy 10,429 (18) No 
Contemporary Stryker Exeter V40 Stryker 6,985 (12) No 
Trident Stryker Exeter V40 Stryker 4,225 (7) No 
Trident Stryker Accolade Stryker 2,875 (5) No 
CSF Plus JRI Furlong HAC JRI 2,400 (4) No 
Elite Plus Ogee Depuy Exeter V40 Stryker 1,941 (3) Yes 
Exeter Duration Stryker Exeter V40 Stryker 1,482 (3) No 
Exceed Biomet Taperloc 
cementless 
Biomet 1,300 (2) No 
Trilogy Zimmer Exeter V40 Stryker 1,293 (2) Yes 
Trilogy Zimmer CPT Zimmer 1,135 (2) No 
CSF JRI Furlong HAC JRI 1,038 (2) No 
ZCA Zimmer CPT Zimmer 869 (2) No 
EPF Plus Smith & Nephew SL Plus Smith & Nephew 805 (1) No 
Elite Plus 
cemented cup 
Depuy Exeter V40 Stryker 765 (1) Yes 
Charnley Depuy Charnley Depuy 689 (1) No 
Charnley Ogee Depuy Charnley Depuy 676 (1) No 
Trilogy Zimmer Corail Depuy 496 (1) Yes 
Duraloc 
cementless cup 
Depuy Corail Depuy 493 (1) No 
Stanmore 
Arcom 
Biomet Stanmore 
Modular 
Biomet 442 (1) No 
Elite Plus 
cemented cup 
Depuy Corail Depuy 399 (1) No 
Procotyl Wright Medical 
UK Ltd 
Profemur 
cementless 
Wright Medical 
UK Ltd 
387 (1) No 
Allofit Zimmer CLS cementless Zimmer 370 (1) No 
Low Profile 
Muller 
Zimmer MS-30 Zimmer 340 (1) No 
Marathon Depuy Corail Depuy 334 (1) No 
Pinnacle Depuy Exeter V40 Stryker 331 (1) Yes 
Reflection Smith & Nephew Synergy Smith & Nephew 295 (1) No 
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Appendix 2, The NJR data  
This Appendix describes the process of accessing, merging and cleaning the NJR (and HES) 
data-sets used in this thesis. 
Northgate Solutions manages the NJR and HES data-sets on behalf of the Department of Health 
(DoH). The process of accessing NJR and HES data for the purpose of this thesis has been 
extensive and involved communications with both Northgate Solutions and the DoH in order to 
satisfy data security concerns. This was the first data request Northgate and the NJR had received 
and as such, was a 'learning process'. The much publicised 'loss' of public data from government 
departments means that obtaining information particularly from HES has become a complex and 
prolonged process. The full process of securing data access involved completion of the 
following: NJR data request form; provision of a research protocol; completion of a HES 
tabulation pack; securing DoH, SCAG (Security and Confidentiality Advisory Group) approval, 
local Research Governance Committee approval and NRES (ethics approval). The process was 
initiated in early 2008 and resulted in full data being received by May 2009. 
Data was requested on all patients under-going a cemented or cementless primary total hip 
replacement. Patients undergoing any knee surgery, hip resurfacing and hip revision surgery 
were excluded from the analysis.  
Six NJR files were received in text file format: 
• Hips - containing 356,340 observations (Variables including reasons for primary and 
revision surgery). 
• Knees - containing 356,226 observations (Variables including reasons for primary and 
revision surgery). 
• Hip articulation - containing 329,527 observations (Variables including type of cup, head 
and head size of the prostheses). 
• Operations - containing 712,566 observations (Variables include patient characteristics; 
anaesthesia used, surgical unit number, funding and patient death date). 
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• Components - containing 3771,172 observations (Variables include patient and procedure 
identifiers. Prosthesis brand, manufacturer, description, codes and batch numbers). 
• Linked primaries - containing 9268 observations, this file provides the patient identifiers 
to link primary procedures and revision procedures for each patient record. 
All files were linkable by a unique patient identifier set up by Northgate Solutions.  
Of the six NJR data-sets: Knees, Hip articulation, Hips and Linked primaries were not used for 
the purpose of this thesis. Table 1 lists the variables included in the raw NJR spreadsheets 
provided. 
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Hip Hip articulation Component Operations 
Data base NJR Index No Data base Database 
NJR Index No Procedure ID NJR Index No NJR Index No 
Procedure ID Cup  Procedure ID Procedure ID 
Previous Procedure head Component ID funding 
Osteoarthritis headsize Implant Category ID waiting list initative 
ankylosing spondylitis   Implant Batch No tertiary referral 
avascular necrosis   Manufacturer ID validate overide 
congenital dislocation dysplasia of 
hip   Brand ID created by 
failed hemiarthroplasty   Brand completed user 
failed internal fixation   Details lead surgeon id 
fractured acetabulum   Cat No consultant id 
fractured neck of femur   Manufacturer general anaesthesia used 
other hip trauma   Category Code epidural anaesthsia used 
other inflammatory arthropathy   Category nerve block anaesthesia used 
perthes   
Implant Category 
Group ID spinal anaesthesia used 
previous arthrodesis   
Implant Category 
Group sedation used 
infection   Component Type ID asa grade 
psoriatic arthropathy   Implant Type consent 
seropositive rheumatoid arthritis   Implant Type Group nhs number 
slipped upper femoral epiphysis     nhs number traced 
Indication other     nnn 
Other indication specific     nnnid 
primary procedure type detailed     sex 
patient position     weight 
incision approach     height 
Trochanteric osteotomy     bmi 
complex osteotomy     age at operation date 
minimally invasive surgery used     patient hospital identifier 
incision length     patient death date 
image guided surgery used     joint 
femoral pulsatile powered lavage 
used     revision reoperation date 
acetabular pulsatile powered lavage 
used     patient procedure 
femoral bone graft used     opcs4 
acetabular bone graft used     bilateral indicator 
femoral prosthesis cemented     side 
gun used     technique1 
cement used retrograde     technique2 
proximal seal used with gun     technique3 
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femoral cement mixed     technique4 
acetabular prosthesis cemented     technique5 
pressuriser used     laminar low theatre 
acetabular cement mixed     surgical unit id 
aspirin     completed date 
chloroquinine     operation date 
low dose heparin     created date 
low mol wt heparin     patient physical ID 
pentasaccharide     patient proced ID 
warfarin       
other chemical       
other chemical specify       
foot pump       
intermittent calf compression       
TED stockings       
other mechanical       
other mechanical specify       
No thromboprophylaxis selected       
no uie specified       
calcar crack       
pelvic penetration       
shaft fracture       
shaft penetration       
trochanteric fracture       
other ui event       
other ui event specify       
aseptic loosening stem       
aseptic loosening socket       
implant fracture stem        
implant fracture socket       
implant fracture head       
incorrect sizing head socket 
mismatch socket       
incorrect sizing head socket 
mismatch head       
lysis stem       
lysis socket       
malalignment stem       
malalignment socket       
periprosthetic fracture stem       
periprosthetic fracture socket       
dislocation subluxation       
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revision infection       
revision pain       
wear of acetabular component       
dissociation of liner       
other indication for revision       
other indication for revision specify       
cemented stem removed       
stem cement removed       
cemented cup removed       
cup cement removed       
uncemented stem removed       
uncemented cup removed       
uncemented cup liner only removed       
femoral head removed       
wound exploration       
open reduction of dislocation       
excision heterotopic bone       
socket augmentation       
orif trochanter       
orif femur       
focal bone graft only femur       
focal bone graft only acetabulum       
other reoperation       
other reoperation specified       
Insert Date       
Ind For Imp MDS3 Previous 
Infection       
Ind For Imp Trauma Acute Neck 
Femur       
Ind For Imp Trauma Chronic       
Ind For Imp Previous Hip Surgery       
MDS3 Bone graft Used Femur YN       
MDS3 Bone graft Used Acetabulum 
YN       
MDS3 Femoral Stem Removed YN       
MDS3 Femoral Stem Removed 
Brand       
MDS3 Acetabular Cup Removed YN       
MDS3 Acetabular Cup Removed 
Brand       
Procedure Type ID       
Table 1: Variables included in raw NJR spread sheets 
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One HES data file was received, containing 398,914 observations on all hip and knee 
replacement operations carried out between the 1st April, 2003 and 31st March, 2008. Table 3 
lists the variables provided by HES. 
HES 
linkmethod1 
linkmethod2 
linkmethod3 
linkmethod4 
linkmethod5 
linkmethod6 
linkmethod7 
hes year 
epikey 
nhs number 
pseudo hes id 
discharge date 
elected date 
epiend 
epistart 
admission date 
admission category 
admin category 
epiorder 
epistat 
epitype 
main speciality 
operation status 
spell begin 
spell end 
treatment speciality 
v code indicator 
ward at start episode 
current ward 
local authority district 1998 
pcg code 
pcg original 
pct code 
pct nhs 
pct historic 
post dischare destination 
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county of residence 
resdhsc 
government office of residence 
sha of residence 
local authrority of residence 
pct of residence 
regional office of residence 
sha of residence historic 
rural urban indicator 
lower super output area 
middle super output area 
ward in 91 
ward in 98 
hrg late 
hrg late35 
hrg nhs 
hrg nhs generated code 
hrg original 
hrg original 35 
end age 
ethnic code binary 
ethnic code 
marital status 
sex 
start age 
dhsc treatment 
government office of treatment 
ha of treatment 
pct treat 
procode 
procode3 
procodet 
provider type 
regional office of treatment 
site of treatment 
sha of treatment 
purchase code 
purd hsc 
commissioners regional office 
commissioners regional sha 
commissioner cod 
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referral orginal 
admission method 
source of admission 
admission status 
carer support indicator 
category 
patient classification 
detention category 
discharge destination 
discharge method 
first regular day or night admission 
intended management 
legal group of patient 
legal category 
bed year 
commissioning serial number 
elective duration 
waiting time 
post operative duration 
poast natal stay 
pre-operative duration 
provider spell number 
spell duration 
cause code 3 
cause code 4 
diagnosis 1 
diagnosis 2 
diagnosis 3 
diagnosis 4 
diagnosis 5 
diagnosis 6 
diagnosis 7 
diagnosis 8 
diagnosis 9 
diagnosis 10 
diagnosis 11 
diagnosis 12 
diagnosis 13 
diagnosis 14 
operation date 1 
operation 1 
(!

operation date 2 
operation 2 
operation date 3 
operation 3 
operation date 4 
operation 4 
operation date 5 
operation 5 
operation date 6 
operation 6 
operation date 7 
operation 7 
operation date 8 
operation 8 
operation date 9 
operation 9 
operation date 10 
operation 10 
operation date 11 
operation 11 
operation date  12 
operation 12 
Table 2, variables provided in raw HES data 
 
All data-sets were imported into STATA, version 11. 
These data were used to construct the two data-sets used in chapter 7 as follows: 
Data-set 1: Individual patient level data (Primary THR using NJR and HES linked data-sets. 
The 'components' file contains multiple observations for each individual patient episode – for one 
episode (surgery) a patient will receive a cup and a stem prosthesis along with some form of 
fixation (i.e. cement). A unique patient identifier was created by joining together the NJR index 
number and the procedure id to give an overall procedure id for each patient. This was then used 
to reshape the data from long to wide so that for each patient procedure (surgery) the brand and 
manufacturer of the prosthesis were variables presented alongside patient identifiers.  
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The same process was used for the remaining NJR data-sets, to establish a unique patient 
identifier for each episode. The data-sets were then merged together using the unique patient 
identifier. 
The HES data-set was cleaned for any duplicate patient episodes, using the NJR index number 
(in HES), epi-start (episode start date), epiorder (episode order) and epi-end (episode end). If 
there was an exact match on these variables, it was established as a duplicate episode and 
dropped from the data-set. This resulted in 2292 of the 398,913 observations being dropped.  
Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the merging process. 
Figure 1, Flow chart showing linkage of NJR procedures with HES records - hips[25] 
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The cleaning and merging process resulted in a final NJR and HES linked data-set of 145,870 
patient observations. Table 3 reports the final data-set dimensions. This process involved 
dropping a large number of the 356,340 individual patient level observations provided from the 
NJR. A large proportion of observations were 'unmatchable' in the merging of HES and NJR. 
While the total number of HES observations was 398,914, only approximately half of these 
observations are hip procedures and it is only these observations which were merged with the 
356,340 NJR patient level observations. NJR patient level observations were also dropped for 
those patients treated in Wales and those funded by the IS because HES only contains data on 
patients treated in England and funded by the NHS.  
As a point of comparison, Sibanda et al were able to successfully link 167,076 of a possible 
327,557 primary hip and knee procedures for 2003 to 2006 and of these, 76,576 were primary 
hip replacements i.e. 23.3% of the 327,557. I was able to link 36% of primary hip procedures out 
of the possible 398,914 patient observations provided by HES. 
Observations 145,870 
Variables 263 
Years 4/2003 - 12/2008 
Table 3 - Data dimensions - data-set 1 (NJR & HES data) 
Given the loss of such a sizeable proportion of the NJR observations in this process, I decided to 
also construct a further data-set excluding the HES data-set, but using some of the hospital 
information from the HES data. This is data-set 2. 
 
 
Data-set 2: Hospital panel data 
The NJR cleaned data-sets 'operations' and reshaped 'components' were merged as in the process 
described in data-set 1 above. This resulted in a data-set size of 350,238 hip patient level 
observations. As shown in Figure 2, some of these had to be dropped, resulting in a data-set of 
278,050 individual patient level observations shown in table 4. 
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Figure 2: NJR individual patient level data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 278,063 
Variables 501 
Years 4/2003 - 12/2008 
Table 4 - Data dimensions - NJR  individual patient level data 
From these NJR individual patient level data, I constructed a hospital level panel for each year 
2003 to 2008. The hospital year is the unit of observation. To do this, the ‘collapse’ command in 
STATA was used to generate ‘mean per hospital year’ variables from the individual patient level 
observation variables e.g. mean number of Exeter V40 prostheses implanted in hospital x in 
2003. This resulted in a total of 2281 hospital year observations, accounting for the 278,063 
patients.  
The NJR does not collect data on hospital characteristics (required for the analysis in chapter 7). 
However, for this purpose, the linking stage provided a very useful source. The HES data 
includes hospital characteristics such as: PCT of treatment, provider type and so on. 
Consequently, in the previous matching stage, I had been able to attach characteristics to most of 
the hospital identities in the NJR data. In this way, I was able to attach to each NJR patient 
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observation, the characteristics of the hospital the patient was treated in, so long as any patient in 
that hospital could be matched in the linking stage. 
Hospital, year and an identification number were extracted from the hospital panel data-set and 
transferred to excel for ease of adding in hospital characteristic variables (bearing in mind that 
this process involves matching variables from an individual patient level panel to a hospital level 
panel).  
 
The following algorithm was employed: 
1. Compile a list of all hospital in the hospital panel data-set 
2. Identify these hospitals from the hospital panel data-set (in STATA) 
3. Extract hospital characteristics for each of the hospitals in the hospital panel data-set61 from data-
set 1: PCT of hospital, and hospital type (NHS trust, Foundation trust, Independent sector and so 
on). 
4. Generate a new variable in excel for PCT and hospital type alongside the hospital identifier. 
5. Import the hospital year variable into excel and reformat so that data is available for each 
hospital where reported 
6. Convert data-set 3 from Excel into a STATA file. 
7. Merge the existing hospital panel data-set with the new data added from excel. 
 
The merger process resulted in an exact match for 1948 hospital year observations (covering 
258,069 of the 278,063 patients). Of these 333 hospital-year observations (19373 patients) were 
not successfully matched for the following reasons: i. Hospitals in the NJR data-set could not be 
successfully identified in the NJR and HES matching process, ii. Data were not available for a 
small number of patient characteristics (age and gender). As explained earlier, these lost 
observations will include patients treated in Wales (HES only contains data on England) and 
those treated and funded by the independent sector (HES does contain data on patients treated in 
the independent sector, but only if they are funded by the NHS). Finally, in order to bring the 
panel closer to balance, a small number of observations were excluded based on a two stage 
algorithm.  This screening identified 53 hospital year observations (accounting for only 334 
patients) which were subsequently omitted. The resulting panel is 374 hospitals, for 265 of which 
 
61
 This is not the full 2071 hospital year observations, but for each hospital 
.

have a full set of observations in each of the 6 years, with an average of 5.5 year observations for 
each hospital. Table 5 provides an overview of the data dimensions both before and after the 
exclusion process. 
Figure 3 Hospital panel (data-set 3) 
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  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Before Exclusions 
No. Hospitals 308 352 351 358 353 349 
No. Patients 22072 41571 46108 46285 51186 51181 
After Exclusions 
No. Hospitals 306 341 341 350 344 336 
No. Patients 22061 41512 46042 46214 51152 51088 
Table 5 - Exclusions from data-set 3 (NJR data) 
 
Limitations of the data-sets: 
As discussed earlier in this section, this is the first data release that Northgate has produced on 
behalf of the NJR linked to HES. Consequently the process of cleaning and linking was no doubt 
more time consuming than is the case to date. The NJR data required considerable cleaning for 
errors such as age anomalies. It also required coding, de-stringing and generating new variables 
and re-shaping of data-sets. The HES data-set also required considerable cleaning.  
I have attempted to be as rigouress and transparent about the cleaning and merging process in 
order to make the process replicable. In order to avoid errors in the data, I have exercised caution 
with regards to dubious variables, choosing to drop them from the data-set. I have also checked 
descriptives on each data-set with those reported in the NJR Annual reports as a ‘check’ on the 
data validity. Inevitably, there may have been some errors in the cleaning and linking/merging 
process.  
  
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Appendix 3, Search strategy for OVID Medline (updated search: May 2010) used in 
literature review (chapter 4) 
Search criteria Results 
total hip replacement.mp. 5164 
*Arthroplasty, Replacement, Hip/ 9477 
total hip arthroplasty.mp. 7298 
(hip adj prosthes$).tw. 2776 
or/1-4 18040 
cost$.mp. 325088 
resource use$.mp. 3066 
*Cost-Benefit Analysis/ 3539 
*"Costs and Cost Analysis"/ 4832 
*Economics/ 9922 
*Models, Economics/ 0 
economic evaluation$.mp. 4375 
*Economics, Medical/ 4996 
or/6-13 339390 
5 and 14 745 

 
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
Appendix 4, Example data extraction form (based on Drummond et al checklist [84] for 
economic evaluations) used in literature review (chapter 4) 
Item (Marinelli et al[121]) Yes No N/C N/A Extract/ comments 
Study design.           
1 The research question 
is stated. 
 
    “To establish a framework in which to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
cementless and cemented implants and 
to analyse how device cost and 
revision affect the model” 
2 The economic 
importance of the 
research question is 
stated. 
 
    “Randomised controlled trials are the 
gold standard for demonstrating the 
clinical benefits of new technologies. 
However, detecting small differences 
in failure rates among implants 
requires randomizing large numbers of 
patients and following them for 
extended periods (15-20 years, or 
longer). These studies are difficult to 
perform due to practical considerations 
of time and cost. In contrast, decision-
analysis techniques offer the potential 
to analyse the performance of a new 
technology prior to the availability of 
long-term clinical outcome data. 
Furthermore, the results from a well-
designed decision analysis study can 
guide further clinical and laboratory 
research based on the variables that the 
have the greatest influence on cost-
effectiveness. Finally, a cost 
effectiveness framework can also be 
readily updated as new information on 
cost and clinical effectiveness emerges 
from randomised trials and cohort 
studies.” 
3 The viewpoint(s) of the 
analysis are clearly 
stated and justified. 
 
    “The costs of cementless and cemented 
THA were estimated from a payer 
perspective using average hospital 
costs for prosthetic implants in 2006 
Euro’s” 
4 The rationale for 
choosing alternative 
programmes or 
interventions compared 
is stated. 
 
    Cemented and cementless implants – 
this reflects current standard practice. 
5 The alternatives being 
compared are clearly 
described. 
  
 
  “Several different devices (..) are 
regularly implanted at our 
Orthopaedics Department. “ 
.
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Appendix 4 
 
The form of economic 
evaluation used is 
stated. 
 
 
 
     
The authors classify the study as cost-
effectiveness analysis. Using the 
Drummond checklist, it could be 
described as a cost-utility analysis. 
7 The choice of form of 
economic evaluation is 
justified in relation to 
the questions 
addressed. 
  
 
  “A Markov decision model was used 
to analyse a theoretical cohort of 70-
year patients….” 
Data collection.           
8 The source(s) of 
effectiveness estimates 
used are stated. 
 
    Data on prosthesis revision rates is 
taken from a prosthesis register (RIPO 
register). Age-specific probability of 
death was determined from 2001 
United States Life Tables. Published 
sources were used for other clinical 
estimates such as peri-operative death 
and utilities in the model were based 
on index scored reported in the 
literature. Methods used to derive the 
estimates were not explicit. 
9 Details of the design 
and results of 
effectiveness study are 
given (if based on a 
single study). 
  
 
  Further details on the study 
methodology and greater detail on 
deriving effectiveness sources is 
required. 
10 Details of the methods 
of synthesis or meta-
analysis of estimates 
are given (if based on a 
synthesis of a number 
of effectiveness 
studies). 
  
 
  Further details on the methods of 
synthesis are required. 
11 The primary outcome 
measure(s) for the 
economic evaluation 
are clearly stated. 
 
    Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
discounted at a yearly rate of 3%. 
QALYs were estimated using the 
Markov model. 
12 Methods to value 
benefits are stated. 
 
    Utilities were based on quality well-
being index scores reported in the 
literature. 
13 Details of the subjects 
from whom valuations 
were obtained were 
given. 
  
 
  Information on utility scores provided 
but not on subject details other than 
age. 
14 Productivity changes (if 
included) are reported 
separately. 
 
 
   Not discussed 
15 The relevance of 
productivity changes to 
the study question is 
discussed. 
 
 
  The authors acknowledge that lack of 
inclusion of all societal costs is a 
limitation of the study. 
.!
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Quantities of resource 
use are reported 
separately from their 
unit costs. 
   
 
 
   
 
Resource use not reported in detail or 
source 
17 Methods for the 
estimation of quantities 
and unit costs are 
described. 
  
 
  Yes, but only prosthesis cost. Costs 
were not broken down. 
18 Currency and price data 
are recorded. 
 
    Euro 2006 
19 Details of currency of 
price adjustments for 
inflation or currency 
conversion are given. 
   
 n.a 
20 Details of any model 
used are given. 
 
   Markov model was used. The model 
structure was provided in a figure. 
21 The choice of model 
used and the key 
parameters on which it 
is based are justified. 
 
   Appropriate choice of model for this 
setting. 
Analysis and interpretation of 
results 
          
22 Time horizon of costs 
and benefits is stated. 
  
 
  Not made explicit, although it appears 
to be 5 years. 
23 The discount rate(s) is 
stated. 
 
   3% applied to costs and outcomes. 
24 The choice of discount 
rate(s) is justified. 
 
   Reference for choice provided. 
25 An explanation is given 
if costs and benefits are 
not discounted. 
 
 
  n.a 
26 Details of statistical 
tests and confidence 
intervals are given for 
stochastic data. 
  
 
 The model is reportedly probabilistic, 
although details of this in the 
methodology and results are not 
provided. 
27 The approach to 
sensitivity analysis is 
given. 
  
 
 A sensitivity analysis was performed 
on revision rates, prosthesis costs, 
preoperative mortality, infection rates 
and utility values. Details of the 
sensitivity analysis is not fully reported 
and thus not fully justified. 
28 The choice of variables 
for sensitivity analysis 
is justified. 
  
 
 See no. 27 
29 The ranges over which 
the variables are varied 
are justified. 
  
 
 See no.27 
30 Relevant alternatives 
are compared. 
 
   See sections 4 & 5 
.2
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Incremental analysis is 
reported. 
 
 
 
    
 
Yes 
32 Major outcomes are 
presented in a 
disaggregated as well 
as aggregated form. 
 
 
   Outcomes are only reported in 
aggregated form. 
33 The answer to the study 
question is given. 
 
    The authors conclude that the risk of 
revision is similar between cemented 
and cementless prosthesis groups, in 
terms of QALYs and the cost-
difference as non-significant. 
34 Conclusions follow 
from the data reported. 
  
 
  Conclusions follow. However, the 
conclusions are hard to follow due to 
the limited reporting of methodology, 
sources and presentation of results. 
35 Conclusions are 
accompanied by the 
appropriate caveats. 
  
 
  
Further clarity could be provided. 


 
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Appendix 5, Summary of included studies in chapter 4 (based on the Drummond checklist for economic evaluation 
studies[84]) 
Study Country Study 
Design 
Interventions Time 
horizon 
Perspective Currency & 
price year 
Outcome 
measure 
Modelling Sponsor Source of cost & 
resource use data 
Source of 
effectiveness 
data 
Baxter 
(99) 
UK CEA charnley v 
alternative 
20 years health care 
system 
UK £ 1994 survival 
rate for 
prosthesi
s 
Deterministic 
model: differential 
life expectancies 
between prostheses 
NHS R &D 
HTA 
Programme 
Primary study – 2 
UK hospitals 
Revision rates – 
published 
sources 
Board
man 
(97) 
USA cost 
analysis 
hybrid v 
cementless 
- health care 
system 
US $ 1988 comparis
on of 
hospital 
costs and 
reimburs
ement 
- - Local hospital data 
(billing sheets),  
Hospital medical 
centre-patient 
records 
- 
Briggs 
(04) 
UK/  
Sweden 
CUA charnley v 
spectron 
60 years health care 
system 
UK £ 2000/1 QALY/I
CER 
probabilistic 
decision model 
Part funded 
by Smith & 
Nephew 
NHS reference costs  Revision rates - 
Swedish hip 
register  & 
QALYS - EQ-
5D† from local 
study 
Daellen
bach 
(90) 
New 
Zealand 
CEA cemented v 
cementless 
Lifetime 
horizon 
health care 
system 
NZ $ 1985 survival 
rate for 
prosthesi
s 
deterministic  
model: differential 
life expectancies 
between prostheses 
- Costing records Life-tables & 
Revision rates - 
published 
sources 
Faulkn
er (98) 
UK Critical 
review, 
CEA 
cemented, 
cementless & 
hybrid 
20 years health care 
system 
UK £ survival 
rate for 
prosthesi
s 
deterministic  
model: differential 
life expectancies 
between prostheses  
NHS R &D 
HTA 
programme 
Primary study – 2  
UK hospitals 
Mortality data –
ONS‡  England 
and Wales & 
Revision rates - 
published 
sources 
Fitzpat
rick 
(98) 
UK Systematic 
Review, 
CUA 
charnley v 
new 
prosthesis 
60 years health care 
system 
UK £ QALY/I
CER 
probabilistic 
decision model 
NHS R &D 
HTA 
Programme 
Primary data – local 
study & published 
sources 
QALY estimates 
and revision 
rates – published 
sources 
Gillespi
e (95) 
Sweden/  
Australia 
CEA hypothetical: 
standard v 
new 
prosthesis 
20 years health care 
system 
US $ survival 
rate for 
prosthesi
s 
deterministic  
model: differential 
life expectancies 
between prostheses  
- Local Health 
records, Australian 
bureau of statistics 
& published sources 
Revision rates – 
primary review 
study 
Givon(
98) 
Israel CUA Cemented//hy
brid and 
cementless 
with and 
without HA 
coating 
9 years Health care 
system 
US $ 1994 Cost/QA
LY 
- - DRG used for 
estimating costs & 
single study 
Single study – 
secondary care 
Marine Italy CEA cemented v  5 years health care  Euro 2006 QALY/ Probabilistic  - Local clinical  Mortality rates – 
.(
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-lli (08) 
 
 
 
cementless 
 
 
 
system 
 
 
 
ICER 
 
 
 
decision model 
 
 
 
database 
life table, 
Revision rates  - 
local register & 
Utilities - 
published 
sources 
Metz 
(98) 
Internatio
nal/USA 
cost 
analysis 
cemented v 
cementless 
- health care 
system 
US $ 1996 total cost 
of 
interventi
on 
- - Survey data from 
surgeons 
- 
Murra
y (95) 
UK cost 
analysis 
cemented v 
cementless 
- health care 
system 
UK £ 1994 price of 
prosthesi
s 
- Biomet Ltd Survey of prosthesis 
manufacturers 
Revision rates 
from published 
sources 
Pingsm
ann 
(98) 
Germany cost 
analysis 
cemented v 
cementless 
- health care 
system 
DM total cost 
of  
interventi
on 
- - Patient records  - 
Pynsen
t(96) 
UK Critical 
review, 
CEA 
cemented, 
cementless & 
hybrid 
20 years? health care 
system 
UK £ survival 
rate for 
prosthesi
s 
deterministic  
model: differential 
life expectancies 
between prostheses  
- - ONS mortality 
data & revision 
rates, published 
sources 
Scheerl
ink (04) 
Belgium cost 
analysis 
Dacup, 
CPT/Duraloc, 
Vectra/ZCA 
& Others 
- health care 
system 
Euro 2001/2 total 
hospital 
cost 
- - Local study – 
discharge summary 
HR-QoL 
questionnaires 
pre and post-
operative 
Spiegel
halter(
03) 
UK CUA charnley v 
alternative 
60 years health care 
system 
UK £ QALY/I
CER 
probabilistic 
decision model 
MRC grant Published sources Revision rates – 
Swedish hip 
register, 
Mortality rates - 
UK & QALYs - 
published 
sources 
Yates 
(06) 
UK cost 
analysis 
cemented v 
cementless 
- health care 
system 
UK £ 2003/4 total cost 
of 
prosthesi
s 
- - Prosthesis prices - 
manufacturers 
- 
Unnan
untana 
(09) 
USA Cost 
analysis 
Cemented/ce
mentless/hybr
id 
- Health care 
system 
US $ 2008 Mean 
cost 
femoral 
stem 
- - 3 academic medical 
centres 
- 
†, EQ-5D is a standardised instrument for use as a measure of health outcome 
‡  ONS – UK Office for National Statistics
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Appendix 6, The outcomes for risk of bias in the studies reviewed in chapter 4 
 
Item Baxter 
(99) 
Boardma
n (97) 
Briggs 
(04) 
Daellenb
ach (90) 
Faulkner 
(98) 
Fitzpatri
ck (98) 
Gillespie 
(95) 
Givon 
(98) 
Marinelli 
(08) 
Metz 
(98) 
Murray 
(95) 
Pingsma
nn (98) 
Pynsent 
(96) 
Scheerlin
k (04) 
Spiegelh
alter (03) 
Unnanun
tana (09)
Assigned to treatment 
adequately concealed prior to 
allocation? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Outcomes of participants who 
withdrew described and 
included in analysis? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Outcome assessors blinded to 
treatment status? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Treatment and control 
compatible at entry? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Participants blind to 
assignment status after 
allocation? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Treatment providers blind to 
assignment status? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Were care programmes other 
than trial options, identical? 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Inclusion and Exclusion 
criteria clearly defined? 
0 2 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Interventions clearly defined? 2 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Outcome measures used 
clearly defined? 
2 1 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 
Diagnostic tests used in 
outcome assessment clinically 
useful? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Surveillance active, and of 
clinically appropriate 
duration? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Key: 0 = not defined; 1 = adequate; 2 = clearly defined
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Appendix 7, The Swedish data-set  
Chapter 5 uses data from SHAR to explore potential difficulties of extrapolating survival curves 
(survival of prostheses) over a lifetime horizon. The chapter uses a previous well-known 
study[18] as an example, and extends the original data-set to include an additional 8 years more 
data in order to assess the accuracy of predictions made in 2000 in the light of a longer time 
series. 
The data for the original study was obtained from SHAR on all patients who received either a 
Charnley or a Spectron hip prosthesis in the period 1992-2000, where both the cup and stem 
were from the same manufacturer. For the Spectron, this included all patients receiving an All-
Poly Cup and a Spectron EF, or EF primary stem. Table 1 provides an overview of the original 
data-set dimensions. 
Data dimensions 
Total sample size 20,495 
Patients receiving a Charnley 18,505 
Patients receiving a Spectron 1,990 
Mean follow up 4 years, 3 months 
Maximum follow up 8 years 
Patient years at risk 90000 
Failures 574 
Table 1 - Data dimensions - Original data from SHAR[18] 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, SHAR was approached for access to an updated form of the data-
set, including information on the variables listed in Table 2 for the period 1992 to present. 
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Swedish Label English translation 
Essential 
GENDER 2 Gender 
OPPDAT 3 Date of operation primary procedure 
DIAGNOSE 4 Diagnosis 
CUP 5 Cup 
STAM 6 Stem 
OPPAR 35 Date of operation primary procedure 
DIAGRP 39 Diagnosis group 
AGE  43 Age 
AGEGRP 44 Age group 
OPRDAT 45 Date of reoperation 
ORSGP 46 Cause of revision by group 
REVTIME 48 Time with primary prosthesis 
OPRAR 49 Date of reoperation 
R 51 Revision indicator 
Also if possible 
KLINGRP 36 Clinic group 
CUPGRP 37 Cup type group 
STAMGRP 38 Stem type group 
TLVPCUP 40 Manufacturer cup 
TLVPSTAM 41 Manufacturer cup 
PROTGRP 42 Prosthesis group 
ATGGRP 47  
Table 2 - Data requested from Swedish Hip Arthroplasty Register 
The new data-set contains 16 years of data, an additional 8 years from the original data-set. In 
order to identify the patients in the original data-set (1992-1999), so that they could be followed 
up in the subsequent 8 years, all patients undergoing primary surgery post-1999 were excluded 
from the data-set (discussed in chapter 5). Neither the original nor the updated data-set was 
available with patient identifiers, meaning that data was matched observation by observation in 
Excel following the steps outlined below: 
1. Both data-sets were split into two separate spreadsheets on the basis of whether patients 
received a Charnley or Spectron prosthesis.  

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2. They were then further split into yearly spreadsheets 
3. Observations were matched ‘observation by observation’ employing the following algorithm: 
i. Match on patient age (allowing for 1 year either side) 
ii. Exact match on operation date 
iii. Exact match on revision date 
iv. Count on observations on matched and unmatched observations in both data-sets 
v. Exclude all unmatched observations from both data-sets. 
vi. Add new variables into old data-set, including ‘revision’ and ‘time until revision surgery’. 
98.3% of all the patients in the original data-set were identified in the new data-set. The 
remaining 1.7% (n=350) non-matched observations were due to occasional minor coding 
discrepancies. In all such cases, caution was exercised by omitting these patients. Table 3 reports 
the sample size, patient characteristics and number of revisions in the original and new 
‘matched’ datasets. The descriptive statistics show that the two samples are virtually identical in 
terms of patient characteristics, age and gender. 
Despite the rigorous methods employed in matching patients in the two data-sets, there were 
clearly some unmatched patients, which reduces the sample available for the analysis described 
in chapter 5. Ideally patient identifiers or some identification number would have been present in 
both data-sets to enable comprehensive matching. However, as table 3 shows, the two data-sets 
are very close in dimensions. 
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 Original data-set New ‘matched’ data-set 
  Charnley Spectron Charnley Spectron 
Patients 18,505 1990 18,178 1967 
Mean age (sd) 72 (9.2) 74 (8.1) 71 (9.2) 74 (8.1) 
Age distribution (%)     
<40 years 70 (0.4) 5 (0.3) 66 (0.4) 5 (0.3) 
40-50 years 264 (1.4) 16 (0.8) 251 (1.4) 15 (0.8) 
50-60 years 1418 (7.7) 60 (3.0) 1,389 (7.7) 60 (3.0) 
60-70 years 4836 (26.1) 391 (19.7) 4,753 (26.1) 385 (19.6) 
70-80 years 8090 (43.7) 1014 (51.0) 7,945 (43.7) 1,000 (51.0) 
80-90 years  3630 (19.6) 481 (24.2) 3,581 (19.6) 479 (24.3) 
>90 years 197 (1.1) 23 (1.2) 193 (1.1) 23 (1.2) 
Gender (%)     
Female 12337 (66.7) 1472 (74.0) 12,108 (66.7) 1,453 (73.9) 
Male 6168 (33.3) 518 (26.0) 6,070 (33.3) 514 (26.1) 
Initial diagnosis (%)     
Osteoarthritis 12970 (70.1) 1348 (67.7) 12,826 (79.5) 1329 (69.8) 
Fracture 1692 (9.1) 319 (16.0) 1,662 (10.3) 317 (16.6) 
Other 3843 (20.8) 323 (16.2) 1,628 (10.1) 258 (13.5) 
Revisions (%)     
1992-1999 552 (2.98) 22 (1.10) 528 (2.90) 21 (1.07) 
1992-2000 - - 1,255(6.90) 98(4.98) 
Table 3 - Comparison of Samples - Original and  new 'matched' data[18] 
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Appendix 8, Market shares by brand of prostheses (disaggregated) 
Table 1 Share of cemented cup   
Explanatory variables Stryker Depuy other' 
Year (Reference year 2003)  
2004 0.03341 
-0.03981* 0.02511 
2005 0.11116*** 
-0.10066*** 0.01265 
2006 0.12723*** 
-0.13714*** 0.01978 
2007 0.16637*** 
-0.17242*** 0.01649 
2008 0.18927*** 
-0.21004*** 0.02331 
Average Age of Patients 0.00123 0.00206 -0.00259 
Proportion of Female Patients 0.06975 
-0.03697 -0.00996 
Proportion of right sided surgery -0.17337+ 
0.08418 0.09012 
Region (reference East Anglia) 
  South East 0.02315 
-0.14854 0.05275 
  East Midlands -0.12421 0.07592 0.01162 
  North West -0.08078 0.32218*** -0.18575* 
  London -0.10005 
-0.33429*** 0.23740** 
  Yorkshire -0.01889 0.27614** -0.27553** 
  South West -0.09908 0.22966* -0.15835+ 
  South Central 0.16659 0.23339* -0.37506*** 
  West Midlands -0.19307 0.33990*** -0.14774+ 
  North East 0.12483 0.07023 -0.15549** 
Hospital Type (reference FT) 
  Trust 
-0.01771 -0.04584+ 0.07037 
  Independent Sector 0.04468 -0.02422 0.04233 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other 0.07467 -0.05327 -0.05671 
  Independent Treatment Centre 
-0.06092 -0.14919+ 0.10924 
Hospital size 0.03398 0.02758 0.00676 
Hospital size quadratic 
-0.00530+ -0.00247 0.00036 
Constant 
-0.02943 0.16421 0.36701* 
σ u 0.5114*** 0.43483*** 0.37747 
σ e 0.2250*** 0.20355*** 0.20059 
Log Likelihood --669.95 -470.47 -503.94 
Number of observations 1892 1892 1892 
Left censored observations 534 534 566 
Right censored observations 196 196 194 
 legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*  
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Table 2 Share of cemented stem  
Explanatory variables Stryker Depuy other' 
Year (Reference year 2003)  
2004 0.01548 -0.0285 0.01576 
2005 0.07300*** -0.07133*** -0.00497 
2006 0.09798*** -0.12907*** -0.00175 
2007 0.14272*** -0.17747*** -0.01695 
2008 0.16968*** -0.23342*** -0.0211 
Average Age of Patients 0.00099 0.0024 -0.0001 
Proportion of Female Patients 0.02561 -0.03 -0.01537 
Proportion of right sided surgery 
-0.05192 -0.0277 0.13524+ 
Region (reference East Anglia) 
  South East 0.01524 -0.0798 0.02968 
  East Midlands 
-0.11117 0.1546 -0.12382 
  North West 0.00642 0.33032*** -0.30885*** 
  London 
-0.09712 -0.20771* 0.13065+ 
  Yorkshire 
-0.07406 0.35787*** -0.29638*** 
  South West 0.39425*** -0.1797+ -0.23806** 
  South Central 0.45293*** -0.1303 -0.38322*** 
  West Midlands 0.17278 0.20088* -0.31390*** 
  North East 0.08677 0.1233 -0.14185 
Hospital Type (reference FT) 
  Trust 
-0.05045* -0.02 0.05794* 
  Independent Sector 
-0.03305 0.0314 0.0654 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other 
-0.03155 0.0385 0.02324 
  Independent Treatment Centre 
-0.18990* 0.0033 0.0998 
Hospital size 0.01245 0.0263 0.02001 
Hospital size quadratic 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.00117 
Constant 0.2021 0.0157 0.23491 
σ u 0.44981*** 
.40596*** 0.33620*** 
σ e 0.18870*** 
.19696*** 0.1894*** 
Log Likelihood -405.36 -466.18 -420.04 
Number of observations 1910 1910 1910 
Left censored observations 501 725 558 
Right censored observations 231 96 151 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*  
  
2

 
Table 3 Share of cementless cup 
Explanatory variables Stryker Depuy other' 
Year (reference year 2003) 
2004 0.02824 0.04079 -0.01736 
2005 0.03594 0.07495* -0.04363+ 
2006 0.03705 0.12856*** -0.06870** 
2007 0.02454 0.19422*** -0.09481*** 
2008 
-0.01261 0.25764*** -0.10613*** 
Average Age of Patients 0.00459 -0.01395*** 0.00610* 
Proportion of Female Patients 0.02486 0.06963 -0.02845 
Proportion of right sided surgery 
-0.17157 0.30227* -0.01443 
Region (reference East Anglia) 
  South East 0.27451* 0.0466 -0.09283 
  East Midlands 
-0.14797 0.03918 0.07918 
  North West 0.11633 0.30968** -0.25482** 
  London 0.09725 0.0498 0.03979 
  Yorkshire 0.00154 0.30845* -0.16349+ 
  South West 0.26158* 0.23548 -0.17198+ 
  South Central 0.43405*** -0.15029 -0.11848 
  West Midlands 0.22806+ 0.25080* -0.26137** 
  North East 0.26525+ 0.2171 -0.16739 
Hospital Type (reference FT) 
  Trust 0.05354 -0.07467* 0.02633 
  Independent Sector 0.03249 -0.07994 0.09165 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other 0.10253 -0.12511 -0.00413 
  Independent Treatment Centre 0.0185 -0.02297 0.0498 
Hospital size 0.01387 0.04413+ 0.02098 
Hospital size quadratic 0.00164 -0.00316 -0.00468+ 
Constant 
-0.47509 0.60546* 0.16414 
σ u 0.49435*** 0.51510*** 0.40306*** 
σ e 0.26632*** 0.25744*** 0.22703*** 
Log Likelihood -80.8 -794.67 -604.54 
Number of observations 1850 1850 1850 
Left censored 881 870 346 
Right censored 120 150 351 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*  
 
Table 4 share of Cementless stem 
6

Explanatory variables Stryker Depuy ‘other' 
Year (reference year 2003) 
2004 
-0.08468 0.08082 0.03814 
2005 
-0.06395 0.15407*** -0.0055 
2006 
-0.14397** 0.21862*** -0.00754 
2007 
-0.14595** 0.32844*** -0.06604* 
2008 
-0.18308*** 0.40905*** -0.11145*** 
Average Age of Patients 0.00479 -0.00914 0.00047 
Proportion of Female Patients 
-0.05845 0.10332 0.00526 
Proportion of right sided surgery 
-.43023796* 0.61465*** -0.18843 
Region (reference East Anglia) 
  South East 0.46375** 0.0196 -0.11703 
  East Midlands 0.03643 -0.00491 0.02792 
  North West 0.1111 0.36043** -0.22352* 
  London 0.25936 -0.08144 0.11209 
  Yorkshire 0.02862 0.23966 -0.05428 
  South West 
-0.06541 0.37378** -0.18067+ 
  South Central 0.48807** -0.28344 -0.03751 
  West Midlands 0.35916* 0.18577 -0.23176* 
  North East 0.2835 0.05937 -0.07477 
Hospital Type (reference FT) 
  Trust 0.10739 -0.15899*** 0.06389+ 
  Independent Sector 0.14005 -0.17382 0.11352 
  NHS Treatment Centre & other 0.22013 -0.25214 0.03352 
  Independent Treatment Centre 0.27898+ -0.0911 0.02776 
Hospital size 0.03944 0.06749* -0.00048 
Hospital size quadratic 
-0.00087 -0.0072 -0.00211 
Constant 
-0.66466 0.11062 0.54013+ 
σ u 0.66706*** 0.56284*** 0.43035*** 
σ e 0.32929*** 0.32863*** 0.27889*** 
Log Likelihood 
-743.92 -943.49 -843.01 
Number of observations 1850 1850 1850 
Left censored 881 870 346 
Right censored 120 150 351 
legend: +p<0.10, * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001*  
	 
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